App Sandbox

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App Sandbox is a macOS access control technology designed to contain damage to the system and user data if an app becomes compromised.

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App Sandbox Resources
General: Forums subtopic: Privacy & Security > General Forums tag: App Sandbox App Sandbox documentation App Sandbox Design Guide documentation — This is no longer available from Apple. There’s still some info in there that isn’t covered by the current docs but, with the latest updates, it’s pretty minimal (r. 110052019). Still, if you’re curious, you can consult an old copy [1]. App Sandbox Temporary Exception Entitlements archived documentation — To better understand the role of temporary exception entitlements, see this post. Embedding a command-line tool in a sandboxed app documentation Discovering and diagnosing App Sandbox violations (replaces the Viewing Sandbox Violation Reports forums post) Resolving App Sandbox Inheritance Problems forums post The Case for Sandboxing a Directly Distributed App forums post Implementing Script Attachment in a Sandboxed App forums post Share and Enjoy — Quinn “The Eskimo!” @ Developer Technical Support @ Apple let myEmail = "eskimo" + "1" + "@" + "apple.com" [1] For example, this one archived by the Wayback Machine.
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Jul ’25
CTFontManagerCreateFontRequestRunLoopSource does not receive events in macOS 27
CTFontManagerCreateFontRequestRunLoopSource does not receive any font requests on macOS 27, since beta 5. This API worked fine until macOS 27 beta 4, including previous macOS releases. It looks like this is caused by the App Sandbox. When the com.apple.security.app-sandbox entitlement is disabled the font request source does receive events. Report including sample project: FB24764122 let source = CTFontManagerCreateFontRequestRunLoopSource(0, { (dict, pid) in /* does not receive events when sandboxed */ } CFRunLoopAddSource(CFRunLoopGetCurrent(), source, .defaultMode) Is this a deliberate change or is this a bug in macOS 27? Is there an entitlement that can be set to enable the API in sandboxed apps? My application is distributed on the Mac App Store and as standalone app. Both are properly sandboxed for added security. Disabling the App Sandbox for this specific API would be very undesirable as users will lose all Sandbox benefits.
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Loading User Installed VST3 Plugins While Remaining Sandboxed on MacOS
Hi, I’m developing a native macOS music app intended for the Mac App Store. We already support Audio Units and are investigating VST3 instrument and effect hosting on Apple Silicon. Users would install plugins themselves, typically in: /Library/Audio/Plug-Ins/VST3 ~/Library/Audio/Plug-Ins/VST3 The app would load these third-party plugin bundles using public APIs, such as CFBundleLoadExecutableAndReturnError. Plugins may be signed by developers with different Team IDs. Our app would not download or install them. Is there a supported way to load and execute these bundles while the hosting process remains sandboxed throughout? If so, which APIs and entitlements should we use? Specifically, I’m trying to distinguish permission to read a plugin bundle from permission to load its executable code. Would user selected folder access and security scoped bookmarks cover the sandbox access requirements, or is another mechanism needed? I understand that com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation addresses loading code signed by other developers, but does not itself grant sandbox file access. We cannot rely on an Audio Unit compatibility exception that disables the host’s sandbox. App Review Guideline 3.1.1 (https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/#in-app-purchase) explicitly allows Mac App Store apps to host plugins enabled outside the App Store. I’m looking for the supported technical approach under App Sandbox, rather than preapproval for our app. We’re checking this before implementation, so we don’t yet have a failing reproducer. Any relevant documentation, sample code or existing discussion would be appreciated. Thanks, Ben
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Kernel Sandbox/System Policy intermittently denies ALL file access (not just mount syscall) on NFS mounts
I'm seeing a recurring issue on macOS 26.5.2 (build 25F84) where the kernel's Sandbox/System Policy layer intermittently denies file access on NFS mount points from local network servers. Posting here in case anyone recognizes this pattern or has a workaround, and flagging it since I've also filed a Feedback Assistant report (with a live-captured sysdiagnose) for the same issue. WHAT HAPPENS Two independent NFS mounts to two separate, unrelated servers on my LAN start failing simultaneously with "Operation not permitted." The kernel log shows: kernel: (Sandbox) System Policy: mount_nfs(PID) deny(1) file-mount /path/to/mount Critically, it's not limited to the mount syscall - within the same few-second window, System Policy also denies ls, perl, diskutil, and even umount -f on the exact same path, for otherwise unrelated processes. So it looks like a transient, path-scoped kernel decision rather than something specific to NFS or the mount syscall. It self-heals anywhere from seconds to ~30 minutes later, then recurs - documented 30-80+ occurrences/day via a background watchdog script. WHAT I'VE RULED OUT Server-side cause: two independent servers on different hardware fail identically at the same instant. Network issue: checked network logs in the same window, no correlated connectivity event. Third-party kext conflict: kextstat shows zero third-party kexts loaded. syspolicyd database corruption: no "ASP: Validation category" signature present. TCC/Full Disk Access: already granted; the denying layer is kernel Sandbox "System Policy," not TCC. QUESTION Has anyone else run into System Policy denying file-mount/file-read-data/file-unmount on network volume paths intermittently like this? Is there any userland way to inspect or reset whatever internal state drives this decision (I haven't found one - no spctl/tccutil/sysctl lever that touches it)? Happy to share more log excerpts if useful.
