Endpoint Security

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Develop system extensions that enhance user security using Endpoint Security.

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FSEvents vs Endpoint Security Framework for a macOS file-operation audit product
I'm developing a macOS product that generates verifiable audit records of media-asset movement on endpoints, for professional media-production companies. It is not an antivirus or Data Loss Prevention product; it collects operating-system file-system events and converts them into tamper-evident audit evidence and audit reports. Target users need comprehensive endpoint audit trails for compliance with industry security standards, including Motion Picture Association Trusted Partner Network assessments. The product must reliably distinguish these operations: file copy, move, rename, and volume mount and unmount — including on external volumes. I've reviewed existing forum guidance, including Quinn's explanation that FSEvents only signals that "something changed" rather than the exact operation, and that it is designed around Spotlight and Time Machine semantics. In my own testing I've also seen inconsistent flags across cp, Finder copy, and application saves, and frequent kFSEventStreamEventFlagMustScanSubDirs events on external drives even when nothing along the path changed. Questions: Given the above, for an audit product that must reliably distinguish copy vs. move vs. rename, should FSEvents be treated as structurally unsuitable, with the Endpoint Security Framework adopted instead as the primary source? For capturing volume mount and unmount operations, is the Endpoint Security Framework the recommended source, or should this be combined with Disk Arbitration? Are there long-term supported APIs recommended for this type of endpoint audit product, to ensure compatibility with future macOS releases? Any recommended documentation, WWDC sessions, or sample code for this use case would be appreciated. For context, I'm building toward a System Extension using the Endpoint Security Framework and will file the entitlement request separately; this post is to confirm the architectural direction before committing. Thank you.
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How to identify a user who performed action which is reported by Endpoint Security
Hello, My application monitors ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_CLOSE. If a file is dragged to another location in Finder, the Endpoint Security reports the event ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_CLOSE was performed by '/usr/libexec/xpcproxy'. So, xpcproxy is the process that performed ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_CLOSE. Looks like the dragged file is copied by some XPC service. I have found the audit user id is equal to user who dragged a file. Can audit user id be used to identify a user who triggers copy file action in this case? If no, are there any way to define such info? Thank you in advance!
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ES event thread playing nicely with Swift Concurrency
We're working on an Endpoint Security extension and using Swift 6 with Concurrency. I've heard there are some subtleties to getting the threading right across those two domains and am hoping that someone can help shed light on it. In particular, ES events can be delivered on a high priority thread and I'd like to be sure that any work done in the Concurrency domain retains that priority to minimize latency between event delivery and response.
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Kernel deadlock with Content Filter + VPN on macOS 26
Hi all, I've run into a kernel deadlock issue involving content filter + VPN system/network extension on macOS 26, and would really appreciate any insights. A user reported that their mac is occasionally assigened a 169.254.0.0/16 address and can't reach any website after connecting Wi-Fi. Disabling our content filter restores network connectivity immediately. They're running the following software on the mac: macOS 26 (issue reproduced on 25C56 and 25F71) NEFilterDataProvider-based content filter (our extension) VPN network extension A spindump taken while the system had lost network connectivity shows the content filter's process stuck while delivering an "allow" verdict to the kernel. All subsequent flow decisions for the extensions are blocked behind it, which would explain why new DHCP request can't complete and the interface stays on a self-assigned address. Based on the "last ran" and timestamp in the spindump, the underlying deadlock appears to have occurred while the computer wasn't connected to any Wi-Fi network, so there was no visible symptom at the time. The user only noticed something was wrong once they tried to reconnect and saw the bad IP address; they did not realize the content filter was already stuck. This issue may be identified by searching for keyword "sofreelastref" in the spindump (see comment below). Has anyone else seen a content filter + VPN hang like this on macOS 26? Any guidance or pointers would be greatly appreciated. Thanks in advance! For Developer Technical Support staffs: FB23720745 Shay
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Identifying system OCSP/CRL traffic in Network Extension.
Hi! We're developing a security product that uses both EndpointSecurity.framework to intercept and authorize process and file events; and NetworkExtension.framework o intercept and inspect network connections. We're occasionally seeing crashes caused by Endpoint Security timeouts. After investigating several crash reports, we believe we've identified a deadlock involving code signature verification: our Network Extension intercepts connections initiated by nsurlsessiond to retrieve OCSP/CRL data (we believe these requests are made on behalf of trustd during code signature validation). To determine which policy should be applied to an intercepted connection, our Network Extension verifies the code signature of the originating process. However, that code signature verification itself blocks while waiting for the OCSP/CRL requests to complete. Since those requests are being intercepted by our Network Extension, we end up with a circular dependency: A process requires code signature verification. Signature verification triggers OCSP/CRL network requests. Those requests are intercepted by our Network Extension. Our Network Extension attempts to verify the initiator's code signature before allowing the connection. That verification waits for the same OCSP/CRL requests to complete. As a result, code signature verification becomes blocked process-wide, including verification performed while handling Endpoint Security events. Eventually, our Endpoint Security client exceeds the allowed response timeout and is terminated. We're considering bypassing interception for OCSP/CRL traffic to avoid this deadlock, but we'd like to understand whether this is the recommended or most robust approach. Questions Is there a reliable way to identify network connections that are fetching OCSP or CRL data for code signature validation? What is the relationship between trustd and nsurlsessiond for these requests? Is there a dedicated nsurlsessiond instance serving trustd, or are these requests performed by the shared system/session-wide nsurlsessiond? Would it be a reasonable and future-proof approach to identify these requests by checking NEAppProxyFlow.remoteHostname (for example, ocsp.apple.com and crl.apple.com) and bypassing interception for those connections? Is there another recommended approach to avoid this deadlock when combining Endpoint Security and Network Extension in this way? Any guidance or best practices would be greatly appreciated. Thank you!
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Unable to disable SIP on macOS 27 Beta 1
I work for a company which develops as part of our product suite a System Extension implementing an Endpoint Security client. Our local developer workflow for testing and validating changes is to build locally with Developer certificates (not a legitimate/production Developer ID certificate) and deploy local builds in to a VM, where to get the System Extension to load and be accepted we need to disable SIP & AMFI. macOS 27 VM is refusing to allow me to disable SIP. Is there an alternate approach we can use for this workflow to allow macOS VMs to accept our software when signing with a (same teamID, but different certificate to the provisioningprofile) developer certificate for local validation?
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Validating Signature Of XPC Process
Quinn, you've often suggested that to validate the other side of an XPC connection, we should use the audit token. But that's not available from the XPC object, whereas the PID is. So everyone uses the PID. While looking for something completely unrelated, I found this in the SecCode.h file OSStatus SecCodeCreateWithXPCMessage(xpc_object_t message, SecCSFlags flags, SecCodeRef * __nonnull CF_RETURNS_RETAINED target); Would this be the preferred way to do this now? At least from 11.0 and up. Like I said, I was looking for something completely unrelated and found this and don't have the cycles right now to try it. But it looks promising from the description and I wanted to check in with you about it in case you can say yes or no before I get a chance to test it. Thanks
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[NetworkExtension] [EndpointSecurity] [AppStore] [macOS] Can an app that uses a MitM-style network traffic interception be submitted to the AppStore?
Hello, What are the restrictions on submitting apps to the mac App Store that use an NETransparentProxy alongside a locally installed and trusted Root-CA to intercept, decrypt and manipulate TLS traffic? To be more specific, I'm not talking about a Safari extension. I'm talking about system-wide traffic. So that the app can detect and block ads and trackers from all apps, not just Safari. I'm aware that such an app can be distributed using an unsandboxed Developer-ID signed app. But I wonder if such an app also breaks Sandbox requirements for AppStore distributed apps? Also, is there a way for a sandboxed app to install and trust a root CA? SecTrustSettingsSetTrustSettings does not work in Sandboxed apps from what I found. Finally, I want to ask about EndpointSecurity. Can this entitlement be used in AppStore-ditributed apps? Is doing any of these things possible on AppStore-distributed apps? Thanks in advance for your reply.
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Jun ’26
Is there some tutorial for the new `es_new_descendants_client` function?
I saw there is a new es_new_descendants_client() function in Endpoint Security, with very interesting details: no TCC approval required no root privileges required which makes it very different from how we've known Endpoint Security so far. What is the real life use of this client? First, I thought it would be good to monitor processes I launch from my central application - but I won't fork() or exec() other apps - I will ask launchd to open them (NSWorkspace...), so they won't be descendants of my Endpoint Security client containing process. Not to mention, I don't understand how this aligns with the entitlement being attachable only to system(?) extensions. Or, can I now add this entitlement to an application? The dropping of root privilege as a requirement seems like this entitlement could be attached to regular apps. Or it can only be attached to a launchd agent, rather than a daemon? I haven't seen any pointers in Endpoint Security documentation other than this function's documentation. A tutorial would be very nice to have. Thanks in advance!
