I'm developing a macOS product that generates verifiable audit records of media-asset movement on endpoints, for professional media-production companies. It is not an antivirus or Data Loss Prevention product; it collects operating-system file-system events and converts them into tamper-evident audit evidence and audit reports. Target users need comprehensive endpoint audit trails for compliance with industry security standards, including Motion Picture Association Trusted Partner Network assessments. The product must reliably distinguish these operations: file copy, move, rename, and volume mount and unmount — including on external volumes. I've reviewed existing forum guidance, including Quinn's explanation that FSEvents only signals that "something changed" rather than the exact operation, and that it is designed around Spotlight and Time Machine semantics. In my own testing I've also seen inconsistent flags across cp, Finder copy, and application saves, and frequent kFSEventStreamEventFlagMustScanSubDirs events on external drives even when nothing along the path changed. Questions: Given the above, for an audit product that must reliably distinguish copy vs. move vs. rename, should FSEvents be treated as structurally unsuitable, with the Endpoint Security Framework adopted instead as the primary source? For capturing volume mount and unmount operations, is the Endpoint Security Framework the recommended source, or should this be combined with Disk Arbitration? Are there long-term supported APIs recommended for this type of endpoint audit product, to ensure compatibility with future macOS releases? Any recommended documentation, WWDC sessions, or sample code for this use case would be appreciated. For context, I'm building toward a System Extension using the Endpoint Security Framework and will file the entitlement request separately; this post is to confirm the architectural direction before committing. Thank you.