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Sandboxed Mac app denied mach-lookup com.apple.cloudd when signed with Mac Team Store Provisioning Profile on macOS 26
A sandboxed Mac app with correct CloudKit entitlements fails to connect to com.apple.cloudd (the CloudKit daemon) when distributed via TestFlight (Mac Team Store Provisioning Profile). The identical binary works correctly when launched from Xcode (Mac Team Provisioning Profile also present). All entitlements are correctly embedded and the App ID is properly configured in Apple Developer Portal. Environment macOS 26.5.1 (25F80) Xcode 26.5 (17F42) SwiftData with NSPersistentCloudKitContainer / ModelConfiguration(cloudKitDatabase: .private(...)) Steps to Reproduce Create a sandboxed Mac app using SwiftData with CloudKit sync Enable iCloud + CloudKit in Signing & Capabilities Archive and distribute to TestFlight (Mac Team Store Provisioning Profile) Install via TestFlight on macOS 26 and launch Check Console for kernel sandbox messages Expected Result CloudKit connects to com.apple.cloudd and syncs data, matching behavior of the iOS version using the same container. Actual Result Console shows repeated kernel sandbox denials followed by CloudKit setup failure: kernel Sandbox: CheatSheet Mac(82347) deny(1) mach-lookup com.apple.cloudd kernel Sandbox: CheatSheet Mac(82347) deny(1) mach-lookup com.apple.duetactivityscheduler CheatSheet Mac CoreData+CloudKit: Failed to set up CloudKit integration for store Error Domain=CKErrorDomain Code=6 "Error connecting to CloudKit daemon." Key Diagnostic Finding When launched from Xcode, taskgated-helper validates both the Mac Team Store Provisioning Profile AND the Mac Team Provisioning Profile, and CloudKit succeeds: cloudd: TCC approved access for container containerID=iCloud.com.michaelendres.CheatSheet:Production When launched from TestFlight, only the Mac Team Store Provisioning Profile is present, and the sandbox denies com.apple.cloudd despite identical entitlements in the binary: codesign -d --entitlements shows: com.apple.developer.icloud-services: [CloudKit] com.apple.developer.icloud-container-identifiers: [iCloud.com.michaelendres.CheatSheet] com.apple.developer.icloud-container-environment: Production com.apple.security.app-sandbox: true Conclusion The Mac Team Store Provisioning Profile on macOS 26 does not appear to grant the sandbox exception for mach-lookup com.apple.cloudd, while the Mac Team Provisioning Profile (development) does. This prevents any Mac App Store / TestFlight app using CloudKit from syncing on macOS 26.
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AVSpeechSynthesizer Enhanced voices produce silent audio in sandboxed Mac Catalyst app
I have reproduced an issue with AVSpeechSynthesizer on macOS 26.6.2 (25G83) using a minimal Mac Catalyst application. Environment macOS 26.6.2 (25G83) Apple Silicon Xcode 26.x Mac Catalyst AVSpeechSynthesizer Enhanced voice: com.apple.voice.enhanced.en-GB.Daniel The problem is specifically related to App Sandbox. Reproduction I created a completely new minimal Mac Catalyst application. With App Sandbox disabled: let synthesizer = AVSpeechSynthesizer() let utterance = AVSpeechUtterance(string: "Hello, this is a test.") utterance.voice = AVSpeechSynthesisVoice(identifier: "com.apple.voice.enhanced.en-GB.Daniel") synthesizer.speak(utterance) The Enhanced voice works normally. With App Sandbox enabled, with no other sandbox capabilities enabled, the same code no longer produces audible speech.
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Sandboxed macOS app using SwiftData and CloudKit cannot initialize CloudKit mirroring.
I have a Mac and iOS app intended to sync data in iCloud. Both apps in TestFlight, the iOS reads and writes to iCloud but the Mac fails as the App Sandbox denies mach-lookup com.apple.cloudd, so NSCloudKitMirroringDelegate` never reaches the daemon and setup fails permanently. I have a minimal app reproducing the issue on for the Mac app. I also submitted a feedback FB24450529
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How can a local AI agent use MLX/Metal unattended on macOS while remaining confined to an authorized workspace?
How can a local AI agent use MLX/Metal unattended while remaining confined to an authorized workspace? I am developing an AI-driven local media-processing workflow on an Apple-silicon Mac and am trying to understand the correct architecture for allowing it to run unattended without giving the AI agent unrestricted access to my primary personal computer. I am not a software engineer, so I may be missing an established macOS mechanism or using the wrong terminology. I would appreciate guidance from people familiar with MLX, Metal, sandboxing, and macOS security. What I am building I use OpenAI Codex as the local execution/software-development agent. The working system currently: ingests and verifies original video and still media while preserving immutable originals; performs visual semantic analysis and divides video into meaningful time-coded segments; separately analyzes spoken language rather than assuming audio and video are semantically equivalent; uses MLX Whisper locally on Apple silicon for time-coded speech transcription; stores visual and language semantics in a relational SQLite media catalog. These five stages are working. My current test corpus contains 148 original media files, 126 visual semantic segments, and 765 speech segments. The next stages are AI editorial construction from the semantic database and generation of instructions/scripts for a DaVinci Resolve rough cut. The security architecture I want Codex to operate autonomously within a deliberately bounded development environment. I do not want to solve this simply by granting an autonomous agent Full Disk Access to my primary personal Mac. The concern is ordinary fault containment. Codex generates and executes scripts, invokes applications and command-line tools, and manipulates files. A mistaken path or defective generated script should not have unrestricted consequences for the rest of my computer. I therefore separated AI execution from ordinary personal files. Codex is configured for Workspace Write access with explicitly authorized project roots. Canonical media resides on a separately authorized external SSD, and temporary AI working artifacts are kept separately. Ordinary Python and FFmpeg operations now run autonomously within these authorized areas. The problem The difficulty appears when the workflow invokes capabilities that cannot operate inside the ordinary Codex sandbox. The clearest example is MLX Whisper. I am using: MLX Whisper 0.4.3 mlx-community/whisper-small-mlx Apple silicon local transcription MLX Whisper works successfully and its transcription quality is sufficient for my semantic-retrieval application. However, MLX could not access Apple Metal/GPU execution from inside the ordinary Codex sandbox. Codex therefore requested permission to execute the transcription operation outside the sandbox. Once approved, MLX/Metal worked and the entire corpus was successfully transcribed. The processing therefore works, but the workflow cannot run genuinely unattended. A future operation should be able to run: new media → integrity verification → visual semantic analysis → MLX Whisper transcription → language semantic analysis → SQLite update → QA But if execution stops midway waiting for a human to click Allow, the pipeline is not operationally autonomous. What I have already tried I initially encountered permission problems even with ordinary file operations. I therefore: separated Codex work from ordinary personal documents; created dedicated project/work areas; explicitly authorized the required working roots; configured Workspace Write; separately authorized the external media repository; tested shell/Python and FFmpeg operations within those boundaries. Those changes worked. Routine Python and FFmpeg operations now run without approval prompts. The remaining issue occurs with MLX/Metal and some other application/runtime operations that require sandbox escalation. My question Is there a supported architecture for allowing a local AI agent to invoke MLX/Metal and other deliberately authorized development tools unattended, while still confining the agent to defined project/workspace boundaries rather than granting unrestricted access to the entire Mac? For example, should I be investigating: App Sandbox entitlements; a signed helper tool or XPC service; security-scoped resources; a dedicated executable with appropriate entitlements; a different method of launching MLX/Metal; or another macOS mechanism? In particular, can Metal/GPU access coexist with persistent bounded filesystem access without requiring interactive approval each time the AI invokes it? I am also unsure which security layer is actually responsible here: the Codex sandbox, macOS App Sandbox, TCC, executable/code-signing rules, Metal restrictions, or some interaction among them. If this kind of bounded unattended execution is intentionally not supported, that would also be useful to know. My alternative would be a dedicated Apple-silicon Mac containing only the AI-development environment and replaceable project data, where broader permissions would have a much smaller failure domain. I can provide the Codex configuration, exact successful and failing commands, directory/root configuration, macOS/hardware information, and sandbox diagnostics. I would particularly appreciate guidance on which security layer is causing the MLX/Metal escalation and what the supported architecture would be for this use case. Thank you.
