General: Forums topic: Privacy & Security Apple Platform Security support document Developer > Security Cryptography: Forums tags: Security, Apple CryptoKit Security framework documentation Apple CryptoKit framework documentation Common Crypto man pages — For the full list of pages, run: % man -k 3cc For more information about man pages, see Reading UNIX Manual Pages. On Cryptographic Key Formats forums post SecItem attributes for keys forums post CryptoCompatibility sample code Keychain: Forums tags: Security Security > Keychain Items documentation TN3137 On Mac keychain APIs and implementations SecItem Fundamentals forums post SecItem Pitfalls and Best Practices forums post Investigating hard-to-reproduce keychain problems forums post Smart cards and other secure tokens: Forums tag: CryptoTokenKit CryptoTokenKit framework documentation Mac-specific resources: Forums tags: Security Foundation, Security Interface Security Foundation framework documentation Security Interface framework documentation BSD Privilege Escalation on macOS Related: Networking Resources — This covers high-level network security, including HTTPS and TLS. Network Extension Resources — This covers low-level network security, including VPN and content filters. Code Signing Resources Notarisation Resources Trusted Execution Resources — This includes Gatekeeper. App Sandbox Resources Share and Enjoy — Quinn “The Eskimo!” @ Developer Technical Support @ Apple let myEmail = "eskimo" + "1" + "@" + "apple.com"

