I am trying to pass smart card PIN from a custom auth plugin with tag kAuthorizationEnvironmentPassword. I added pam_smartcard.so to login stack (\etc\pam.d\login) but the changes do not take place. # login: auth account password session auth sufficient pam_smartcard.so auth optional pam_krb5.so use_kcminit auth optional pam_ntlm.so try_first_pass auth optional pam_mount.so try_first_pass auth required pam_opendirectory.so try_first_pass account required pam_nologin.so account required pam_opendirectory.so password required pam_opendirectory.so session required pam_launchd.so session required pam_uwtmp.so session optional pam_mount.so What could possible be going wrong in this ? Also is there an API to trigger authorization_ctk from a custom auth plugin to work with smart card ?

I created a custom PAM module following this and It works fine with etc/pam.d/sudo but doesn't work with etc/pam.d/authorization and etc/pam.d/login. sudo # sudo: auth account password session auth include sudo_local auth sufficient /usr/local/Cellar/cpam/1.0.0/lib/security/cpam.so auth sufficient pam_smartcard.so auth required pam_opendirectory.so account required pam_permit.so password required pam_deny.so session required pam_permit.so authorization # authorization: auth account auth sufficient /usr/local/Cellar/cpam/1.0.0/lib/security/cpam.so auth optional pam_krb5.so use_first_pass use_kcminit no_auth_ccache auth optional pam_ntlm.so use_first_pass auth sufficient pam_smartcard.so use_first_pass account required pam_opendirectory.so Is it even allowed to add a custom PAM to \etc\pam.d\login or etc\pam.d\authorization ? Is it possible to create a mechanism with custom logic and replace it with<string>builtin:authenticate,privileged</string> in system.login.console authorization right ? Note: I have also tried moving the .so file to /usr/lib/pam but it failed even after disabling SIP.

I need to integrate BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) functionality into an authorization plugin. Specifically, I want to use a beacon to send a notification to the user if the app is not running or has been killed. However, I’ve encountered a significant limitation: Core Bluetooth is not permitted to be used within authorization plugins, whereas the Multipeer Connectivity framework operates without issue which use WiFi. This has led me to a few questions: What are the fundamental differences in entitlements or restrictions between Core Bluetooth and the Multipeer Connectivity(WiFi) framework that could explain why Core Bluetooth is disallowed in authorization plugins? Are there specific technical or security concerns associated with Core Bluetooth that prevent its use in these contexts, while the Multipeer Connectivity framework is allowed? Given that Google’s Nearby Connections API can work within authorization plugins, could there be any similar approaches or best practices for implementing BLE functionality in scenarios involving authorization plugins? For reference, you can check Google’s Nearby Connections API here: Google Nearby Connections - https://developers.google.com/nearby/connections/swift/get-started Any insights or suggestions on how to overcome this limitation or alternative approaches to achieve the desired functionality would be greatly appreciated. Thank you in advance for your help!

Description: I am attempting to use the OpenDirectory API ODRecord.changePassword to change a user's password without needing the old password, given that I have the appropriate permissions. The goal is to ensure that the password change operation bypasses third-party tools such as EDR or eBPF apps that might otherwise intercept commands, as the operation occurs directly via the API. Problem: When invoking the OpenDirectory API from a launch daemon with root privileges, I receive the following error message: Error Domain=com.apple.OpenDirectory Code=4001 "Operation was denied because the current credentials do not have the appropriate privileges." UserInfo={NSUnderlyingError=0x135907570 {Error Domain=com.apple.OpenDirectory Code=4001 "Credential cannot update user's SecureToken" UserInfo={NSDescription=Credential cannot update user's SecureToken}}, NSLocalizedDescription=Operation was denied because the current credentials do not have the appropriate privileges., NSLocalizedFailureReason=Operation was denied because the current credentials do not have the appropriate privileges.} It seems the error is related to SecureToken, and the underlying issue is that the current credentials (even though they are root-level) do not have the necessary privileges to update the SecureToken status for the user. Steps I’ve Taken: Tested the API via a launch daemon running with root privileges. Ensured that Full Disk Access was granted to the daemon, but this did not resolve the issue. Request: Has anyone encountered this specific issue where root privileges are insufficient to update the user password via the OpenDirectory API ? What additional steps or permissions are required for a user password change? Is there a specific API or method to elevate the privileges for modifying SecureToken, or a workaround to overcome this limitation? Any insights or guidance on this issue would be greatly appreciated! Thank you in advance for your help!

I'm looking for confirmation on the security aspects of fdesetup authrestart when used on a FileVault-enabled Mac. As I understand it, this command temporarily stores the decryption key in memory to allow the system to restart without requiring manual entry of the FileVault password. However, I have a few security-related concerns: Storage of the Decryption Key: Where exactly is the key stored during an authenticated restart? Is it protected within the Secure Enclave (for Apple Silicon Macs) or the T2 Security Chip on Intel Macs? Key Lifetime &amp; Wiping: At what point is the decryption key erased from memory? Does it persist in any form after the system has fully rebooted? Protection Against Physical Attacks: If an attacker gains physical access to the machine before the restart completes, is there any possibility that they could extract the decryption key from memory? Cold Boot Attack Resistance: Is there any risk that advanced forensic techniques (such as freezing RAM to retain data) could be used to recover the decryption key after issuing an authenticated restart? Malware Resistance: Could a compromised system (e.g., root access by an attacker) intercept or misuse the decryption key before the restart? I understand that on Apple Silicon and T2-equipped Macs, FileVault keys are tied to hardware-based encryption, making unauthorized access difficult. However, I'd like to confirm whether Authenticated Restart introduces any new risks compared to a standard FileVault-enabled boot process.