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ShazamKit under the App Sandbox on macOS — sanctioned way to reach com.apple.shazamd? (error 202)
I'm building a music-recognition app for the Mac App Store that uses ShazamKit (SHSession / SHManagedSession) against the default Shazam catalog. In a sandboxed build, SHSession.match(_:) fails with: com.apple.ShazamKit error 202 — "The connection to service named com.apple.shazamd was invalidated" The root cause is a sandbox denial of the mach-lookup to the ShazamKit matching daemon: kernel (Sandbox): deny(1) mach-lookup com.apple.shazamd What I've established: Enabling the ShazamKit App Service on the App ID does not add com.apple.shazamd to the sandbox mach-lookup allow-list on macOS — the denial persists and matching returns error 202. The iOS entitlement com.apple.developer.shazamkit is rejected by the macOS validator at upload ("not supported on macOS"), so it isn't an option here. Adding com.apple.security.temporary-exception.mach-lookup.global-name = [com.apple.shazamd] to the app's entitlements removes the denial, and ShazamKit then matches correctly under the sandbox (verified end-to-end: real api.shazam.apple.com/v1/catalog/.../match requests complete and tracks are identified). Removing that exception reproduces error 202 on every probe. So the temporary-exception appears to be the only way to make ShazamKit's default-catalog matching work inside the macOS App Sandbox today. Questions: Is there a sanctioned, non-temporary-exception way to use ShazamKit default-catalog matching in a sandboxed macOS app (a proper entitlement, an App Service configuration, or a supported API usage)? If not, is the com.apple.shazamd mach-lookup temporary-exception the intended approach on macOS? My actual SHSession.match runs in a nested helper that inherits the app's sandbox (com.apple.security.inherit). Is it correct to place the exception on the main app (which the inherited helper then picks up), rather than on the helper itself? Environment: macOS 26.1, ShazamKit App Service enabled on the App ID, signed App Sandbox build installed via TestFlight (valid _MASReceipt present). Happy to share entitlement plists and a focused sample on request. Thanks!
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Jul ’26
How can a SwiftUI drag provide the actual file URL of an existing file on macOS (as NSOutlineView does)?
I'm dragging existing files from a SwiftUI List (a search result list in a sandboxed, document-based Mac app), and I want drop targets to receive the actual file URL — the same behavior as AppKit's NSOutlineView with outlineView(_:pasteboardWriterForItem:) returning an NSURL: the Finder copies the file, browsers load it, and text views insert its path. My current implementation is Transferable-based: FileRepresentation(exportedContentType: .data) { item in SentTransferredFile(item.fileURL, allowAccessingOriginalFile: true) } .suggestedFileName(\.fileURL.lastPathComponent) With this, what receivers get is a temporary copy in the app's own container (Caches/com.apple.SwiftUI.Drag-<UUID>/), not the actual file URL — despite allowAccessingOriginalFile: true. Dropping on the Finder or onto an application icon works through the copy, but receivers that interpret the URL itself — a browser window, or a text view that inserts the dropped file's path — see the temporary container path. Note that the dragged files live inside a folder the user has opened as a document (the app is NSDocument-based), so the app already holds security-scoped access to them. Alternatives don't help either: DataRepresentation(exportedContentType: .fileURL) returning the URL bytes of the actual file: the pasteboard data is likewise replaced with the copy's URL, and moreover, drops onto application icons (e.g. Safari in the Dock) are no longer accepted at all. onDrag with NSItemProvider(object: url as NSURL): same substitution. I've already filed this as FB23578716, with detailed reproduction steps and drag-pasteboard dumps. My questions: Is there any way in current SwiftUI (macOS 26/27 SDK) to put the real file URL of an existing file on the drag pasteboard? Is the rewriting to a temporary copy intended behavior (for sandbox safety), or a bug? If it's intended, is embedding an AppKit view that calls beginDraggingSession(with:event:source:) with an NSURL pasteboard writer the recommended workaround for now? It does write the real URL, but making it coexist with List's selection and click handling has proven fragile. Environment: macOS: macOS 27 Beta 2 / Version 26.5.2 Xcode: Version 27.0 Beta 2 App Sandbox enabled
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Jul ’26
macOS Tahoe 26.5.1: Mac Catalyst App Crashes at Launch with EXC_BREAKPOINT in libsystem_secinit due to Container Integrity Check Failure
After updating the application following an upgrade from a previous macOS version to macOS Tahoe 26.5.1 (25F80), the sandboxed app immediately crashes on launch. The crash occurs during dyld library initialization, before any application code (including main()) is executed. The crash report identifies that libsystem_secinit.dylib rejects the existing app sandbox container with the following signature: "failed integrity checks for container at /Users/apptest/Library/Containers/77C6DBAA-6E54-4ED4-947C-5C5648BE280B/Data: Invalid argumen" Clearing out the old sandbox container data (e.g., rm -rf ~/Library/Containers/77C6DBAA-6E54-4ED4-947C-5C5648BE280B/Data) resolves the crash. Please help analyze the possible causes of this issue: 1.Could this be a compatibility issue between the new macOS 26.5.1 system and Mac Catalyst apps? 2.Could this be caused by certain APIs used by the app or specific project configuration settings? If so, please provide some relevant hints to help narrow down the scope of analysis. Crash Log excerpt.txt
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Jul ’26
Is com.apple.security.network.server appropriate for a sandboxed Mac app using MultipeerConnectivity?
I have a sandboxed Mac App Store app that uses Apple’s MultipeerConnectivity framework for a local peer-to-peer “mesh” feature. The app advertises itself as a nearby peer and accepts inbound invitations from other nearby devices so users can do local collaboration, chat, shared workspace sync, and multiplayer game sessions. This is local peer-to-peer only; the app is not running a public web server, FTP server, or similar service. When I remove the App Sandbox Incoming Connections entitlement: com.apple.security.network.server nearby peer discovery / inbound connections stop working in the sandboxed Mac build. Is com.apple.security.network.server the correct entitlement for this MultipeerConnectivity use case on macOS, assuming the app clearly exposes this local peer-to-peer feature in the UI?