I regularly help developers with keychain problems, both here on DevForums and for my Day Job™ in DTS. Many of these problems are caused by a fundamental misunderstanding of how the keychain works. This post is my attempt to explain that. I wrote it primarily so that Future Quinn™ can direct folks here rather than explain everything from scratch (-: If you have questions or comments about any of this, put them in a new thread and apply the Security tag so that I see it. Share and Enjoy — Quinn “The Eskimo!” @ Developer Technical Support @ Apple let myEmail = "eskimo" + "1" + "@" + "apple.com" SecItem: Fundamentals or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the SecItem API The SecItem API seems very simple. After all, it only has four function calls, how hard can it be? In reality, things are not that easy. Various factors contribute to making this API much trickier than it might seem at first glance. This post explains the fundamental underpinnings of the keychain. For information about specific issues, see its companion post, SecItem: Pitfalls and Best Practices. Keychain Documentation Your basic starting point should be Keychain Items. If your code runs on the Mac, also read TN3137 On Mac keychain APIs and implementations. Read the doc comments in <Security/SecItem.h>. In many cases those doc comments contain critical tidbits. When you read keychain documentation [1] and doc comments, keep in mind that statements specific to iOS typically apply to iPadOS, tvOS, and watchOS as well (r. 102786959). Also, they typically apply to macOS when you target the data protection keychain. Conversely, statements specific to macOS may not apply when you target the data protection keychain. [1] Except TN3137, which is very clear about this (-: Caveat Mac Developer macOS supports two different keychain implementations: the original file-based keychain and the iOS-style data protection keychain. IMPORTANT If you’re able to use the data protection keychain, do so. It’ll make your life easier. See the Careful With that Shim, Mac Developer section of SecItem: Pitfalls and Best Practices for more about this. TN3137 On Mac keychain APIs and implementations explains this distinction. It also says: The file-based keychain is on the road to deprecation. This is talking about the implementation, not any specific API. The SecItem API can’t be deprecated because it works with both the data protection keychain and the file-based keychain. However, Apple has deprecated many APIs that are specific to the file-based keychain, for example, SecKeychainCreate. TN3137 also notes that some programs, like launchd daemons, can’t use the file-based keychain. If you’re working on such a program then you don’t have to worry about the deprecation of these file-based keychain APIs. You’re already stuck with the file-based keychain implementation, so using a deprecated file-based keychain API doesn’t make things worse. The Four Freedoms^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H Functions The SecItem API contains just four functions: SecItemAdd(_:_:) SecItemCopyMatching(_:_:) SecItemUpdate(_:_:) SecItemDelete(_:) These directly map to standard SQL database operations: SecItemAdd(_:_:) maps to INSERT. SecItemCopyMatching(_:_:) maps to SELECT. SecItemUpdate(_:_:) maps to UPDATE. SecItemDelete(_:) maps to DELETE. You can think of each keychain item class (generic password, certificate, and so on) as a separate SQL table within the database. The rows of that table are the individual keychain items for that class and the columns are the attributes of those items. Note Except for the digital identity class, kSecClassIdentity, where the values are split across the certificate and key tables. See Digital Identities Aren’t Real in SecItem: Pitfalls and Best Practices. This is not an accident. The data protection keychain is actually implemented as an SQLite database. If you’re curious about its structure, examine it on the Mac by pointing your favourite SQLite inspection tool — for example, the sqlite3 command-line tool — at the keychain database in ~/Library/Keychains/UUU/keychain-2.db, where UUU is a UUID. WARNING Do not depend on the location and structure of this file. These have changed in the past and are likely to change again in the future. If you embed knowledge of them into a shipping product, it’s likely that your product will have binary compatibility problems at some point in the future. The only reason I’m mentioning them here is because I find it helpful to poke around in the file to get a better understanding of how the API works. For information about which attributes are supported by each keychain item class — that is, what columns are in each table — see the Note box at the top of Item Attribute Keys and Values. Alternatively, look at the Attribute Key Constants doc comment in <Security/SecItem.h>. Uniqueness A critical part of the keychain model is uniqueness. How does the keychain determine if item A is the same as item B? It turns out that this is class dependent. For each keychain item class there is a set of attributes that form the uniqueness constraint for items of that class. That is, if you try to add item A where all of its attributes are the same as item B, the add fails with errSecDuplicateItem. For more information, see the errSecDuplicateItem page. It has lists of attributes that make up this uniqueness constraint, one for each class. These uniqueness constraints are a major source of confusion, as discussed in the Queries and the Uniqueness Constraints section of SecItem: Pitfalls and Best Practices. Parameter Blocks Understanding The SecItem API is a classic ‘parameter block’ API. All of its inputs are dictionaries, and you have to know which properties to set in each dictionary to achieve your desired result. Likewise for when you read properties in output dictionaries. There are five different property groups: The item class property, kSecClass, determines the class of item you’re operating on: kSecClassGenericPassword, kSecClassCertificate, and so on. The item attribute properties, like kSecAttrAccessGroup, map directly to keychain item attributes. The search properties, like kSecMatchLimit, control how the system runs a query. The return type properties, like kSecReturnAttributes, determine what values the query returns. The value type properties, like kSecValueRef perform multiple duties, as explained below. There are other properties that perform a variety of specific functions. For example, kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain tells macOS to use the data protection keychain instead of the file-based keychain. These properties are hard to describe in general; for the details, see the documentation for each such property. Inputs Each of the four SecItem functions take dictionary input parameters of the same type, CFDictionary, but these dictionaries are not the same. Different dictionaries support different property groups: The first parameter of SecItemAdd(_:_:) is an add dictionary. It supports all property groups except the search properties. The first parameter of SecItemCopyMatching(_:_:) is a query and return dictionary. It supports all property groups. The first parameter of SecItemUpdate(_:_:) is a pure query dictionary. It supports all property groups except the return type properties. Likewise for the only parameter of SecItemDelete(_:). The second parameter of SecItemUpdate(_:_:) is an update dictionary. It supports the item attribute and value type property groups. Outputs Two of the SecItem functions, SecItemAdd(_:_:) and SecItemCopyMatching(_:_:), return values. These output parameters are of type CFTypeRef because the type of value you get back depends on the return type properties you supply in the input dictionary: If you supply a single return type property, except kSecReturnAttributes, you get back a value appropriate for that return type. If you supply multiple return type properties or kSecReturnAttributes, you get back a dictionary. This supports the item attribute and value type property groups. To get a non-attribute value from this dictionary, use the value type property that corresponds to its return type property. For example, if you set kSecReturnPersistentRef in the input dictionary, use kSecValuePersistentRef to get the persistent reference from the output dictionary. In the single item case, the type of value you get back depends on the return type property and the keychain item class: For kSecReturnData you get back the keychain item’s data. This makes most sense for password items, where the data holds the password. It also works for certificate items, where you get back the DER-encoded certificate. Using this for key items is kinda sketchy. If you want to export a key, called SecKeyCopyExternalRepresentation. Using this for digital identity items is nonsensical. For kSecReturnRef you get back an object reference. This only works for keychain item classes that have an object representation, namely certificates, keys, and digital identities. You get back a SecCertificate, a SecKey, or a SecIdentity, respectively. For kSecReturnPersistentRef you get back a data value that holds the persistent reference. Value Type Subtleties There are three properties in the value type property group: kSecValueData kSecValueRef kSecValuePersistentRef Their semantics vary based on the dictionary type. For kSecValueData: In an add dictionary, this is the value of the item to add. For example, when adding a generic password item (kSecClassGenericPassword), the value of this key is a Data value containing the password. This is not supported in a query dictionary. In an update dictionary, this is the new value for the item. For kSecValueRef: In add and query dictionaries, the system infers the class property and attribute properties from the supplied object. For example, if you supply a certificate object (SecCertificate, created using SecCertificateCreateWithData), the system will infer a kSecClass value of kSecClassCertificate and various attribute values, like kSecAttrSerialNumber, from that certificate object. This is not supported in an update dictionary. For kSecValuePersistentRef: For query dictionaries, this uniquely identifies the item to operate on. This is not supported in add and update dictionaries. Revision History 2025-05-28 Expanded the Caveat Mac Developer section to cover some subtleties associated with the deprecation of the file-based keychain. 2023-09-12 Fixed various bugs in the revision history. Added a paragraph explaining how to determine which attributes are supported by each keychain item class. 2023-02-22 Made minor editorial changes. 2023-01-28 First posted.