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Jun ’26
How to make app appear in Input Monitoring permissions list (like Accessibility does automatically)?
My app needs both Accessibility and Input Monitoring permissions. Accessibility works as expected — calling AXIsProcessTrusted() automatically adds the app to System Settings > Privacy & Security > Accessibility, and the user just needs to toggle it on. Input Monitoring doesn't behave the same way. I'm calling CGRequestListenEventAccess() and creating a CGEvent.tapCreate(.listenOnly), but the app doesn't reliably appear in the Input Monitoring list. The user opens the pane and sees nothing to enable. What I've tried: CGRequestListenEventAccess() — shows the system prompt once per install, but doesn't always add the app to the list CGEvent.tapCreate(tap: .cgSessionEventTap, place: .headInsertEventTap, options: .listenOnly, ...) — returns nil before Accessibility is granted; after Accessibility is granted, the tap succeeds but the app still may not appear in the Input Monitoring list 3. Calling both after Accessibility is confirmed, with a delay before opening the Settings pane The flow: User grants Accessibility (app appears automatically via AXIsProcessTrusted()) App creates a listen-only CGEventTap (succeeds) App opens x-apple.systempreferences:com.apple.preference.security?Privacy_ListenEvent User sees the Input Monitoring pane but the app is not listed Environment: macOS 15 (Sequoia), signed and notarized app, correct bundle ID, Hardened Runtime with com.apple.security.device.audio-input-monitoring entitlement not set (not applicable — this is for audio, not HID). Question: Is there an API equivalent to AXIsProcessTrusted() that reliably registers an app in the Input Monitoring list? Or is there a specific entitlement, Info.plist key, or sequence of calls required on macOS 14+/15 to ensure the app appears?
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May ’26
How to muse app appear in Input Monitoring permissions list (like Accessibility does automatically)?
My app needs both Accessibility and Input Monitoring permissions. Accessibility works as expected - calling AXIsProcesstrusted() automatically adds the app to System Settings > Privacy & Security > Accessibility, and the user just needs to toggle it on. Input Monitoring doesn't behave the same way. I'm calling CGRequestListenEventAccess() and creating a CGEvent.tapCreate(.listenOnly), but the app doesn't reliably appear in the Input Monitoring list. The user opens the pane and sees nothing to enable. What I've tried: CGRequestListenEventAccess() — shows the system prompt once per install, but doesn't always add the app to the list CGEvet.tapCreate(tsp: .cgSessionEventTap, place: .headInsertEventTap, options: listenOnly, ...) — returns nil before Accessibility is granted; after Accessibility is granted, the tap succeeds but the app still may not appear in the Input Monitoring list Calling both after Accessibility is confirmed, with a delay before opening the Settings pane The flow: User grants Accessibility (app appears automatically via AXIsProcessTrusted()) App creates a listen-only CGEventTap (succeeds) App opens x-apple.systempreferences:com.apple.preferences.security?Privacy_ListenEvent User sees the Input Monitoring pane but the app is not listed Environment: macOS 15, signed and notarized app, correct bundle ID, Hardened Runtime with com.apple.security.device.audio-input-monitoring entitlement not set (not applicable). Is there an API equivalent to AXIsProcessTrusted() that reliably registers an app in the Input Monitoring list? Or is there a specific entitlement, Info.plist key, or sequence of calls required on macOS 14+/15 to ensure the app appears?
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May ’26
M5 Pro - macOS Tahoe 26.4.1 crashes almost immediately after connecting to a VPN
Hello Everyone, Like probably several other Enterprise customers and more, we have been bitten by a bug with regards to VPN and Endpoint Security and the new M5 / M5 Pro SoCs shipping in the latest MacBook devices. I have raised the following feedback IDFB22753954 (which itself references an internal issue I believe, if we need to mark it as a dupe: 172793638 ). The technical sequence leading to the crash is as follows I believe: The macOS system process neagent successfully initializes the GlobalProtect network extension. The GP Network extension transitions from an 'inactive' state to a 'running' state. As network traffic begins flowing through the extension, a critical flaw in the macOS kernel's memory allocation (specifically related to the Apple Network Extension framework) is triggered. This memory management failure at the kernel level results in a kernel panic at an unpredictable point during packet processing. Because this is a core operating system vulnerability, any third-party application or security solution that leverages Apple's Network Extension framework is susceptible to these crashes. This has been confirmed across multiple vendors within the cybersecurity industry from what I understand. Crashes_M5Pro_1.txt Thank you in advance for your help! Kind Regards, Goffredo
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May ’26
EndpointSecurity AUTH_SIGNAL Handler Causes Dock UI Desync and Activity Monitor Force Quit Failure
ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_SIGNAL DENY causes Dock icon to disappear and LaunchServices to lose track of the process Platform: macOS 11.0 (Big Sur) – macOS 15 (Sequoia) Xcode: 16.4 (16F6) Language: Swift, EndpointSecurity framework Testing OS: macOS 15.5 (primary), reproduced on macOS 11.0+ [1]Description I'm developing a System Extension using the EndpointSecurity framework for a security product. My extension subscribes to ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_SIGNAL to block unauthorized signals sent to protected GUI applications (self-protection feature). When I respond with ES_AUTH_RESULT_DENY to an AUTH_SIGNAL event targeting a GUI application, the system enters an inconsistent state: The Dock icon disappears — loginwindow removes the app's UI via its applicationQuit event, even though the process is still running LaunchServices loses track of the application's PID — it can no longer determine the PID from the LSASN Activity Monitor's subsequent Force Quit attempts fail silently — no kill() syscall is issued because LaunchServices cannot resolve the PID The issue only resolves after: Restarting Activity Monitor (clears its internal cache), or Relaunching the protected application (re-registers with LaunchServices) Expected: Signal is denied, the process keeps running, Dock icon remains visible, and Activity Monitor can still force-quit the process normally. Actual: Dock icon disappears after the first blocked signal. Subsequent Force Quit attempts do nothing — no kill() syscall is issued. The process remains alive but is invisible to the system. [2]Minimal Reproducible Code Requires System Extension entitlement: com.apple.developer.endpoint-security.client entitlements.plist <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd"> <plist version="1.0"> <dict> <key>com.apple.developer.endpoint-security.client</key> <true/> </dict> </plist> SignalBlockingDemo.swift import EndpointSecurity import Foundation var client: OpaquePointer? es_new_client(&client) { _, message in guard message.pointee.event_type == ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_SIGNAL else { return } let sig = message.pointee.event.signal.sig let target = message.pointee.event.signal.target.pointee let targetPid = audit_token_to_pid(target.audit_token) // es_string_token_t does not guarantee null-termination — read via buffer let esToken = target.executable.pointee.path let targetPath: String let count = Int(esToken.length) if count > 0, let rawPtr = esToken.data { let buf = UnsafeBufferPointer( start: UnsafeRawPointer(rawPtr).assumingMemoryBound(to: UInt8.self), count: count) targetPath = String(decoding: buf, as: UTF8.self) } else { targetPath = "" } // Protect a specific GUI app — replace with your target path let protectedPath = "/Applications/Numbers.app/Contents/MacOS/Numbers" guard targetPath == protectedPath else { es_respond_auth_result(client!, message, ES_AUTH_RESULT_ALLOW, false) return } print("[ES] Blocking signal \(sig) -> pid \(targetPid) (\(targetPath))") // After this DENY: Dock icon disappears, LaunchServices loses the PID es_respond_auth_result(client!, message, ES_AUTH_RESULT_DENY, false) } let events: [es_event_type_t] = [ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_SIGNAL] es_subscribe(client!, events, UInt32(events.count)) print("Signal blocking active. Press Enter to stop.") _ = readLine() es_unsubscribe_all(client!) es_delete_client(client!) Build & run: swiftc -o SignalBlockingDemo SignalBlockingDemo.swift codesign --force --sign - --entitlements entitlements.plist SignalBlockingDemo sudo ./SignalBlockingDemo [3]Steps to Reproduce Build and run SignalBlockingDemo as above (targets Numbers.app) Launch Numbers.app — note its PID Open Activity Monitor In Activity Monitor, select Numbers → click Force Quit (⊗) Observe: ES extension logs "Blocking signal 15" — signal is denied Bug: Numbers.app Dock icon disappears, even though the process is alive Press Enter in the demo terminal to stop signal blocking In Activity Monitor, click Force Quit again on the Numbers process Bug: No error shown in Activity Monitor UI, but the process is NOT terminated In Console.app (filter: LaunchServices), observe: "Unable to determine pid of LSASN:{hi=0x1;lo=0x...