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Jul ’26
Mac App Store submission rejected for missing sandbox — but similar apps on the store don't use it
I'm trying to submit a macOS window manager app to the Mac App Store. The app uses the Accessibility API (AXUIElement) to read and write window positions, which requires the user to grant Accessibility permission in System Settings. My submission is being rejected by the automated checker with error 90296: "App sandbox not enabled." If we enable App sandbox then the app does not work at all. However, I can see at least one currently-shipping Mac App Store app in the same category (window management) that does not have the com.apple.security.app-sandbox entitlement set to true, yet it was clearly approved and continues to receive updates built with current versions of Xcode. The AXUIElement write API (AXUIElementSetAttributeValue) does not function correctly within the App Sandbox, even when the user has granted Accessibility permission. This makes the sandbox requirement incompatible with the core functionality of window manager apps. My questions: Is there an entitlement or exception available for apps that require Accessibility API write access? Is there a way to request a sandbox exemption for this category of app? I cant even upload it. Is the existing app on the store grandfathered, and if so, how do new window manager apps get approved? Any guidance appreciated. Thanks
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Jul ’26
API to determine firewall settings in sandboxed app
My app is sandboxed and for one feature listens for an incoming connection on a user selected port. When the firewall is enabled and block incoming (all, this app, or signed apps) is enabled, I want to be able to not offer this feature with a brief explanation. I tried using /usr/libexec/ApplicationFirewall/socketfilterfw but that fails when used in a sandboxed app. I have an XPC module, which is also sandboxed, and the call fails there as well. If I remove the sandbox from the XPC then the call succeeds but then is unable to communicate with the main app. Is there an API to determine if the firewall is enabled and all connections blocked? I've submitted a Feedback request (FB23378402) as well.
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Jun ’26
[NetworkExtension] [EndpointSecurity] [AppStore] [macOS] Can an app that uses a MitM-style network traffic interception be submitted to the AppStore?
Hello, What are the restrictions on submitting apps to the mac App Store that use an NETransparentProxy alongside a locally installed and trusted Root-CA to intercept, decrypt and manipulate TLS traffic? To be more specific, I'm not talking about a Safari extension. I'm talking about system-wide traffic. So that the app can detect and block ads and trackers from all apps, not just Safari. I'm aware that such an app can be distributed using an unsandboxed Developer-ID signed app. But I wonder if such an app also breaks Sandbox requirements for AppStore distributed apps? Also, is there a way for a sandboxed app to install and trust a root CA? SecTrustSettingsSetTrustSettings does not work in Sandboxed apps from what I found. Finally, I want to ask about EndpointSecurity. Can this entitlement be used in AppStore-ditributed apps? Is doing any of these things possible on AppStore-distributed apps? Thanks in advance for your reply.
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Jun ’26
Fullscreen Detection
Hi, I want to detect if there is a fullscreen window on each screen. _AXUIElementGetWindow and kAXFullscreenAttribute methods work, but I have to be in a non-sandbox environment to use them. Is there any other way that also works? I don't think it's enough to judge if it's fullscreen by comparing the window size to the screen size, since it doesn't work on MacBook with notch, or the menu bar is set to 'auto-hide'. Thanks.
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Jun ’26
NSFileSandboxingRequestRelatedItemExtension: Failed to issue extension
Hi there, I have an SwiftUI app that opens a user selected audio file (wave). For each audio file an additional file exists containing events that were extracted from the audio file. This additional file has the same filename and uses the extension bcCalls. I load the audio file using FileImporter view modifier and within access the audio file with a security scoped bookmark. That works well. After loading the audio I create a CallsSidecar NSFilePresenter with the url of the audio file. I make the presenter known to the NSFileCoordinator and upon this add it to the FileCoordinator. This fails with NSFileSandboxingRequestRelatedItemExtension: Failed to issue extension for; Error Domain=NSPOSIXErrorDomain Code=3 "No such process" My Info.plist contains an entry for the document with NSIsRelatedItemType set to YES I am using this kind of FilePresenter code in various live apps developed some years ago. Now when starting from scratch on a fresh macOS26 system with most current Xcode I do not manage to get it running. Any ideas welcome! Here is the code: struct ContentView: View { @State private var sonaImg: CGImage? @State private var calls: Array<CallMeasurements> = Array() @State private var soundContainer: BatSoundContainer? @State private var importPresented: Bool = false var body: some View { VStack { Image(systemName: "globe") .imageScale(.large) .foregroundStyle(.tint) Text("Hello, world!") if self.sonaImg != nil { Image(self.sonaImg!, scale: 1.0, orientation: .left, label: Text("Sonagram")) } if !(self.calls.isEmpty) { List(calls) {aCall in Text("\(aCall.callNumber)") } } Button("Load sound file") { importPresented.toggle() } } .fileImporter(isPresented: $importPresented, allowedContentTypes: [.audio, UTType(filenameExtension: "raw")!], onCompletion: { result in switch result { case .success(let url): let gotAccess = url.startAccessingSecurityScopedResource() if !gotAccess { return } if let soundContainer = try? BatSoundContainer(with: url) { self.soundContainer = soundContainer self.sonaImg = soundContainer.overviewSonagram(expectedWidth: 800) let callsSidecar = CallsSidecar(withSoundURL: url) let data = callsSidecar.readData() print(data) } url.stopAccessingSecurityScopedResource() case .failure(let error): // handle error print(error) } }) .padding() } } The file presenter according to the WWDC 19 example: class CallsSidecar: NSObject, NSFilePresenter { lazy var presentedItemOperationQueue = OperationQueue.main var primaryPresentedItemURL: URL? var presentedItemURL: URL? init(withSoundURL audioURL: URL) { primaryPresentedItemURL = audioURL presentedItemURL = audioURL.deletingPathExtension().appendingPathExtension("bcCalls") } func readData() -> Data? { var data: Data? var error: NSError? NSFileCoordinator.addFilePresenter(self) let coordinator = NSFileCoordinator.init(filePresenter: self) NSFileCoordinator.addFilePresenter(self) coordinator.coordinate(readingItemAt: presentedItemURL!, options: [], error: &error) { url in data = try! Data.init(contentsOf: url) } return data } } And from Info.plist <key>CFBundleDocumentTypes</key> <array> <dict> <key>CFBundleTypeExtensions</key> <array> <string>bcCalls</string> </array> <key>CFBundleTypeName</key> <string>bcCalls document</string> <key>CFBundleTypeRole</key> <string>None</string> <key>LSHandlerRank</key> <string>Alternate</string> <key>LSItemContentTypes</key> <array> <string>com.apple.property-list</string> </array> <key>LSTypeIsPackage</key> <false/> <key>NSIsRelatedItemType</key> <true/> </dict> <dict> <key>CFBundleTypeExtensions</key> <array> <string>wav</string> <string>wave</string> </array> <key>CFBundleTypeName</key> <string>Windows wave</string> <key>CFBundleTypeRole</key> <string>Editor</string> <key>LSHandlerRank</key> <string>Alternate</string> <key>LSItemContentTypes</key> <array> <string>com.microsoft.waveform-audio</string> </array> <key>LSTypeIsPackage</key> <integer>0</integer> <key>NSDocumentClass</key> <string></string> </dict> </array> Note that BatSoundContainer is a custom class for loading audio of various undocumented formats as well as wave, Flac etc. and this is working well displaying a sonogram of the audio. Thx, Volker
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Jun ’26
Title: Clipboard manager rejected under Guideline 2.4.5 for using CGEvent.post — what is the correct approach?
