We generate Secure Enclave keys via SecKeyCreateRandomKey with kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave on macOS. We need to prove to a remote server that the key is genuinely hardware-bound, not a software key claiming to be one. Is there any API on macOS for an app to obtain an Apple-signed certificate or attestation statement for such a Secure Enclave key, similar to how ASAuthorizationProviderExtensionLoginManager.attestKey() works within Platform SSO but available to general apps? Or other possible workaround for this? Thank you!

Hey guys, I'm building a managed macOS app (credential-provider extension) that needs an MDM-provisioned, hardware-bound, attested identity via the ManagedApp framework on macOS 27 which just released days ago, and I've hit a documentation contradiction. By reading through the docs, my understanding of the ManagedApp identity path is com.apple.configuration.app.managed → Identities → com.apple.asset.credential.acme. But the OS27 ACME schema says, for both HardwareBound and Attest: "On macOS, this is a required key. Set the value to false" (https://github.com/apple/device-management/blob/seed_OS_27_0/declarative/declarations/assets/credentials/acme.yaml#L66) — implying a software key. However, the macOS 27 release notes say ManagedApp deploys "hardware-bound identities" on macOS. So I am wondering that on macOS 27 + Apple silicon, can a ManagedApp-provisioned ACME identity actually be HardwareBound: true / Attest: true? If yes, is the acme.yaml "set to false on macOS" text just stale? If no, how is the documented "hardware-bound identities" capability delivered? And would that identity gonna be able to be used by the app / app extension? Thanks!

Hey guys, I posted a similar thread in Privacy channel earlier, but their engineer points me to here: https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/831492 I'm building a managed macOS app (credential-provider extension) that needs an MDM-provisioned, hardware-bound, attested identity via the ManagedApp framework on macOS 27 which just released days ago, and I've hit a documentation contradiction. By reading through the docs, my understanding of the ManagedApp identity path is com.apple.configuration.app.managed → Identities → com.apple.asset.credential.acme. But the OS27 ACME schema says, for both HardwareBound and Attest: "On macOS, this is a required key. Set the value to false" (https://github.com/apple/device-management/blob/seed_OS_27_0/declarative/declarations/assets/credentials/acme.yaml#L66) — implying a software key. However, the macOS 27 release notes say ManagedApp deploys "hardware-bound identities" on macOS. So I am wondering that on macOS 27 + Apple silicon, can a ManagedApp-provisioned ACME identity actually be HardwareBound: true / Attest: true? If yes, is the acme.yaml "set to false on macOS" text just stale? If no, how is the documented "hardware-bound identities" capability delivered? And would that identity gonna be able to be used by the app / app extension? Thanks!

Hi, The WWDC session noted App Attest is supported on macOS 27, but only for certain extension types (Action and SSO were the examples shown IIRC). Is there a definitive list of which extension types support DCAppAttestService on macOS 27 — and is the credential-provider extension (ASCredentialProviderExtension) among them? If credential-provider extensions are not supported, in an app that ships a credential-provider extension, can I add a separate (e.g. SSO or Action) extension — or use the containing app — to perform App Attest and generate/attest a key, then use that key from the credential-provider extension (e.g. via a shared keychain access group)? Or is the attested key inherently bound to the attesting process and not shareable? Thanks!

Hey there, I'm trying to building an iOS credential provider (ASCredentialProviderExtension, iOS 17+) that manages passkeys backed by keys generated in the Secure Enclave, attested via App Attest. My question is about the cross-device (FIDO2 hybrid / "passkey on a nearby device") flow, where a phone authenticates a sign-in initiated on a separate client device (e.g. a laptop browser). Specifically, Can a third-party credential provider serve as the authenticator in this flow, signing with its own key — or is the cross-device role reserved for iCloud Keychain? If it can, does the OS handle the BLE advertisement and tunnel/handshake on the provider's behalf? I ask because it seems like CBPeripheralManager.startAdvertising(_:) will not emit raw bytes, so an app can't emit a CTAP hybrid advert itself. If neither is supported, is there any supported API — including MDM-managed/supervised-device capabilities — for an app to act as a cross-device FIDO2 authenticator with a non-iCloud-Keychain key? Thanks!