}" Confirm: No kill() syscall is issued — verify with DTrace script below DTrace verification (trace_kill.d): syscall::kill:entry /execname == "Activity Monitor"/ { printf("%Y: Activity Monitor calling kill(%d, %d)\n", walltimestamp, arg0, arg1); } sudo dtrace -s trace_kill.d During the broken Force Quit: no output (no kill() issued). After restarting Activity Monitor and retrying: kill() appears and process terminates. [4 What We've Tried Allowing ALL signals → Dock icon never disappears, behavior is normal Subscribing to AUTH_SIGNAL but always returning ALLOW → no issue Denying signals only on headless daemon processes → no issue observed Always allowing signals from launchd (PID 1) → does not prevent the Dock issue Always allowing SIGCHLD, SIGWINCH, SIGCONT → does not prevent the Dock issue Hypothesis: loginwindow observes the AUTH_SIGNAL event (or a related notification) and proactively removes the Dock UI entry when a termination signal targets a GUI app — regardless of whether the signal was ultimately denied. This seems like a coordination gap between EndpointSecurity's signal interception and loginwindow/LaunchServices' app lifecycle management. [5] Specific Questions Is it expected that loginwindow removes the Dock UI entry for a GUI app when AUTH_SIGNAL is received, even if the signal is ultimately denied (ES_AUTH_RESULT_DENY)? Is there a known coordination mechanism between EndpointSecurity's AUTH_SIGNAL and loginwindow / LaunchServices that we should be aware of when implementing self-protection for GUI apps? Is there a recommended pattern or API for protecting a GUI app from termination signals via AUTH_SIGNAL without disrupting its Dock presence and LaunchServices registration? Should we notify loginwindow or LaunchServices to re-register the application after denying a signal, and if so, how? [6] Additional Context The issue reproduces on macOS 11.0 through macOS 15.5 Tested with Numbers.app and other GUI applications — all reproduce the same behavior The issue is NOT reproducible when the protected process is a headless daemon (no Dock presence) launchd (PID 1) senders are always allowed in our policy SIGCHLD, SIGWINCH, SIGCONT are excluded from our deny list DTS Case ID: 19226051 Feedback ID :FB22338746
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May ’26
Requesting guidance on Endpoint Security entitlement (com.apple.developer.endpoint-security.client) for per-process network connection telemetry on managed macOS
Hi Apple Developer Forums, We are developing a managed macOS security/monitoring agent for enterprise customers (deployed only to MDM-managed endpoints). Our goal is to collect per-process network connection metadata (e.g., which process initiated a TCP connection, destination IP/port, timestamps). We are not intercepting or collecting network payload/content—only connection metadata for security telemetry/compliance. We previously explored options like: sysctl PCB lists (e.g., net.inet.tcp.pcblist_n) / kernel structs (not stable ABI; appears private/fragile) Aggregate TCP stats (sysctl net.inet.tcp.stats) which are public but system-wide only proc_pidinfo() / PROC_PIDFDSOCKETINFO for per-PID socket snapshots (polling-based; limited / not event-driven) It seems the supported, event-based approach for per-process connection visibility is EndpointSecurity.framework, but it requires the entitlement: com.apple.developer.endpoint-security.client Questions: Is EndpointSecurity.framework the recommended/supported approach for per-process TCP connection events on macOS for a managed enterprise security agent? What is the correct process to request approval for the Endpoint Security client entitlement under an Apple Developer Program team? (We were directed to post here.) Which Endpoint Security event types are appropriate for capturing connect/accept/close style network events per-process, strictly for metadata telemetry? Are there any platform/privacy constraints or best practices Apple expects us to follow for this use case (MDM-managed enterprise deployments)? We can provide additional details (distribution method, signing, MDM deployment model, privacy disclosures) if needed. Thanks!
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May ’26
Kernel panic when using fclonefileat from ES
Hi, I am developing instant snapshot backup solution for macOS using Endpoint Security. We have stumbled upon a Kernel Panic when using "fclonefileat" API. We are catching a kernel panic on customer machines when attempting to clone the file during ES sync callback: panic(cpu 0 caller 0xfffffe002c495508): "apfs_io_lock_exclusive : Recursive exclusive lock attempt" @fs_utils.c:435 I have symbolized the backtrace to know it is related to clone operation with the following backtrace: apfs_io_lock_exclusive apfs_clone_internal apfs_vnop_clonefile I made a minimal repro that boils down to the following operations: apfs_crash_stress - launch thread to do rsrc writes static void *rsrc_write_worker(void *arg) { int id = (int)(long)arg; char buf[8192]; long n = 0; fill_pattern(buf, sizeof(buf), 'W' + id); while (n < ITERATION_LIMIT) { int file_idx = n % NUM_SOURCE_FILES; int fd = open(g_src_rsrc[file_idx], O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0644); if (fd >= 0) { off_t off = ((n * 4096) % RSRC_DATA_SIZE); pwrite(fd, buf, sizeof(buf), off); if ((n & 0x7) == 0) fsync(fd); close(fd); } else { setxattr(g_src[file_idx], "com.apple.ResourceFork", buf, sizeof(buf), 0, 0); } n++; } printf("[rsrc_wr_%d] done (%ld ops)\n", id, n); return NULL; } apfs_crash_es - simple ES client that is cloning the file (error checking omitted for brevity) static std::string volfsPath(uint64_t devId, uint64_t vnodeId) { return "/.vol/" + std::to_string(devId) + "/" + std::to_string(vnodeId); } static void cloneAndScheduleDelete(const std::string& sourcePath, dispatch_queue_t queue, uint64_t devId, uint64_t vnodeId) { struct stat st; if (stat(sourcePath.c_str(), &st) != 0 || !S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) return; int srcFd = open(sourcePath.c_str(), O_RDONLY); const char* cloneDir = "/Users/admin/Downloads/_clone"; mkdir(cloneDir, 0755); const char* filename = strrchr(sourcePath.c_str(), '/'); filename = filename ? filename + 1 : sourcePath.c_str(); std::string cloneFilename = std::string(filename) + ".clone." + std::to_string(time(nullptr)) + "." + std::to_string(getpid()); std::string clonePath = std::string(cloneDir) + "/" + cloneFilename; fclonefileat(srcFd, AT_FDCWD, clonePath.c_str(), 0); { dispatch_after(dispatch_time(DISPATCH_TIME_NOW, 1 * NSEC_PER_SEC), queue, ^{ if (unlink(clonePath.c_str()) == 0) { LOG("Deleted clone: %s", clonePath.c_str()); } else { LOG("Failed to delete clone: %s", clonePath.c_str()); } }); } close(srcFd); } static const es_file_t* file(const es_message_t* msg) { switch (msg->event_type) { case ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_OPEN: return msg->event.open.file; case ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_EXEC: return msg->event.exec.target->executable; case ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_RENAME: return msg->event.rename.source; } return nullptr; } int main(void) { es_client_t* cli; auto ret = es_new_client(&cli, ^(es_client_t* client, const es_message_t * msgc) { if (msgc->process->is_es_client) { es_mute_process(client, &msgc->process->audit_token); return respond(client, msgc, true); } dispatch_async(esQueue, ^{ bool shouldClone = false; if (msgc->event_type == ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_OPEN) { auto& ev = msgc->event.open; if (ev.fflag & (FWRITE | O_RDWR | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC | O_APPEND)) { shouldClone = true; } } else if (msgc->event_type == ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_UNLINK || msgc->event_type == ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_RENAME) { shouldClone = true; } if (shouldClone) { if (auto f = ::file(msgc)) cloneAndScheduleDelete(f->path.data, cloneQueue, f->stat.st_dev, f->stat.st_ino); } respond(client, msgc, true); }); }); LOG("es_new_client -> %d", ret); es_event_type_t events[] = { ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_OPEN, ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_EXEC, ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_RENAME, ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_UNLINK, }; es_subscribe(cli, events, sizeof(events) / sizeof(*events)); } Create 2 terminal sessions and run the following commands: % sudo ./apfs_crash_es % sudo ./apfs_crash_stress ~/Downloads/test/ Machine will very quickly panic due to APFS deadlock. I expect that no userspace syscall should be able to cause kernel panic. It looks like a bug in APFS implementation and requires fix on XNU/kext side. We were able to reproduce this issue on macOS 26.3.1/15.6.1 on Intel/ARM machines. Here is the panic string: panic_string.txt Source code without XCode project: apfs_crash_es.cpp apfs_crash_stress.cpp Full XCode project + full panic is available at https://www.icloud.com/iclouddrive/0f215KkZffPOTLpETPo-LdaXw#apfs%5Fcrash%5Fes