I'm developing a sandboxed clipboard history manager for macOS. When a user selects an item from their clipboard history, the app: Writes the data to NSPasteboard.general Posts a ⌘V keystroke via CGEvent.post(tap: .cgSessionEventTap) This requires the user to grant permission under System Settings > Privacy & Security > Accessibility (kTCCServicePostEvent). The app does not use any Accessibility framework APIs (AXUIElement, AXIsProcessTrusted, etc.) — only Core Graphics event posting. The app has been rejected twice under Guideline 2.4.5, with the reviewer stating that Accessibility features should not be used for non-accessibility purposes. My understanding is that kTCCServicePostEvent (used by CGEvent.post) is a separate TCC service from kTCCServiceAccessibility (used by AXUIElement APIs), but both appear under "Accessibility" in System Settings, which may be causing confusion. My questions: Is there an approved way for a sandboxed Mac App Store app to simulate a keystroke (specifically ⌘V) after writing to the pasteboard? If CGEvent.post is not appropriate for App Store apps, what alternative API should clipboard managers use to provide a "paste" action? Is there a way to use CGEvent.post that is compliant with Guideline 2.4.5? I have a minimal sample project (single Swift file, sandboxed) that demonstrates the behavior. I can share it if helpful. I was referred here by DTS (Case-ID: 19088416).
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1k
Jun ’26
Sometimes my apps crash on launch at _libsecinit_appsandbox.cold.6
I first started observing this behaviour through the crash logs of one of my App Store apps which are downloaded by Xcode. Then 3 days ago the same crash happened when launching one of my other apps on my own Mac. On the next try, the app launched correctly. The crash logs don't show any of my app's symbols, only a single thread that does something with libsecinit. I have no idea what the problem is, and since these crashes are also downloaded by Xcode, one would get the impression it’s a fault in my programming… but without any hint as to what I’m doing wrong, I have no chance to fix it, and so I get the feeling that it’s actually a macOS bug. I created FB22712334. crash
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707
May ’26
App Sandbox Resources
General: Forums subtopic: Privacy & Security > General Forums tag: App Sandbox App Sandbox documentation App Sandbox Design Guide documentation — This is no longer available from Apple. There’s still some info in there that isn’t covered by the current docs but, with the latest updates, it’s pretty minimal (r. 110052019). Still, if you’re curious, you can consult an old copy [1]. App Sandbox Temporary Exception Entitlements archived documentation — To better understand the role of temporary exception entitlements, see this post. Embedding a command-line tool in a sandboxed app documentation Discovering and diagnosing App Sandbox violations (replaces the Viewing Sandbox Violation Reports forums post) Resolving App Sandbox Inheritance Problems forums post The Case for Sandboxing a Directly Distributed App forums post Implementing Script Attachment in a Sandboxed App forums post Share and Enjoy — Quinn “The Eskimo!” @ Developer Technical Support @ Apple let myEmail = "eskimo" + "1" + "@" + "apple.com" [1] For example, this one archived by the Wayback Machine.
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Jul ’25
CTFontManagerCreateFontRequestRunLoopSource does not receive events in macOS 27
CTFontManagerCreateFontRequestRunLoopSource does not receive any font requests on macOS 27, since beta 5. This API worked fine until macOS 27 beta 4, including previous macOS releases. It looks like this is caused by the App Sandbox. When the com.apple.security.app-sandbox entitlement is disabled the font request source does receive events. Report including sample project: FB24764122 let source = CTFontManagerCreateFontRequestRunLoopSource(0, { (dict, pid) in /* does not receive events when sandboxed */ } CFRunLoopAddSource(CFRunLoopGetCurrent(), source, .defaultMode) Is this a deliberate change or is this a bug in macOS 27? Is there an entitlement that can be set to enable the API in sandboxed apps? My application is distributed on the Mac App Store and as standalone app. Both are properly sandboxed for added security. Disabling the App Sandbox for this specific API would be very undesirable as users will lose all Sandbox benefits.
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23m
Loading User Installed VST3 Plugins While Remaining Sandboxed on MacOS
Hi, I’m developing a native macOS music app intended for the Mac App Store. We already support Audio Units and are investigating VST3 instrument and effect hosting on Apple Silicon. Users would install plugins themselves, typically in: /Library/Audio/Plug-Ins/VST3 ~/Library/Audio/Plug-Ins/VST3 The app would load these third-party plugin bundles using public APIs, such as CFBundleLoadExecutableAndReturnError. Plugins may be signed by developers with different Team IDs. Our app would not download or install them. Is there a supported way to load and execute these bundles while the hosting process remains sandboxed throughout? If so, which APIs and entitlements should we use? Specifically, I’m trying to distinguish permission to read a plugin bundle from permission to load its executable code. Would user selected folder access and security scoped bookmarks cover the sandbox access requirements, or is another mechanism needed? I understand that com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation addresses loading code signed by other developers, but does not itself grant sandbox file access. We cannot rely on an Audio Unit compatibility exception that disables the host’s sandbox. App Review Guideline 3.1.1 (https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/#in-app-purchase) explicitly allows Mac App Store apps to host plugins enabled outside the App Store. I’m looking for the supported technical approach under App Sandbox, rather than preapproval for our app. We’re checking this before implementation, so we don’t yet have a failing reproducer. Any relevant documentation, sample code or existing discussion would be appreciated. Thanks, Ben
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1d
Kernel Sandbox/System Policy intermittently denies ALL file access (not just mount syscall) on NFS mounts
I'm seeing a recurring issue on macOS 26.5.2 (build 25F84) where the kernel's Sandbox/System Policy layer intermittently denies file access on NFS mount points from local network servers. Posting here in case anyone recognizes this pattern or has a workaround, and flagging it since I've also filed a Feedback Assistant report (with a live-captured sysdiagnose) for the same issue. WHAT HAPPENS Two independent NFS mounts to two separate, unrelated servers on my LAN start failing simultaneously with "Operation not permitted." The kernel log shows: kernel: (Sandbox) System Policy: mount_nfs(PID) deny(1) file-mount /path/to/mount Critically, it's not limited to the mount syscall - within the same few-second window, System Policy also denies ls, perl, diskutil, and even umount -f on the exact same path, for otherwise unrelated processes. So it looks like a transient, path-scoped kernel decision rather than something specific to NFS or the mount syscall. It self-heals anywhere from seconds to ~30 minutes later, then recurs - documented 30-80+ occurrences/day via a background watchdog script. WHAT I'VE RULED OUT Server-side cause: two independent servers on different hardware fail identically at the same instant. Network issue: checked network logs in the same window, no correlated connectivity event. Third-party kext conflict: kextstat shows zero third-party kexts loaded. syspolicyd database corruption: no "ASP: Validation category" signature present. TCC/Full Disk Access: already granted; the denying layer is kernel Sandbox "System Policy," not TCC. QUESTION Has anyone else run into System Policy denying file-mount/file-read-data/file-unmount on network volume paths intermittently like this? Is there any userland way to inspect or reset whatever internal state drives this decision (I haven't found one - no spctl/tccutil/sysctl lever that touches it)? Happy to share more log excerpts if useful.