By default, it seems 15.6 is shipped with git version 2.39.5 (Apple Git-154) I was wondering when Apple will ship a Git version above 2.43 to resolve this vulnerability. Git Carriage Return Line Feed (CRLF) Vulnerability (CVE-2025-48384) https://github.com/git/git/security/advisories/GHSA-vwqx-4fm8-6qc9 You can install Homebrew then install newer versions of git using Homebrew; however that installs in a new location so the vulnerability is still present as the native version is behind and updated by Apple during software updates Thanks

In the LightweightCodeRequirements framework, there is a LaunchCodeRequirement object which can be used as a requirement object for a Process for example. What I don't understand (I admit my macOS low-level knowledge is limited) is that how can this be used in a secure way that doesn't fall victim of a Time-of-Check/Time-of-Use issue. e.g. I specify a LaunchCodeRequirement via Process.launchRequirement for my process, let's say /usr/local/bin/mycommandlinetool. The LaunchCodeRequirement specifies my development team and a developer ID certificate. The process must be started in some form, before a SecCode/SecTask object can be created, rather than a SecStaticCode object (which only guarantees its validity checks to be intact as long as the file is not modified). But if the process was started, then I have no tools in my set to prevent it from executing its initialization code or similar. Then, by the time I'm able to check via SecCode/SecTask functions the LaunchCodeRequirement, I might have already ran malicious code - if mycommandlinetool was maliciously replaced. Or does the operating system use a daemon to copy the executable specified for Process to a secure location, then creates the SecStaticCode object, assesses the LaunchCodeRequirement and if passed, launches the executable from that trusted location (which would make sure it is immutable for replacement by malicious actors)? I have a hard time understanding how this works under the hood - if I remember correctly these are private APIs.

how can I prevent handshake when certificate is user installed for example if user is using Proxyman or Charles proxy and they install their own certificates now system is trusting those certificates I wanna prevent that, and exclude those certificates that are installed by user, and accept the handshake if CA certificate is in a real valid certificate defined in OS I know this can be done in android by setting something like <network-security-config> <base-config> <trust-anchors> <certificates src="system" /> </trust-anchors> </base-config> </network-security-config>