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Apr ’26
System-wide deadlock in removexattr from revisiond / APFS
System-wide deadlock in removexattr from revisiond / APFS We're experiencing a deadlock on certains systems when our software is installed, which is causing side effects in our process (and likely others) such as blocked queues and increased memory usage. According to the spindump, revisiond appears to be holding an exclusive lock within the kernel. Process: revisiond [426] UUID: 5E9B9E04-984B-31AD-A4FF-A1A90B7D53A1 Path: /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/GenerationalStorage.framework/Versions/A/Support/revisiond Codesigning ID: com.apple.revisiond Shared Cache: 25AE5A2A-FE2A-3998-8D4E-F3C5C6E6CEB6 slid base address 0x189834000, slide 0x9834000 (System Primary) Architecture: arm64e Parent: launchd [1] UID: 0 Sudden Term: Tracked Memory Limit: 50MB Jetsam Priority: 40 Footprint: 6225 KB Time Since Fork: 1740319s Num samples: 940 (1-940) Num threads: 5 Note: 1 idle work queue thread omitted [...] Thread 0xc0616d 940 samples (1-940) priority 46 (base 4) last ran 241692.754s ago 940 start_wqthread + 8 (libsystem_pthread.dylib + 7068) [0x189d0ab9c] 940 _pthread_wqthread + 292 (libsystem_pthread.dylib + 11852) [0x189d0be4c] 940 _dispatch_workloop_worker_thread + 692 (libdispatch.dylib + 85356) [0x189b65d6c] 940 _dispatch_root_queue_drain_deferred_wlh + 292 (libdispatch.dylib + 87156) [0x189b66474] 940 _dispatch_lane_invoke + 440 (libdispatch.dylib + 45048) [0x189b5bff8] 940 _dispatch_lane_serial_drain + 944 (libdispatch.dylib + 42420) [0x189b5b5b4] 940 _dispatch_client_callout + 16 (libdispatch.dylib + 113364) [0x189b6cad4] 940 _dispatch_call_block_and_release + 32 (libdispatch.dylib + 7004) [0x189b52b5c] 940 ??? (revisiond + 168768) [0x10494d340] 940 ??? (revisiond + 165940) [0x10494c834] 940 ??? (revisiond + 40264) [0x10492dd48] 940 ??? (revisiond + 56680) [0x104931d68] 940 <patched truncated backtrace> 940 removexattr + 8 (libsystem_kernel.dylib + 23768) [0x189cd1cd8] *940 ??? (kernel.release.t6000 + 15240) [0xfffffe000886fb88] *940 ??? (kernel.release.t6000 + 1886348) [0xfffffe0008a3888c] *940 ??? (kernel.release.t6000 + 7730436) [0xfffffe0008fcb504] *940 ??? (kernel.release.t6000 + 2759592) [0xfffffe0008b0dba8] *940 ??? (kernel.release.t6000 + 2808244) [0xfffffe0008b199b4] *940 apfs_vnop_removexattr + 1044 (apfs + 474512) [0xfffffe000be8d4d0] *940 decmpfs_cnode_set_vnode_state + 80 (kernel.release.t6000 + 2945816) [0xfffffe0008b3b318] *940 IORWLockWrite + 184 (kernel.release.t6000 + 496184) [0xfffffe00088e5238] *940 ??? (kernel.release.t6000 + 494624) [0xfffffe00088e4c20] *940 ??? (kernel.release.t6000 + 619452) [0xfffffe00089033bc] *940 ??? (kernel.release.t6000 + 624472) [0xfffffe0008904758] The bulk of the other processes are waiting for that lock. (suspended, blocked by krwlock for reading owned by revisiond [426] thread 0xc0616d) (blocked by krwlock for writing owned by revisiond [426] thread 0xc0616d) Around the time of the event, these messages were logged by revision: 2026-03-06 18:49:37.781673-0500 0x16b7 Error 0x7f92f364 426 14 revisiond: [com.apple.revisiond:default] [ERROR] CSCopyChunkIDsForToken failed for 41639 2026-03-06 18:49:37.781716-0500 0x16b7 Error 0x7f92f365 426 14 revisiond: [com.apple.revisiond:default] [ERROR] updateEntry for new entry <private> failed 2026-03-06 18:49:37.781738-0500 0x16b7 Error 0x7f92f366 426 14 revisiond: [com.apple.revisiond:default] [ERROR] no entry for '<private>' 2026-03-06 18:49:37.781754-0500 0x16b7 Error 0x7f92f367 426 14 revisiond: [com.apple.revisiond:default] [ERROR] failed assembleInfoForOffset for fsid 16777234 fileid 359684022 offset 0 size 14334 (path <private>) Our agent uses Endpoint Security Framework to monitor events, and provide anti-tamper functionality for installed components and processes. While several EndpointSecurity calls appear in the spindump stack traces, we don't have any evidence that any calls from revisiond were blocked. What we'd really like to to understand what that lock is (appears to be decompressing an object on an APFS volume), what revisiond and APFS are doing with it, and what might cause it to deadlock. Of note, one of our processes is also waiting on that lock, one thread for reading and the other for writing. This issue affects machines running several macOS versions (15.x, 26.x). The machine in the examples is running macOS 26.3 (25D125)
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1.1k
Apr ’26
Endpoint Security entitlement for open-source behavioral monitoring tool
Hi, I’m building a macOS tool that analyzes process behavior to detect autonomous / AI-like activity locally (process trees, file access patterns, and network usage). The system is fully user-space and runs locally in real time. I’m planning to use the Endpoint Security Framework for process and file event monitoring. This is an open-source project (non-enterprise), developed by a solo developer. My question: What are the realistic chances of getting Endpoint Security entitlements approved for this type of project? Are there specific requirements or common reasons for rejection I should be aware of? Thanks, sivan-rnd
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410
Mar ’26
Current wisdom on multiple XPC services in a System Extension?
I'm following up on a couple of forum threads from 2020 to get more clarity on the current guidance for supporting multiple XPC services in system extensions. For context, I'm trying to create a system extension that contains both an Endpoint Security client and a Network Extension filter, and I'm seeing indications that the system may not expect this and doesn't handle it smoothly. First: Previous guidance indicated that the system would automatically provide a Mach service named <TeamID>.<BundleID>.xpc to use for communicating with the system extension. However, the SystemExtension man page currently documents an Info.plist key called NSEndpointSecurityMachServiceName and suggests that the default service name is deprecated; and in fact if this key is not set, I find a message in the Console: The extension from () is using the deprecated default mach service name. Please update the extension to set the NSEndpointSecurityMachServiceName key in the Info.plist file. I have accordingly set this key, but I wanted to confirm that this is the current best practice. Second, and more interesting: Another user was trying to do something similar and observed that the Mach service for the endpoint security client wasn't available but the NE filter was. Quinn did some research and replied that this was intended behavior, quoting the EndpointSecurity man page: "If ES extension is combined with a Network Extension, set the NEMachServiceName key in the Info.plist" (which I have also done), and concluding from this: ... if you have a combined ES and NE system extension then the Mach service provided by the NE side takes precedence. However, the current man page does not include this quoted text and says nothing about a combined ES and NE system extension. So I'm wondering about current best practice. If I do combine the ES and NE clients in a single system extension, should they each declare the Mach service name under their respective Info.plist keys? And could there be a single XPC listener for both, using the same service name under each key, or would it be better to have separate XPC listeners? Alternatively, would it be preferable to have each component in a separate system extension? (This would entail some rearchitecting of the current design.)