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1d
Sandboxed Mac app denied mach-lookup com.apple.cloudd when signed with Mac Team Store Provisioning Profile on macOS 26
A sandboxed Mac app with correct CloudKit entitlements fails to connect to com.apple.cloudd (the CloudKit daemon) when distributed via TestFlight (Mac Team Store Provisioning Profile). The identical binary works correctly when launched from Xcode (Mac Team Provisioning Profile also present). All entitlements are correctly embedded and the App ID is properly configured in Apple Developer Portal. Environment macOS 26.5.1 (25F80) Xcode 26.5 (17F42) SwiftData with NSPersistentCloudKitContainer / ModelConfiguration(cloudKitDatabase: .private(...)) Steps to Reproduce Create a sandboxed Mac app using SwiftData with CloudKit sync Enable iCloud + CloudKit in Signing & Capabilities Archive and distribute to TestFlight (Mac Team Store Provisioning Profile) Install via TestFlight on macOS 26 and launch Check Console for kernel sandbox messages Expected Result CloudKit connects to com.apple.cloudd and syncs data, matching behavior of the iOS version using the same container. Actual Result Console shows repeated kernel sandbox denials followed by CloudKit setup failure: kernel Sandbox: CheatSheet Mac(82347) deny(1) mach-lookup com.apple.cloudd kernel Sandbox: CheatSheet Mac(82347) deny(1) mach-lookup com.apple.duetactivityscheduler CheatSheet Mac CoreData+CloudKit: Failed to set up CloudKit integration for store Error Domain=CKErrorDomain Code=6 "Error connecting to CloudKit daemon." Key Diagnostic Finding When launched from Xcode, taskgated-helper validates both the Mac Team Store Provisioning Profile AND the Mac Team Provisioning Profile, and CloudKit succeeds: cloudd: TCC approved access for container containerID=iCloud.com.michaelendres.CheatSheet:Production When launched from TestFlight, only the Mac Team Store Provisioning Profile is present, and the sandbox denies com.apple.cloudd despite identical entitlements in the binary: codesign -d --entitlements shows: com.apple.developer.icloud-services: [CloudKit] com.apple.developer.icloud-container-identifiers: [iCloud.com.michaelendres.CheatSheet] com.apple.developer.icloud-container-environment: Production com.apple.security.app-sandbox: true Conclusion The Mac Team Store Provisioning Profile on macOS 26 does not appear to grant the sandbox exception for mach-lookup com.apple.cloudd, while the Mac Team Provisioning Profile (development) does. This prevents any Mac App Store / TestFlight app using CloudKit from syncing on macOS 26.
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1w
AVSpeechSynthesizer Enhanced voices produce silent audio in sandboxed Mac Catalyst app
I have reproduced an issue with AVSpeechSynthesizer on macOS 26.6.2 (25G83) using a minimal Mac Catalyst application. Environment macOS 26.6.2 (25G83) Apple Silicon Xcode 26.x Mac Catalyst AVSpeechSynthesizer Enhanced voice: com.apple.voice.enhanced.en-GB.Daniel The problem is specifically related to App Sandbox. Reproduction I created a completely new minimal Mac Catalyst application. With App Sandbox disabled: let synthesizer = AVSpeechSynthesizer() let utterance = AVSpeechUtterance(string: "Hello, this is a test.") utterance.voice = AVSpeechSynthesisVoice(identifier: "com.apple.voice.enhanced.en-GB.Daniel") synthesizer.speak(utterance) The Enhanced voice works normally. With App Sandbox enabled, with no other sandbox capabilities enabled, the same code no longer produces audible speech.
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1w
Sandboxed macOS app using SwiftData and CloudKit cannot initialize CloudKit mirroring.
I have a Mac and iOS app intended to sync data in iCloud. Both apps in TestFlight, the iOS reads and writes to iCloud but the Mac fails as the App Sandbox denies mach-lookup com.apple.cloudd, so NSCloudKitMirroringDelegate` never reaches the daemon and setup fails permanently. I have a minimal app reproducing the issue on for the Mac app. I also submitted a feedback FB24450529
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3w
How can a local AI agent use MLX/Metal unattended on macOS while remaining confined to an authorized workspace?