With Let's Encrypt having completely dropped support for OCSP recently [1], I wanted to ask if macOS has a means of keeping up to date with their CRLs and if so, roughly how often this occurs? I first observed an issue where a revoked-certificate test site, "revoked.badssl.com" (cert signed by Let's Encrypt), was not getting blocked on any browser, when a revocation policy was set up using the SecPolicyCreateRevocation API, in tandem with the kSecRevocationUseAnyAvailableMethod and kSecRevocationPreferCRL flags. After further investigation, I noticed that even on a fresh install of macOS, Safari does not block this test website, while Chrome and Firefox (usually) do, due to its revoked certificate. Chrome and Firefox both have their own means of dealing with CRLs, while I assume Safari uses the system Keychain and APIs. I checked cert info for the site here [2]. It was issued on 2025-07-01 20:00 and revoked an hour later. [1] https://letsencrypt.org/2024/12/05/ending-ocsp/ [2] https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=revoked.badssl.com

If I was to build an app that opened a web server at local host on a random port that resolved subdomains for local host at that port, but there was no certificate authority, signed certificate available to provide HTTPS security, would this be in violation of apples ATS policy

Hi, I run a PacketTunnelProvider embedded within a system extension. We have been having success using this; however we have problems with accessing certificates/private keys manually imported in the file-based keychain. As per this, we are explicitly targeting the file-based keychain. However when attempting to access the certificate and private key we get the following error: System error using certificate key from keychain: Error Domain=NSOSStatusErrorDomain Code=-25308 "CSSM Exception: -2147415840 CSSMERR_CSP_NO_USER_INTERACTION" (errKCInteractionNotAllowed / errSecInteractionNotAllowed: / Interaction is not allowed As per the online documentation, I would expect to be prompted for the access to the application: When an app attempts to access a keychain item for a particular purpose—like using a private key to sign a document—the system looks for an entry in the item’s ACL containing the operation. If there’s no entry that lists the operation, then the system denies access and it’s up to the calling app to try something else or to notify the user. If there is an entry that lists the operation, the system checks whether the calling app is among the entry’s trusted apps. If so, the system grants access. Otherwise, the system prompts the user for confirmation. The user may choose to Deny, Allow, or Always Allow the access. In the latter case, the system adds the app to the list of trusted apps for that entry, enabling the app to gain access in the future without prompting the user again But I do not see that prompt, and I only see the permission denied error in my program. I can work around this one of two ways Change the access control of the keychain item to Allow all applications to access this item. This is not preferable, as it essentially disables any ACLs for this item. Embed the certificate in a configuration profile that is pushed down to the device via MDM or something similar. This works at a larger scale, but if I'm trying to manually test out a certificate, I don't always want to have to set this up. Is there another way that I go about adding my application to the ACL of the keychain item? Thanks!

I am trying to create an app bundle with an xpc service. The main app creates a keychain item, and attempts to share (keychain access groups) with the xpc service it includes in its bundle. However, the xpc service always encounters a 'user interaction not allowed' error regardless of how I create the keychain item. kSecAttrAccessiblei is set to kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly, the keychain access group is set for both the main app and the xpc service and in the provisioning profile. I've tried signing and notarizing. Is it ever possible for an xpc service to access the keychain? This all on macos 15.5.

Hi Team, How can we fetch the macOS password requirement(for setting a new password) that are inforce during login for users? Is there a way to get this info in swift programming?