4
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713
Mar ’26
FSEvents vs Endpoint Security Framework for a macOS file-operation audit product
I'm developing a macOS product that generates verifiable audit records of media-asset movement on endpoints, for professional media-production companies. It is not an antivirus or Data Loss Prevention product; it collects operating-system file-system events and converts them into tamper-evident audit evidence and audit reports. Target users need comprehensive endpoint audit trails for compliance with industry security standards, including Motion Picture Association Trusted Partner Network assessments. The product must reliably distinguish these operations: file copy, move, rename, and volume mount and unmount — including on external volumes. I've reviewed existing forum guidance, including Quinn's explanation that FSEvents only signals that "something changed" rather than the exact operation, and that it is designed around Spotlight and Time Machine semantics. In my own testing I've also seen inconsistent flags across cp, Finder copy, and application saves, and frequent kFSEventStreamEventFlagMustScanSubDirs events on external drives even when nothing along the path changed. Questions: Given the above, for an audit product that must reliably distinguish copy vs. move vs. rename, should FSEvents be treated as structurally unsuitable, with the Endpoint Security Framework adopted instead as the primary source? For capturing volume mount and unmount operations, is the Endpoint Security Framework the recommended source, or should this be combined with Disk Arbitration? Are there long-term supported APIs recommended for this type of endpoint audit product, to ensure compatibility with future macOS releases? Any recommended documentation, WWDC sessions, or sample code for this use case would be appreciated. For context, I'm building toward a System Extension using the Endpoint Security Framework and will file the entitlement request separately; this post is to confirm the architectural direction before committing. Thank you.
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7
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253
Activity
2d
Endpoint Security Framework deadline
Hello. When testing with the Endpoint Security Framework for the AUTH_OPEN event, I found that the deadline was 15 seconds, but the actual process termination occurred at 5 or 6 seconds. Is this intended?
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3
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879
Activity
1w
How to identify a user who performed action which is reported by Endpoint Security
Hello, My application monitors ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_CLOSE. If a file is dragged to another location in Finder, the Endpoint Security reports the event ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_CLOSE was performed by '/usr/libexec/xpcproxy'. So, xpcproxy is the process that performed ES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_CLOSE. Looks like the dragged file is copied by some XPC service. I have found the audit user id is equal to user who dragged a file. Can audit user id be used to identify a user who triggers copy file action in this case? If no, are there any way to define such info? Thank you in advance!
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5
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875
Activity
1w
ES event thread playing nicely with Swift Concurrency
We're working on an Endpoint Security extension and using Swift 6 with Concurrency. I've heard there are some subtleties to getting the threading right across those two domains and am hoping that someone can help shed light on it. In particular, ES events can be delivered on a high priority thread and I'd like to be sure that any work done in the Concurrency domain retains that priority to minimize latency between event delivery and response.
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2
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337
Activity
2w
Kernel deadlock with Content Filter + VPN on macOS 26
Hi all, I've run into a kernel deadlock issue involving content filter + VPN system/network extension on macOS 26, and would really appreciate any insights. A user reported that their mac is occasionally assigened a 169.254.0.0/16 address and can't reach any website after connecting Wi-Fi. Disabling our content filter restores network connectivity immediately. They're running the following software on the mac: macOS 26 (issue reproduced on 25C56 and 25F71) NEFilterDataProvider-based content filter (our extension) VPN network extension A spindump taken while the system had lost network connectivity shows the content filter's process stuck while delivering an "allow" verdict to the kernel. All subsequent flow decisions for the extensions are blocked behind it, which would explain why new DHCP request can't complete and the interface stays on a self-assigned address. Based on the "last ran" and timestamp in the spindump, the underlying deadlock appears to have occurred while the computer wasn't connected to any Wi-Fi network, so there was no visible symptom at the time. The user only noticed something was wrong once they tried to reconnect and saw the bad IP address; they did not realize the content filter was already stuck. This issue may be identified by searching for keyword "sofreelastref" in the spindump (see comment below). Has anyone else seen a content filter + VPN hang like this on macOS 26? Any guidance or pointers would be greatly appreciated. Thanks in advance! For Developer Technical Support staffs: FB23720745 Shay
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6
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503
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2w
Identifying system OCSP/CRL traffic in Network Extension.
Hi! We're developing a security product that uses both EndpointSecurity.framework to intercept and authorize process and file events; and NetworkExtension.framework o intercept and inspect network connections. We're occasionally seeing crashes caused by Endpoint Security timeouts. After investigating several crash reports, we believe we've identified a deadlock involving code signature verification: our Network Extension intercepts connections initiated by nsurlsessiond to retrieve OCSP/CRL data (we believe these requests are made on behalf of trustd during code signature validation). To determine which policy should be applied to an intercepted connection, our Network Extension verifies the code signature of the originating process. However, that code signature verification itself blocks while waiting for the OCSP/CRL requests to complete. Since those requests are being intercepted by our Network Extension, we end up with a circular dependency: A process requires code signature verification. Signature verification triggers OCSP/CRL network requests. Those requests are intercepted by our Network Extension. Our Network Extension attempts to verify the initiator's code signature before allowing the connection. That verification waits for the same OCSP/CRL requests to complete. As a result, code signature verification becomes blocked process-wide, including verification performed while handling Endpoint Security events. Eventually, our Endpoint Security client exceeds the allowed response timeout and is terminated. We're considering bypassing interception for OCSP/CRL traffic to avoid this deadlock, but we'd like to understand whether this is the recommended or most robust approach. Questions Is there a reliable way to identify network connections that are fetching OCSP or CRL data for code signature validation? What is the relationship between trustd and nsurlsessiond for these requests? Is there a dedicated nsurlsessiond instance serving trustd, or are these requests performed by the shared system/session-wide nsurlsessiond? Would it be a reasonable and future-proof approach to identify these requests by checking NEAppProxyFlow.remoteHostname (for example, ocsp.apple.com and crl.apple.com) and bypassing interception for those connections? Is there another recommended approach to avoid this deadlock when combining Endpoint Security and Network Extension in this way? Any guidance or best practices would be greatly appreciated. Thank you!
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1
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217
Activity
2w
Unable to disable SIP on macOS 27 Beta 1
I work for a company which develops as part of our product suite a System Extension implementing an Endpoint Security client. Our local developer workflow for testing and validating changes is to build locally with Developer certificates (not a legitimate/production Developer ID certificate) and deploy local builds in to a VM, where to get the System Extension to load and be accepted we need to disable SIP & AMFI. macOS 27 VM is refusing to allow me to disable SIP. Is there an alternate approach we can use for this workflow to allow macOS VMs to accept our software when signing with a (same teamID, but different certificate to the provisioningprofile) developer certificate for local validation?
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6
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3
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1k
Activity
3w
Validating Signature Of XPC Process
Quinn, you've often suggested that to validate the other side of an XPC connection, we should use the audit token. But that's not available from the XPC object, whereas the PID is. So everyone uses the PID. While looking for something completely unrelated, I found this in the SecCode.h file OSStatus SecCodeCreateWithXPCMessage(xpc_object_t message, SecCSFlags flags, SecCodeRef * __nonnull CF_RETURNS_RETAINED target); Would this be the preferred way to do this now? At least from 11.0 and up. Like I said, I was looking for something completely unrelated and found this and don't have the cycles right now to try it. But it looks promising from the description and I wanted to check in with you about it in case you can say yes or no before I get a chance to test it. Thanks
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8
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8.7k
Activity
3w
[NetworkExtension] [EndpointSecurity] [AppStore] [macOS] Can an app that uses a MitM-style network traffic interception be submitted to the AppStore?
Hello, What are the restrictions on submitting apps to the mac App Store that use an NETransparentProxy alongside a locally installed and trusted Root-CA to intercept, decrypt and manipulate TLS traffic? To be more specific, I'm not talking about a Safari extension. I'm talking about system-wide traffic. So that the app can detect and block ads and trackers from all apps, not just Safari. I'm aware that such an app can be distributed using an unsandboxed Developer-ID signed app. But I wonder if such an app also breaks Sandbox requirements for AppStore distributed apps? Also, is there a way for a sandboxed app to install and trust a root CA? SecTrustSettingsSetTrustSettings does not work in Sandboxed apps from what I found. Finally, I want to ask about EndpointSecurity. Can this entitlement be used in AppStore-ditributed apps? Is doing any of these things possible on AppStore-distributed apps? Thanks in advance for your reply.
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2
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481
Activity
Jun ’26
Is there some tutorial for the new `es_new_descendants_client` function?