How can a local AI agent use MLX/Metal unattended while remaining confined to an authorized workspace? I am developing an AI-driven local media-processing workflow on an Apple-silicon Mac and am trying to understand the correct architecture for allowing it to run unattended without giving the AI agent unrestricted access to my primary personal computer. I am not a software engineer, so I may be missing an established macOS mechanism or using the wrong terminology. I would appreciate guidance from people familiar with MLX, Metal, sandboxing, and macOS security. What I am building I use OpenAI Codex as the local execution/software-development agent. The working system currently: ingests and verifies original video and still media while preserving immutable originals; performs visual semantic analysis and divides video into meaningful time-coded segments; separately analyzes spoken language rather than assuming audio and video are semantically equivalent; uses MLX Whisper locally on Apple silicon for time-coded speech transcription; stores visual and language semantics in a relational SQLite media catalog. These five stages are working. My current test corpus contains 148 original media files, 126 visual semantic segments, and 765 speech segments. The next stages are AI editorial construction from the semantic database and generation of instructions/scripts for a DaVinci Resolve rough cut. The security architecture I want Codex to operate autonomously within a deliberately bounded development environment. I do not want to solve this simply by granting an autonomous agent Full Disk Access to my primary personal Mac. The concern is ordinary fault containment. Codex generates and executes scripts, invokes applications and command-line tools, and manipulates files. A mistaken path or defective generated script should not have unrestricted consequences for the rest of my computer. I therefore separated AI execution from ordinary personal files. Codex is configured for Workspace Write access with explicitly authorized project roots. Canonical media resides on a separately authorized external SSD, and temporary AI working artifacts are kept separately. Ordinary Python and FFmpeg operations now run autonomously within these authorized areas. The problem The difficulty appears when the workflow invokes capabilities that cannot operate inside the ordinary Codex sandbox. The clearest example is MLX Whisper. I am using: MLX Whisper 0.4.3 mlx-community/whisper-small-mlx Apple silicon local transcription MLX Whisper works successfully and its transcription quality is sufficient for my semantic-retrieval application. However, MLX could not access Apple Metal/GPU execution from inside the ordinary Codex sandbox. Codex therefore requested permission to execute the transcription operation outside the sandbox. Once approved, MLX/Metal worked and the entire corpus was successfully transcribed. The processing therefore works, but the workflow cannot run genuinely unattended. A future operation should be able to run: new media → integrity verification → visual semantic analysis → MLX Whisper transcription → language semantic analysis → SQLite update → QA But if execution stops midway waiting for a human to click Allow, the pipeline is not operationally autonomous. What I have already tried I initially encountered permission problems even with ordinary file operations. I therefore: separated Codex work from ordinary personal documents; created dedicated project/work areas; explicitly authorized the required working roots; configured Workspace Write; separately authorized the external media repository; tested shell/Python and FFmpeg operations within those boundaries. Those changes worked. Routine Python and FFmpeg operations now run without approval prompts. The remaining issue occurs with MLX/Metal and some other application/runtime operations that require sandbox escalation. My question Is there a supported architecture for allowing a local AI agent to invoke MLX/Metal and other deliberately authorized development tools unattended, while still confining the agent to defined project/workspace boundaries rather than granting unrestricted access to the entire Mac? For example, should I be investigating: App Sandbox entitlements; a signed helper tool or XPC service; security-scoped resources; a dedicated executable with appropriate entitlements; a different method of launching MLX/Metal; or another macOS mechanism? In particular, can Metal/GPU access coexist with persistent bounded filesystem access without requiring interactive approval each time the AI invokes it? I am also unsure which security layer is actually responsible here: the Codex sandbox, macOS App Sandbox, TCC, executable/code-signing rules, Metal restrictions, or some interaction among them. If this kind of bounded unattended execution is intentionally not supported, that would also be useful to know. My alternative would be a dedicated Apple-silicon Mac containing only the AI-development environment and replaceable project data, where broader permissions would have a much smaller failure domain. I can provide the Codex configuration, exact successful and failing commands, directory/root configuration, macOS/hardware information, and sandbox diagnostics. I would particularly appreciate guidance on which security layer is causing the MLX/Metal escalation and what the supported architecture would be for this use case. Thank you.
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4w
Is Sandboxing possible for Command line app run with sudo
Hi Team, If I want to create a command line app in swift which needs to be invoked using sudo, will I be able to sandbox this app?
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632
Activity
Jul ’26
ShazamKit under the App Sandbox on macOS — sanctioned way to reach com.apple.shazamd? (error 202)
I'm building a music-recognition app for the Mac App Store that uses ShazamKit (SHSession / SHManagedSession) against the default Shazam catalog. In a sandboxed build, SHSession.match(_:) fails with: com.apple.ShazamKit error 202 — "The connection to service named com.apple.shazamd was invalidated" The root cause is a sandbox denial of the mach-lookup to the ShazamKit matching daemon: kernel (Sandbox): deny(1) mach-lookup com.apple.shazamd What I've established: Enabling the ShazamKit App Service on the App ID does not add com.apple.shazamd to the sandbox mach-lookup allow-list on macOS — the denial persists and matching returns error 202. The iOS entitlement com.apple.developer.shazamkit is rejected by the macOS validator at upload ("not supported on macOS"), so it isn't an option here. Adding com.apple.security.temporary-exception.mach-lookup.global-name = [com.apple.shazamd] to the app's entitlements removes the denial, and ShazamKit then matches correctly under the sandbox (verified end-to-end: real api.shazam.apple.com/v1/catalog/.../match requests complete and tracks are identified). Removing that exception reproduces error 202 on every probe. So the temporary-exception appears to be the only way to make ShazamKit's default-catalog matching work inside the macOS App Sandbox today. Questions: Is there a sanctioned, non-temporary-exception way to use ShazamKit default-catalog matching in a sandboxed macOS app (a proper entitlement, an App Service configuration, or a supported API usage)? If not, is the com.apple.shazamd mach-lookup temporary-exception the intended approach on macOS? My actual SHSession.match runs in a nested helper that inherits the app's sandbox (com.apple.security.inherit). Is it correct to place the exception on the main app (which the inherited helper then picks up), rather than on the helper itself? Environment: macOS 26.1, ShazamKit App Service enabled on the App ID, signed App Sandbox build installed via TestFlight (valid _MASReceipt present). Happy to share entitlement plists and a focused sample on request. Thanks!
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Jul ’26
How can a SwiftUI drag provide the actual file URL of an existing file on macOS (as NSOutlineView does)?