Hi everyone, I’m working an Objective-C lib that performs Keychain operations, such as generating cryptographic keys and signing data. The lib will be used by my team in a Java program for macOS via JNI. When working with the traditional file-based Keychain (i.e., without access control flags), everything works smoothly, no issues at all. However, as soon as I try to generate a key using access control flags SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags, the Data Protection Keychain returns error -34018 (errSecMissingEntitlement) during SecKeyCreateRandomKey. This behavior is expected. To address this, I attempted to codesign my native dynamic library (.dylib) with an entitlement plist specifying various combinations of: keychain-access-groups com.apple.security.keychain etc. with: My Apple Development certificate Developer ID Application certificate Apple Distribution certificate None of these combinations made a difference, the error persists. I’d love to clarify: Is it supported to access Data Protection Keychain / Secure Enclave Keys in this type of use case? If so, what exact entitlements does macOS expect when calling SecKeyCreateRandomKey from a native library? I’d really appreciate any guidance or clarification. Thanks in advance! Best regards, Neil

I am developing a macOS application (targeting macOS 13 and later) that is non-sandboxed and needs to install and trust a root certificate by adding it to the System keychain programmatically. I’m fine with prompting the user for admin privileges or password, if needed. So far, I have attempted to execute the following command programmatically from both: A user-level process A root-level process sudo security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/cert.pem While the certificate does get installed, it does not appear as trusted in the Keychain Access app. One more point: The app is not distributed via MDM. App will be distributed out side the app store. Questions: What is the correct way to programmatically install and trust a root certificate in the System keychain? Does this require additional entitlements, signing, or profile configurations? Is it possible outside of MDM management? Any guidance or working samples would be greatly appreciated.

Attempts to programmatically update or add numerous system-installed certificates (a common practice for organizations that rotate certificates regularly) are blocked, forcing manual, insecure, and error-prone workarounds. The root cause lies in the stricter security protocols implemented in macOS 15, specifically: System Integrity Protection (SIP) and Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) Command we are using : sudo security authorizationdb write com.apple.trust-settings.admin

I'm developing an Authorization Plug-In and have stumbled upon a concerning behavior regarding credential caching that may have security implications. Consider this scenario: I'm working on a Mac without admin privileges, and I need to temporarily disable the Firewall for some testing. An administrator physically comes to my machine, inputs their credentials to disable the Firewall, and then leaves. What follows is that, for a short period after this action, the administrator's credentials remain cached in Authorization Services. During this window, I can perform some additional privileged operations without any re-authentication. For example, I can open Activity Monitor and send SIGKILL signals to arbitrary privileged processes (!!). From what I could gather, this happens because system.preferences.network shares cached credentials with other authorization rights. Even more concerning, even when I explicitly modify the authorization database to prevent credential sharing for this specific right, the behavior persists! I suspect the issue relates to the underlying shared authentication rules (such as authenticate-admin-30, which com.apple.activitymonitor.kill uses), but I've been unable to modify these rules to test this theory. From my understanding, the most concerning aspect is that even if all system Authorization Rights were configured to not share credentials, third-party applications could still create proprietary rights that might end up sharing credentials anyway. From my Auth Plug-In, I've tried unsetting the kAuthorizationEnvironmentShared context value (even though the documentation in AuthorizationTags.h tells me that the value is ignored), and looking for ways to override the timeout for shared credentials, both without success. Finally, I'm looking to answer some questions that have been raised: I understand that this credential sharing is a feature, but isn't the behavior I described actually a security vulnerability? I worry that other (potentially more dangerous) operations may be able to exploit this. Is there a recommended way to prevent privileged credentials from being reused across arbitrary authorization rights if the original process does not destroy the auth reference? Are there any options from within an Authorization Plug-In to ensure more strict authentication boundaries? What exactly is the authorization "session" mentioned in /System/Library/Security/authorization.plist? Does this concept imply that System Settings.app and Activity Monitor.app share the same session in my previous example? This post ended up being quite long, but unfortunately, documentation on the subject seems incredibly scarce. For reference, the little information I could find came from: QA 1277 The Credentials Cache and the Authentication Dialog Comments on /System/Library/Security/authorization.plist