I saw there is a new es_new_descendants_client() function in Endpoint Security, with very interesting details: no TCC approval required no root privileges required which makes it very different from how we've known Endpoint Security so far. What is the real life use of this client? First, I thought it would be good to monitor processes I launch from my central application - but I won't fork() or exec() other apps - I will ask launchd to open them (NSWorkspace...), so they won't be descendants of my Endpoint Security client containing process. Not to mention, I don't understand how this aligns with the entitlement being attachable only to system(?) extensions. Or, can I now add this entitlement to an application? The dropping of root privilege as a requirement seems like this entitlement could be attached to regular apps. Or it can only be attached to a launchd agent, rather than a daemon? I haven't seen any pointers in Endpoint Security documentation other than this function's documentation. A tutorial would be very nice to have. Thanks in advance!
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481
Activity
Jun ’26
Any plan to deanonymize the 26.x ES_EVENT TYPEs?
Is there any plan to deanonymize in the near future ES_EVENT_TYPE_RESERVED_X where the range of X is [1, 8] ?
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1
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187
Activity
Jun ’26
How to make app appear in Input Monitoring permissions list (like Accessibility does automatically)?
My app needs both Accessibility and Input Monitoring permissions. Accessibility works as expected — calling AXIsProcessTrusted() automatically adds the app to System Settings > Privacy & Security > Accessibility, and the user just needs to toggle it on. Input Monitoring doesn't behave the same way. I'm calling CGRequestListenEventAccess() and creating a CGEvent.tapCreate(.listenOnly), but the app doesn't reliably appear in the Input Monitoring list. The user opens the pane and sees nothing to enable. What I've tried: CGRequestListenEventAccess() — shows the system prompt once per install, but doesn't always add the app to the list CGEvent.tapCreate(tap: .cgSessionEventTap, place: .headInsertEventTap, options: .listenOnly, ...) — returns nil before Accessibility is granted; after Accessibility is granted, the tap succeeds but the app still may not appear in the Input Monitoring list 3. Calling both after Accessibility is confirmed, with a delay before opening the Settings pane The flow: User grants Accessibility (app appears automatically via AXIsProcessTrusted()) App creates a listen-only CGEventTap (succeeds) App opens x-apple.systempreferences:com.apple.preference.security?Privacy_ListenEvent User sees the Input Monitoring pane but the app is not listed Environment: macOS 15 (Sequoia), signed and notarized app, correct bundle ID, Hardened Runtime with com.apple.security.device.audio-input-monitoring entitlement not set (not applicable — this is for audio, not HID). Question: Is there an API equivalent to AXIsProcessTrusted() that reliably registers an app in the Input Monitoring list? Or is there a specific entitlement, Info.plist key, or sequence of calls required on macOS 14+/15 to ensure the app appears?
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1.1k
Activity
May ’26
How to muse app appear in Input Monitoring permissions list (like Accessibility does automatically)?
My app needs both Accessibility and Input Monitoring permissions. Accessibility works as expected - calling AXIsProcesstrusted() automatically adds the app to System Settings > Privacy & Security > Accessibility, and the user just needs to toggle it on. Input Monitoring doesn't behave the same way. I'm calling CGRequestListenEventAccess() and creating a CGEvent.tapCreate(.listenOnly), but the app doesn't reliably appear in the Input Monitoring list. The user opens the pane and sees nothing to enable. What I've tried: CGRequestListenEventAccess() — shows the system prompt once per install, but doesn't always add the app to the list CGEvet.tapCreate(tsp: .cgSessionEventTap, place: .headInsertEventTap, options: listenOnly, ...) — returns nil before Accessibility is granted; after Accessibility is granted, the tap succeeds but the app still may not appear in the Input Monitoring list Calling both after Accessibility is confirmed, with a delay before opening the Settings pane The flow: User grants Accessibility (app appears automatically via AXIsProcessTrusted()) App creates a listen-only CGEventTap (succeeds) App opens x-apple.systempreferences:com.apple.preferences.security?Privacy_ListenEvent User sees the Input Monitoring pane but the app is not listed Environment: macOS 15, signed and notarized app, correct bundle ID, Hardened Runtime with com.apple.security.device.audio-input-monitoring entitlement not set (not applicable). Is there an API equivalent to AXIsProcessTrusted() that reliably registers an app in the Input Monitoring list? Or is there a specific entitlement, Info.plist key, or sequence of calls required on macOS 14+/15 to ensure the app appears?
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1
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1.1k
Activity
May ’26
M5 Pro - macOS Tahoe 26.4.1 crashes almost immediately after connecting to a VPN
Hello Everyone, Like probably several other Enterprise customers and more, we have been bitten by a bug with regards to VPN and Endpoint Security and the new M5 / M5 Pro SoCs shipping in the latest MacBook devices. I have raised the following feedback IDFB22753954 (which itself references an internal issue I believe, if we need to mark it as a dupe: 172793638 ). The technical sequence leading to the crash is as follows I believe: The macOS system process neagent successfully initializes the GlobalProtect network extension. The GP Network extension transitions from an 'inactive' state to a 'running' state. As network traffic begins flowing through the extension, a critical flaw in the macOS kernel's memory allocation (specifically related to the Apple Network Extension framework) is triggered. This memory management failure at the kernel level results in a kernel panic at an unpredictable point during packet processing. Because this is a core operating system vulnerability, any third-party application or security solution that leverages Apple's Network Extension framework is susceptible to these crashes. This has been confirmed across multiple vendors within the cybersecurity industry from what I understand. Crashes_M5Pro_1.txt Thank you in advance for your help! Kind Regards, Goffredo
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5
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799
Activity
May ’26
EndpointSecurity AUTH_SIGNAL Handler Causes Dock UI Desync and Activity Monitor Force Quit Failure
ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_SIGNAL DENY causes Dock icon to disappear and LaunchServices to lose track of the process Platform: macOS 11.0 (Big Sur) – macOS 15 (Sequoia) Xcode: 16.4 (16F6) Language: Swift, EndpointSecurity framework Testing OS: macOS 15.5 (primary), reproduced on macOS 11.0+ [1]Description I'm developing a System Extension using the EndpointSecurity framework for a security product. My extension subscribes to ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_SIGNAL to block unauthorized signals sent to protected GUI applications (self-protection feature). When I respond with ES_AUTH_RESULT_DENY to an AUTH_SIGNAL event targeting a GUI application, the system enters an inconsistent state: The Dock icon disappears — loginwindow removes the app's UI via its applicationQuit event, even though the process is still running LaunchServices loses track of the application's PID — it can no longer determine the PID from the LSASN Activity Monitor's subsequent Force Quit attempts fail silently — no kill() syscall is issued because LaunchServices cannot resolve the PID The issue only resolves after: Restarting Activity Monitor (clears its internal cache), or Relaunching the protected application (re-registers with LaunchServices) Expected: Signal is denied, the process keeps running, Dock icon remains visible, and Activity Monitor can still force-quit the process normally. Actual: Dock icon disappears after the first blocked signal. Subsequent Force Quit attempts do nothing — no kill() syscall is issued. The process remains alive but is invisible to the system. [2]Minimal Reproducible Code Requires System Extension entitlement: com.apple.developer.endpoint-security.client entitlements.plist <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd"> <plist version="1.0"> <dict> <key>com.apple.developer.endpoint-security.client</key> <true/> </dict> </plist> SignalBlockingDemo.swift import EndpointSecurity import Foundation var client: OpaquePointer? es_new_client(&client) { _, message in guard message.pointee.event_type == ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_SIGNAL else { return } let sig = message.pointee.event.signal.sig let target = message.pointee.event.signal.target.pointee let targetPid = audit_token_to_pid(target.audit_token) // es_string_token_t does not guarantee null-termination — read via buffer let esToken = target.executable.pointee.path let targetPath: String let count = Int(esToken.length) if