I am developing a custom authorization plugin for macOS, and I’ve encountered an issue where the auth plugin view remains visible on the home screen for a few seconds after login. Issue Details: After entering valid credentials, I call setResult(.allow) in my plugin to proceed with login. The authentication succeeds, and macOS starts transitioning to the home screen. However, for a few seconds after login, the authorization plugin view is still visible on the home screen before it disappears. I have observed this issue even when using Apple's sample authorization plugin. Observation: This issue occurs without an external monitor (on a single built-in display). If I manually close the plugin window inside Destroy(AuthPlugin.mechanism), then the auth plugin views do not appear on the home screen, which seems to fix the issue. However, when I do this, a gray screen appears for about a second before the desktop environment fully loads. I suspect that the gray screen appears due to the time macOS takes to fully load the home screen environment after login. Questions: Why does the authorization plugin view persist on the home screen for a few seconds after login? Is manually closing the plugin window in Destroy(AuthPlugin.mechanism) the correct way to prevent this, or is there a better approach? Is my assumption that the gray screen appears due to the home screen not being fully loaded correct? If the gray screen is caused by home screen loading, is there a system notification or event I can listen to in order to know when the home screen has fully loaded?

I'm using Secure Enclave to generate and use a private key like this: let access = SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags(nil, kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly, [.privateKeyUsage, .biometryAny], nil) let attributes: [String: Any] = [ kSecAttrKeyType as String: kSecAttrKeyTypeECSECPrimeRandom, kSecAttrKeySizeInBits as String: 256, kSecAttrTokenID as String: kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave, kSecAttrAccessControl as String: access as Any, kSecAttrApplicationTag as String: "com.example.key".data(using: .utf8)!, kSecReturnRef as String: true ] let privateKey = SecKeyCreateRandomKey(attributes as CFDictionary, nil) Later, I use this key to sign a message: let signature = SecKeyCreateSignature(privateKey, .ecdsaSignatureMessageX962SHA256, dataToSign as CFData, nil) This prompts for biometric authentication, but shows the default system text. How can I customize or localize the biometric prompt (e.g., title, description, button text) shown during SecKeyCreateSignature? Thanks!

I’m using a custom Installer plug-in (InstallerPane) to collect sensitive user input (username/password) during install. After the payload is laid down, I need to send those values to a newly installed agent (LaunchAgent) to persist them. What I tried I expose an XPC Mach service from the agent and have the plug-in call it. On the agent side I validate the XPC client using the audit token → SecCodeCopyGuestWithAttributes → SecCodeCheckValidity. However, the client process is InstallerRemotePluginService-* (Apple’s view service that hosts all plug-ins), so the signature I see is Apple’s, not mine. I can’t distinguish which plug-in made the call. Any suggestion on better approach ?

While working with Platform SSO on macOS, I’m trying to better understand how the system handles cases where a user’s local account password becomes unsynchronized with their Identity Provider (IdP) password—for example, when the device is offline during a password change. My assumption is that macOS may store some form of persistent token during the Platform SSO user registration process (such as a certificate or similar credential), and that this token could allow the system to unlock the user’s login keychain even if the local password no longer matches the IdP password. I’m hoping to get clarification on the following: Does macOS actually use a persistent token to unlock the login keychain when the local account password is out of sync with the IdP password? If so, how is that mechanism designed to work? If such a capability exists, is it something developers can leverage to enable a true passwordless authentication experience at the login window and lock screen (i.e., avoiding the need for a local password fallback)? I’m trying to confirm what macOS officially supports so I can understand whether passwordless login is achievable using the persistent-token approach. Thanks in advance for any clarification.

While working with Platform SSO on macOS, I’m trying to better understand how the system handles cases where a user’s local account password becomes unsynchronized with their Identity Provider (IdP) password—for example, when the device is offline during a password change. My assumption is that macOS may store some form of persistent token during the Platform SSO user registration process (such as a certificate or similar credential), and that this token could allow the system to unlock the user’s login keychain even if the local password no longer matches the IdP password. I’m hoping to get clarification on the following: Does macOS actually use a persistent token to unlock the login keychain when the local account password is out of sync with the IdP password? If so, how is that mechanism designed to work? If such a capability exists, is it something developers can leverage to enable a true passwordless authentication experience at the login window and lock screen (i.e., avoiding the need for a local password fallback)? I’m trying to confirm what macOS officially supports so I can understand whether passwordless login is achievable using the persistent-token approach. Thanks in advance for any clarification.

While working with Platform SSO on macOS, I’m trying to better understand how the system handles cases where a user’s local account password becomes unsynchronized with their Identity Provider (IdP) password—for example, when the device is offline during a password change. My assumption is that macOS may store some form of persistent token during the Platform SSO user registration process (such as a certificate or similar credential), and that this token could allow the system to unlock the user’s login keychain even if the local password no longer matches the IdP password. I’m hoping to get clarification on the following: Does macOS actually use a persistent token to unlock the login keychain when the local account password is out of sync with the IdP password? If so, how is that mechanism designed to work? If such a capability exists, is it something developers can leverage to enable a true passwordless authentication experience at the login window and lock screen (i.e., avoiding the need for a local password fallback)? I’m trying to confirm what macOS officially supports so I can understand whether passwordless login is achievable using the persistent-token approach. Thanks in advance for any clarification.

Hi, We are implementing Platform SSO and using attestKey during registration via ASAuthorizationProviderExtensionLoginManager. Could you clarify whether the attestKey flow involves sending attestation data to an Apple server for verification (similar to App Attest in the DeviceCheck framework), or if the attestation certificate chain is generated and signed entirely on-device without any Apple server interaction? The App Attest flow is clearly documented as using Apple’s attestation service, but the Platform SSO process is less clearly described. Thank you.