Hello, I’m an iOS developer and the original creator of the app "Instant Save: Reels story" (App Apple ID: 6469411763). On July 5, 2025, I received two Apple emails saying the app was transferred to another developer account. However, I did not initiate or approve this transfer. My Apple Developer account has Two-Factor Authentication enabled, and I received no OTP or request for approval. I submitted a legal dispute form via Apple’s Intellectual Property page on July 7, 2025, but I’ve only received an automated acknowledgment — no dispute number or follow-up. I’ve also contacted Apple Developer Support multiple times by phone, but they confirmed they cannot escalate legal cases or access my dispute status. Has anyone else faced this issue recently? I’m looking for any guidance or similar experiences while I await a response from Apple Legal. Thanks in advance,
 Bhautik Amipara

We are experiencing a significant issue with macOS security alerts that began on July 9th, at approximately 4:40 AM UTC. This alert is incorrectly identifying output files from our snippet tests as malware, causing these files to be blocked and moved to the Trash. This is completely disrupting our automated testing workflows. Issue Description: Alert: We are seeing the "Malware Blocked and Moved to Trash" popup window. Affected Files: The security alert triggers when attempting to execute .par files generated as outputs from our snippet tests. These .par files are unique to each individual test run; they are not a single, static tool. System-Wide Impact: This issue is impacting multiple macOS hosts across our testing infrastructure. Timeline: The issue began abruptly on July 9th, at approximately 4:40 AM UTC. Before that time, our tests were functioning correctly. macOS Versions: The problem is occurring on hosts running both macOS 14.x and 15.x. Experimental Host: Even after upgrading an experimental host to macOS 15.6 beta 2, the issue persisted. Local execution: The issue can be reproduced locally. Observations: The security system is consistently flagging these snippet test output files as malware. Since each test generates a new .par file, and this issue is impacting all generated files, the root cause doesn't appear to be specific to the code within the .par files themselves. This issue is impacting all the snippet tests, making us believe that the root cause is not related to our code. The sudden and widespread nature of the issue strongly suggests a change in a security database or rule, rather than a change in our testing code. Questions: Could a recent update to the XProtect database be the cause of this false positive? Are there any known issues or recent changes in macOS security mechanisms that could cause this kind of widespread and sudden impact? What is the recommended way to diagnose and resolve this kind of false positive? We appreciate any guidance or assistance you can provide. Thank you.

Problem : Connection error occurs in iOS26 beta while connecting to the device's softap via commercial app (Socket exception errSSLfeerBadCert CFSreamErrorDomainSSL code -9825). iOS 18 release version does not occur. Why does it cause problems? Does the iOS 26 version not cause problems? Is there a way to set it up in the app so that the iOS 26 beta doesn't cause problems? error : "alias":"SOCKET_LOG", "additional":{"currentNetworkStatus":"socket e=errSSLPeerBadCert ns WifiStatus: Connected Error Domain kCFStreamErrorDomainSSL Code-9825 "(null)" UserInfo={NSLocalizedRecoverySuggestion=Error code definition can be found in Apple's SecureTransport.h} Description : It's an issue that happens when you connect our already mass-produced apps to our home appliances (using SoftAP), and it's currently only happening in iOS 26 beta. This particular issue didn't appear until iOS 18 version. Let me know to make sure that this issue will persist with the official release of iOS 26? If the issue continues to occur with the official version, would you share any suggestions on how to mitigate or avoid it. Also, it would be helpful to find out if there are known solutions or processes such as exemptions to fix this issue.