count > 0, let rawPtr = esToken.data { let buf = UnsafeBufferPointer( start: UnsafeRawPointer(rawPtr).assumingMemoryBound(to: UInt8.self), count: count) targetPath = String(decoding: buf, as: UTF8.self) } else { targetPath = "" } // Protect a specific GUI app — replace with your target path let protectedPath = "/Applications/Numbers.app/Contents/MacOS/Numbers" guard targetPath == protectedPath else { es_respond_auth_result(client!, message, ES_AUTH_RESULT_ALLOW, false) return } print("[ES] Blocking signal \(sig) -> pid \(targetPid) (\(targetPath))") // After this DENY: Dock icon disappears, LaunchServices loses the PID es_respond_auth_result(client!, message, ES_AUTH_RESULT_DENY, false) } let events: [es_event_type_t] = [ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_SIGNAL] es_subscribe(client!, events, UInt32(events.count)) print("Signal blocking active. Press Enter to stop.") _ = readLine() es_unsubscribe_all(client!) es_delete_client(client!) Build & run: swiftc -o SignalBlockingDemo SignalBlockingDemo.swift codesign --force --sign - --entitlements entitlements.plist SignalBlockingDemo sudo ./SignalBlockingDemo [3]Steps to Reproduce Build and run SignalBlockingDemo as above (targets Numbers.app) Launch Numbers.app — note its PID Open Activity Monitor In Activity Monitor, select Numbers → click Force Quit (⊗) Observe: ES extension logs "Blocking signal 15" — signal is denied Bug: Numbers.app Dock icon disappears, even though the process is alive Press Enter in the demo terminal to stop signal blocking In Activity Monitor, click Force Quit again on the Numbers process Bug: No error shown in Activity Monitor UI, but the process is NOT terminated In Console.app (filter: LaunchServices), observe: "Unable to determine pid of LSASN:{hi=0x1;lo=0x...}" Confirm: No kill() syscall is issued — verify with DTrace script below DTrace verification (trace_kill.d): syscall::kill:entry /execname == "Activity Monitor"/ { printf("%Y: Activity Monitor calling kill(%d, %d)\n", walltimestamp, arg0, arg1); } sudo dtrace -s trace_kill.d During the broken Force Quit: no output (no kill() issued). After restarting Activity Monitor and retrying: kill() appears and process terminates. [4 What We've Tried Allowing ALL signals → Dock icon never disappears, behavior is normal Subscribing to AUTH_SIGNAL but always returning ALLOW → no issue Denying signals only on headless daemon processes → no issue observed Always allowing signals from launchd (PID 1) → does not prevent the Dock issue Always allowing SIGCHLD, SIGWINCH, SIGCONT → does not prevent the Dock issue Hypothesis: loginwindow observes the AUTH_SIGNAL event (or a related notification) and proactively removes the Dock UI entry when a termination signal targets a GUI app — regardless of whether the signal was ultimately denied. This seems like a coordination gap between EndpointSecurity's signal interception and loginwindow/LaunchServices' app lifecycle management. [5] Specific Questions Is it expected that loginwindow removes the Dock UI entry for a GUI app when AUTH_SIGNAL is received, even if the signal is ultimately denied (ES_AUTH_RESULT_DENY)? Is there a known coordination mechanism between EndpointSecurity's AUTH_SIGNAL and loginwindow / LaunchServices that we should be aware of when implementing self-protection for GUI apps? Is there a recommended pattern or API for protecting a GUI app from termination signals via AUTH_SIGNAL without disrupting its Dock presence and LaunchServices registration? Should we notify loginwindow or LaunchServices to re-register the application after denying a signal, and if so, how? [6] Additional Context The issue reproduces on macOS 11.0 through macOS 15.5 Tested with Numbers.app and other GUI applications — all reproduce the same behavior The issue is NOT reproducible when the protected process is a headless daemon (no Dock presence) launchd (PID 1) senders are always allowed in our policy SIGCHLD, SIGWINCH, SIGCONT are excluded from our deny list DTS Case ID: 19226051 Feedback ID :FB22338746
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3
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275
Activity
May ’26
Requesting guidance on Endpoint Security entitlement (com.apple.developer.endpoint-security.client) for per-process network connection telemetry on managed macOS
Hi Apple Developer Forums, We are developing a managed macOS security/monitoring agent for enterprise customers (deployed only to MDM-managed endpoints). Our goal is to collect per-process network connection metadata (e.g., which process initiated a TCP connection, destination IP/port, timestamps). We are not intercepting or collecting network payload/content—only connection metadata for security telemetry/compliance. We previously explored options like: sysctl PCB lists (e.g., net.inet.tcp.pcblist_n) / kernel structs (not stable ABI; appears private/fragile) Aggregate TCP stats (sysctl net.inet.tcp.stats) which are public but system-wide only proc_pidinfo() / PROC_PIDFDSOCKETINFO for per-PID socket snapshots (polling-based; limited / not event-driven) It seems the supported, event-based approach for per-process connection visibility is EndpointSecurity.framework, but it requires the entitlement: com.apple.developer.endpoint-security.client Questions: Is EndpointSecurity.framework the recommended/supported approach for per-process TCP connection events on macOS for a managed enterprise security agent? What is the correct process to request approval for the Endpoint Security client entitlement under an Apple Developer Program team? (We were directed to post here.) Which Endpoint Security event types are appropriate for capturing connect/accept/close style network events per-process, strictly for metadata telemetry? Are there any platform/privacy constraints or best practices Apple expects us to follow for this use case (MDM-managed enterprise deployments)? We can provide additional details (distribution method, signing, MDM deployment model, privacy disclosures) if needed. Thanks!
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May ’26
Kernel panic when using fclonefileat from ES
Hi, I am developing instant snapshot backup solution for macOS using Endpoint Security. We have stumbled upon a Kernel Panic when using "fclonefileat" API. We are catching a kernel panic on customer machines when attempting to clone the file during ES sync callback: panic(cpu 0 caller 0xfffffe002c495508): "apfs_io_lock_exclusive : Recursive exclusive lock attempt" @fs_utils.c:435 I have symbolized the backtrace to know it is related to clone operation with the following backtrace: apfs_io_lock_exclusive apfs_clone_internal apfs_vnop_clonefile I made a minimal repro that boils down to the following operations: apfs_crash_stress - launch thread to do rsrc writes static void *rsrc_write_worker(void *arg) { int id = (int)(long)arg; char buf[8192]; long n = 0; fill_pattern(buf, sizeof(buf), 'W' + id); while (n < ITERATION_LIMIT) { int file_idx = n % NUM_SOURCE_FILES; int fd = open(g_src_rsrc[file_idx], O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0644); if (fd >= 0) { off_t off = ((n * 4096) % RSRC_DATA_SIZE); pwrite(fd, buf, sizeof(buf), off); if ((n & 0x7) == 0) fsync(fd); close(fd); } else { setxattr(g_src[file_idx], "com.apple.ResourceFork", buf, sizeof(buf), 0, 0); } n++; } printf("[rsrc_wr_%d] done (%ld ops)\n", id, n); return NULL; } apfs_crash_es - simple ES client that is cloning the file (error checking omitted for brevity) static std::string volfsPath(uint64_t devId, uint64_t vnodeId) { return "/.vol/" + std::to_string(devId) + "/" + std::to_string(vnodeId); } static void cloneAndScheduleDelete(const std::string& sourcePath, dispatch_queue_t queue, uint64_t devId, uint64_t vnodeId) { struct stat st; if (stat(sourcePath.c_str(), &st) != 0 || !S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) return; int srcFd = open(sourcePath.c_str(), O_RDONLY); const char* cloneDir = "/Users/admin/Downloads/_clone"; mkdir(cloneDir, 0755); const char* filename = strrchr(sourcePath.c_str(), '/'); filename = filename ? filename + 1 : sourcePath.c_str(); std::string cloneFilename = std::string(filename) + ".clone." + std::to_string(time(nullptr)) + "." + std::to_string(getpid()); std::string clonePath = std::string(cloneDir) + "/" + cloneFilename; fclonefileat(srcFd, AT_FDCWD, clonePath.c_str(), 0); { dispatch_after(dispatch_time(DISPATCH_TIME_NOW, 1 * NSEC_PER_SEC), queue, ^{ if (unlink(clonePath.c_str()) == 0) { LOG("Deleted clone: %s", clonePath.c_str()); } else { LOG("Failed to delete clone: %s", clonePath.c_str()); } }); } close(srcFd); } static const es_file_t* file(const es_message_t* msg) { switch (msg->event_type) { case ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_OPEN: return msg->event.open.file; case ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_EXEC: return msg->event.exec.target->executable; case ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_RENAME: return msg->event.rename.source; } return nullptr; } int main(void) { es_client_t* cli; auto ret = es_new_client(&cli, ^(es_client_t* client, const es_message_t * msgc) { if (msgc->process->is_es_client) { es_mute_process(client, &msgc->process->audit_token); return respond(client, msgc, true); } dispatch_async(esQueue, ^{ bool shouldClone = false; if (msgc->event_type == ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_OPEN) { auto& ev = msgc->event.open; if (ev.fflag & (FWRITE | O_RDWR | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC | O_APPEND)) { shouldClone = true; } } else if (msgc->event_type == ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_UNLINK || msgc->event_type == ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_RENAME) { shouldClone = true; } if (shouldClone) { if (auto f = ::file(msgc)) cloneAndScheduleDelete(f->path.data, cloneQueue, f->stat.st_dev, f->stat.st_ino); } respond(client, msgc, true); }); }); LOG("es_new_client -> %d", ret); es_event_type_t events[] = { ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_OPEN, ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_EXEC, ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_RENAME, ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_UNLINK, }; es_subscribe(cli, events, sizeof(events) / sizeof(*events)); } Create 2 terminal sessions and run the following commands: % sudo ./apfs_crash_es % sudo ./apfs_crash_stress ~/Downloads/test/ Machine will very quickly panic due to APFS deadlock. I expect that no userspace syscall should be able to cause kernel panic. It looks like a bug in APFS implementation and requires fix on XNU/kext side. We were able to reproduce this issue on macOS 26.3.1/15.6.1 on Intel/ARM machines. Here is the panic string: panic_string.txt Source code without XCode project: apfs_crash_es.cpp apfs_crash_stress.cpp Full XCode project + full panic is available at https://www.icloud.com/iclouddrive/0f215KkZffPOTLpETPo-LdaXw#apfs%5Fcrash%5Fes
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453
Activity
Apr ’26
System-wide deadlock in removexattr from revisiond / APFS
System-wide deadlock in removexattr from revisiond / APFS We're experiencing a deadlock on certains systems when our software is installed, which is causing side effects in our process (and likely others) such as blocked queues and increased memory usage. According to the spindump, revisiond appears to be holding an exclusive lock within the kernel. Process: revisiond [426] UUID: 5E9B9E04-984B-31AD-A4FF-A1A90B7D53A1 Path: /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/GenerationalStorage.framework/Versions/A/Support/revisiond Codesigning ID: com.apple.revisiond Shared Cache: 25AE5A2A-FE2A-3998-8D4E-F3C5C6E6CEB6 slid base address 0x189834000, slide 0x9834000 (System Primary) Architecture: arm64e Parent: launchd [1] UID: 0 Sudden Term: Tracked Memory Limit: 50MB Jetsam Priority: 40 Footprint: 6225 KB Time Since Fork: 1740319s Num samples: 940 (1-940) Num threads: 5 Note: 1 idle work queue thread omitted [...] Thread 0xc0616d 940 samples (1-940) priority 46 (base 4) last ran 241692.754s ago 940 start_wqthread + 8 (libsystem_pthread.dylib + 7068) [0x189d0ab9c] 940 _pthread_wqthread + 292 (libsystem_pthread.dylib + 11852) [0x189d0be4c] 940 _dispatch_workloop_worker_thread + 692 (libdispatch.dylib + 85356) [0x189b65d6c] 940 _dispatch_root_queue_drain_deferred_wlh + 292 (libdispatch.dylib + 87156) [0x189b66474] 940 _dispatch_lane_invoke + 440 (libdispatch.dylib + 45048) [0x189b5bff8] 940 _dispatch_lane_serial_drain + 944 (libdispatch.dylib + 42420) [0x189b5b5b4] 940 _dispatch_client_callout + 16 (libdispatch.dylib + 113364) [0x189b6cad4] 940 _dispatch_call_block_and_release + 32 (libdispatch.dylib + 7004) [0x189b52b5c] 940 ??? (revisiond + 168768) [0x10494d340] 940 ??? (revisiond + 165940) [0x10494c834] 940 ??? (revisiond + 40264) [0x10492dd48] 940 ??? (revisiond + 56680) [0x104931d68] 940 <patched truncated backtrace> 940 removexattr + 8 (libsystem_kernel.dylib + 23768) [0x189cd1cd8] *940 ??? (kernel.release.t6000 + 15240) [0xfffffe000886fb88] *940 ??? (kernel.release.t6000 + 1886348) [0xfffffe0008a3888c] *940 ??? (kernel.release.t6000 + 7730436) [0xfffffe0008fcb504] *940 ??? (kernel.release.t6000 + 2759592) [0xfffffe0008b0dba8] *940 ??? (kernel.release.t6000 + 2808244) [0xfffffe0008b199b4] *940 apfs_vnop_removexattr + 1044 (apfs + 474512) [0xfffffe000be8d4d0] *940 decmpfs_cnode_set_vnode_state + 80 (kernel.release.t6000 + 2945816) [0xfffffe0008b3b318] *940 IORWLockWrite + 184 (kernel.release.t6000 + 496184) [0xfffffe00088e5238] *940 ??? (kernel.release.t6000 + 494624) [0xfffffe00088e4c20] *940 ??? (kernel.release.t6000 + 619452) [0xfffffe00089033bc] *940 ??? (kernel.release.t6000 + 624472) [0xfffffe0008904758] The bulk of the other processes are waiting for that lock. (suspended, blocked by krwlock for reading owned by revisiond [426] thread 0xc0616d) (blocked by krwlock for writing owned by revisiond [426] thread 0xc0616d) Around the time of the event, these messages were logged by revision: 2026-03-06 18:49:37.781673-0500 0x16b7 Error 0x7f92f364 426 14 revisiond: [com.apple.revisiond:default] [ERROR] CSCopyChunkIDsForToken failed for 41639 2026-03-06 18:49:37.781716-0500 0x16b7 Error 0x7f92f365 426 14 revisiond: [com.apple.revisiond:default] [ERROR] updateEntry for new entry <private> failed 2026-03-06 18:49:37.781738-0500 0x16b7 Error 0x7f92f366 426 14 revisiond: [com.apple.revisiond:default] [ERROR] no entry for '<private>' 2026-03-06 18:49:37.781754-0500 0x16b7 Error 0x7f92f367 426 14 revisiond: [com.apple.revisiond:default] [ERROR] failed assembleInfoForOffset for fsid 16777234 fileid 359684022 offset 0 size 14334 (path <private>) Our agent uses Endpoint Security Framework to monitor events, and provide anti-tamper functionality for installed components and processes. While several EndpointSecurity calls appear in the spindump stack traces, we don't have any evidence that any calls from revisiond were blocked. What we'd really like to to understand what that lock is (appears to be decompressing an object on an APFS volume), what revisiond and APFS are doing with it, and what might cause it to deadlock. Of note, one of our processes is also waiting on that lock, one thread for reading and the other for writing. This issue affects machines running several macOS versions (15.x, 26.x). The machine in the examples is running macOS 26.3 (25D125)
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Apr ’26
Endpoint Security entitlement for open-source behavioral monitoring tool
Hi, I’m building a macOS tool that analyzes process behavior to detect autonomous / AI-like activity locally (process trees, file access patterns, and network usage). The system is fully user-space and runs locally in real time. I’m planning to use the Endpoint Security Framework for process and file event monitoring. This is an open-source project (non-enterprise), developed by a solo developer. My question: What are the realistic chances of getting Endpoint Security entitlements approved for this type of project? Are there specific requirements or common reasons for rejection I should be aware of? Thanks, sivan-rnd
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410
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Mar ’26
Current wisdom on multiple XPC services in a System Extension?
I'm following up on a couple of forum threads from 2020 to get more clarity on the current guidance for supporting multiple XPC services in system extensions. For context, I'm trying to create a system extension that contains both an Endpoint Security client and a Network Extension filter, and I'm seeing indications that the system may not expect this and doesn't handle it smoothly. First: Previous guidance indicated that the system would automatically provide a Mach service named <TeamID>.<BundleID>.xpc to use for communicating with the system extension. However, the SystemExtension man page currently documents an Info.plist key called NSEndpointSecurityMachServiceName and suggests that the default service name is deprecated; and in fact if this key is not set, I find a message in the Console: The extension from () is using the deprecated default mach service name. Please update the extension to set the NSEndpointSecurityMachServiceName key in the Info.plist file. I have accordingly set this key, but I wanted to confirm that this is the current best practice. Second, and more interesting: Another user was trying to do something similar and observed that the Mach service for the endpoint security client wasn't available but the NE filter was. Quinn did some research and replied that this was intended behavior, quoting the EndpointSecurity man page: "If ES extension is combined with a Network Extension, set the NEMachServiceName key in the Info.plist" (which I have also done), and concluding from this: ... if you have a combined ES and NE system extension then the Mach service provided by the NE side takes precedence. However, the current man page does not include this quoted text and says nothing about a combined ES and NE system extension. So I'm wondering about current best practice. If I do combine the ES and NE clients in a single system extension, should they each declare the Mach service name under their respective Info.plist keys? And could there be a single XPC listener for both, using the same service name under each key, or would it be better to have separate XPC listeners? Alternatively, would it be preferable to have each component in a separate system extension? (This would entail some rearchitecting of the current design.)
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Mar ’26