Hello! I have a quirky situation that I am looking for a solution to. The iOS app I am working on needs to be able to communicate with systems that do not have valid root certs. Furthermore, these systems addresses will be sent to the user at run time. The use case is that administrators will provide a self signed certificate (.pem) for the iPhones to download which will then be used to pass the authentication challenge. I am fairly new to customizing trust and my understanding is that it is very easy to do it incorrectly and expose the app unintentionally. Here is our users expected workflow: An administrator creates a public ip server. The ip server is then configured with dns. A .pem file that includes a self signed certificate is created for the new dns domain. The pem file is distributed to iOS devices to download and enable trust for. When they run the app and attempt to establish connection with the server, it will not error with an SSL error. When I run the app without modification to the URLSessionDelegate method(s) I do get an SSL error. Curiously, attempting to hit the same address in Safari will not show the insecure warning and proceed without incident. What is the best way to parity the Safari use case for our app? Do I need to modify the urlSession(_ session: URLSession, didReceive challenge: URLAuthenticationChallenge, completionHandler: @escaping (URLSession.AuthChallengeDisposition, URLCredential?) -> Void) method to examine the NSURLAuthenticationMethodServerTrust? Maybe there is a way to have the delegate look through all the certs in keychain or something to find a match? What would you advise here? Sincerely thank you for taking the time to help me, ~Puzzled iOS Dev

Hey, there are plans to design a government app. When a citizen will login they will see their passport, driving license etc... What is the solution of avoiding mandatory in-app user data deletion?

Hello Apple Developer Team, We’re preparing a future version of our enterprise app, Lenovo XClarity Mobile, and would like to request guidance regarding a potential ATS exception scenario. Context: The app is used exclusively in enterprise environments. It connects via USB to a local Lenovo Think Server (embedded device). The connection is entirely offline (no internet use). The app uses SSDP to discover the device over the USB-attached local network. Communication occurs via HTTPS over 192.168.x.x, tunneled through the USB interface. The server uses a factory-generated self-signed certificate. Planned Behavior: In a future release, we plan to prompt the user with a certificate trust confirmation if a self-signed cert is detected locally. Only if the user explicitly agrees, the connection proceeds. Here’s a simplified code example: if challenge.protectionSpace.authenticationMethod == NSURLAuthenticationMethodServerTrust, let serverTrust = challenge.protectionSpace.serverTrust { let accepted = UserDefaults.standard.bool(forKey: "AcceptInvalidCertificate") if accepted { let credential = URLCredential(trust: serverTrust) completionHandler(.useCredential, credential) return } // Show user confirmation alert before accepting } **Key Notes:** This logic is not in the current App Store version. ATS is fully enforced in production today. The exception would only apply to USB-based local sessions, not to internet endpoints. Question: Would such an implementation be acceptable under App Store and platform guidelines, given the restricted use case (offline, USB-only, user-confirmed self-signed certs)? We're looking for pre-approval or confirmation before investing further in development. Thank you in advance!

Hi Forum, We’re building a security-focused SDK for iOS that includes SIM Binding and SIM Swap detection to help prevent fraud and unauthorised device access, particularly in the context of banking and fintech apps. We understand that iOS limits access to SIM-level data, and that previously available APIs (such as those in CoreTelephony, now deprecated from iOS 16 onwards) provide only limited support for these use cases. We have a few questions and would appreciate any guidance from the community or Apple engineers: Q1. Are there any best practices or Apple-recommended approaches for binding a SIM to a device or user account? Q2. Is there a reliable way to detect a SIM swap when the app is not running (e.g., via system callback, entitlement, or background mechanism)? Q3. Are fields like GID1, GID2, or ICCID accessible through any public APIs or entitlements (such as com.apple.coretelephony.IdentityAccess)? If so, what is the process to request access? Q4. For dual SIM and eSIM scenarios, is there a documented approach to identify which SIM is active or whether a SIM slot has changed? Q5. In a banking or regulated environment, is it possible for an app vendor (e.g., a bank) to acquire certain entitlements from Apple and securely expose that information to a security SDK like ours? What would be the compliant or recommended way to structure such a partnership? Thanks in advance for any insights!

Dear Apple Team, I am reaching out regarding the need for more sophisticated location verification APIs beyond basic IP lookup capabilities. As online fraud continues to evolve, IP-based geolocation has proven insufficient for many business use cases requiring accurate location verification. Would it be possible to discuss this proposal with your API development team? I believe this would be valuable for the entire iOS and macOS developer ecosystem while maintaining Apple's commitment to user privacy.