I'm dragging existing files from a SwiftUI List (a search result list in a sandboxed, document-based Mac app), and I want drop targets to receive the actual file URL — the same behavior as AppKit's NSOutlineView with outlineView(_:pasteboardWriterForItem:) returning an NSURL: the Finder copies the file, browsers load it, and text views insert its path. My current implementation is Transferable-based: FileRepresentation(exportedContentType: .data) { item in SentTransferredFile(item.fileURL, allowAccessingOriginalFile: true) } .suggestedFileName(\.fileURL.lastPathComponent) With this, what receivers get is a temporary copy in the app's own container (Caches/com.apple.SwiftUI.Drag-<UUID>/), not the actual file URL — despite allowAccessingOriginalFile: true. Dropping on the Finder or onto an application icon works through the copy, but receivers that interpret the URL itself — a browser window, or a text view that inserts the dropped file's path — see the temporary container path. Note that the dragged files live inside a folder the user has opened as a document (the app is NSDocument-based), so the app already holds security-scoped access to them. Alternatives don't help either: DataRepresentation(exportedContentType: .fileURL) returning the URL bytes of the actual file: the pasteboard data is likewise replaced with the copy's URL, and moreover, drops onto application icons (e.g. Safari in the Dock) are no longer accepted at all. onDrag with NSItemProvider(object: url as NSURL): same substitution. I've already filed this as FB23578716, with detailed reproduction steps and drag-pasteboard dumps. My questions: Is there any way in current SwiftUI (macOS 26/27 SDK) to put the real file URL of an existing file on the drag pasteboard? Is the rewriting to a temporary copy intended behavior (for sandbox safety), or a bug? If it's intended, is embedding an AppKit view that calls beginDraggingSession(with:event:source:) with an NSURL pasteboard writer the recommended workaround for now? It does write the real URL, but making it coexist with List's selection and click handling has proven fragile. Environment: macOS: macOS 27 Beta 2 / Version 26.5.2 Xcode: Version 27.0 Beta 2 App Sandbox enabled
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Jul ’26
macOS Tahoe 26.5.1: Mac Catalyst App Crashes at Launch with EXC_BREAKPOINT in libsystem_secinit due to Container Integrity Check Failure
After updating the application following an upgrade from a previous macOS version to macOS Tahoe 26.5.1 (25F80), the sandboxed app immediately crashes on launch. The crash occurs during dyld library initialization, before any application code (including main()) is executed. The crash report identifies that libsystem_secinit.dylib rejects the existing app sandbox container with the following signature: "failed integrity checks for container at /Users/apptest/Library/Containers/77C6DBAA-6E54-4ED4-947C-5C5648BE280B/Data: Invalid argumen" Clearing out the old sandbox container data (e.g., rm -rf ~/Library/Containers/77C6DBAA-6E54-4ED4-947C-5C5648BE280B/Data) resolves the crash. Please help analyze the possible causes of this issue: 1.Could this be a compatibility issue between the new macOS 26.5.1 system and Mac Catalyst apps? 2.Could this be caused by certain APIs used by the app or specific project configuration settings? If so, please provide some relevant hints to help narrow down the scope of analysis. Crash Log excerpt.txt
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749
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Jul ’26
Is com.apple.security.network.server appropriate for a sandboxed Mac app using MultipeerConnectivity?
I have a sandboxed Mac App Store app that uses Apple’s MultipeerConnectivity framework for a local peer-to-peer “mesh” feature. The app advertises itself as a nearby peer and accepts inbound invitations from other nearby devices so users can do local collaboration, chat, shared workspace sync, and multiplayer game sessions. This is local peer-to-peer only; the app is not running a public web server, FTP server, or similar service. When I remove the App Sandbox Incoming Connections entitlement: com.apple.security.network.server nearby peer discovery / inbound connections stop working in the sandboxed Mac build. Is com.apple.security.network.server the correct entitlement for this MultipeerConnectivity use case on macOS, assuming the app clearly exposes this local peer-to-peer feature in the UI?
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Jul ’26
Mac App Store submission rejected for missing sandbox — but similar apps on the store don't use it
I'm trying to submit a macOS window manager app to the Mac App Store. The app uses the Accessibility API (AXUIElement) to read and write window positions, which requires the user to grant Accessibility permission in System Settings. My submission is being rejected by the automated checker with error 90296: "App sandbox not enabled." If we enable App sandbox then the app does not work at all. However, I can see at least one currently-shipping Mac App Store app in the same category (window management) that does not have the com.apple.security.app-sandbox entitlement set to true, yet it was clearly approved and continues to receive updates built with current versions of Xcode. The AXUIElement write API (AXUIElementSetAttributeValue) does not function correctly within the App Sandbox, even when the user has granted Accessibility permission. This makes the sandbox requirement incompatible with the core functionality of window manager apps. My questions: Is there an entitlement or exception available for apps that require Accessibility API write access? Is there a way to request a sandbox exemption for this category of app? I cant even upload it. Is the existing app on the store grandfathered, and if so, how do new window manager apps get approved? Any guidance appreciated. Thanks
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Activity
Jul ’26
API to determine firewall settings in sandboxed app
My app is sandboxed and for one feature listens for an incoming connection on a user selected port. When the firewall is enabled and block incoming (all, this app, or signed apps) is enabled, I want to be able to not offer this feature with a brief explanation. I tried using /usr/libexec/ApplicationFirewall/socketfilterfw but that fails when used in a sandboxed app. I have an XPC module, which is also sandboxed, and the call fails there as well. If I remove the sandbox from the XPC then the call succeeds but then is unable to communicate with the main app. Is there an API to determine if the firewall is enabled and all connections blocked? I've submitted a Feedback request (FB23378402) as well.
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671
Activity
Jun ’26
[NetworkExtension] [EndpointSecurity] [AppStore] [macOS] Can an app that uses a MitM-style network traffic interception be submitted to the AppStore?
Hello, What are the restrictions on submitting apps to the mac App Store that use an NETransparentProxy alongside a locally installed and trusted Root-CA to intercept, decrypt and manipulate TLS traffic? To be more specific, I'm not talking about a Safari extension. I'm talking about system-wide traffic. So that the app can detect and block ads and trackers from all apps, not just Safari. I'm aware that such an app can be distributed using an unsandboxed Developer-ID signed app. But I wonder if such an app also breaks Sandbox requirements for AppStore distributed apps? Also, is there a way for a sandboxed app to install and trust a root CA? SecTrustSettingsSetTrustSettings does not work in Sandboxed apps from what I found. Finally, I want to ask about EndpointSecurity. Can this entitlement be used in AppStore-ditributed apps? Is doing any of these things possible on AppStore-distributed apps? Thanks in advance for your reply.
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Jun ’26
Sandboxed network permissions on macOS
Are there specific Entitlements (com.apple.security.temporary-exception.files.absolute-path.read-write or network exceptions) required to allow App Intents to talk to local UNIX sockets or loopback interfaces (127.0.0.1) without triggering sandbox violations?
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610
Activity
Jun ’26
Fullscreen Detection
Hi, I want to detect if there is a fullscreen window on each screen. _AXUIElementGetWindow and kAXFullscreenAttribute methods work, but I have to be in a non-sandbox environment to use them. Is there any other way that also works? I don't think it's enough to judge if it's fullscreen by comparing the window size to the screen size, since it doesn't work on MacBook with notch, or the menu bar is set to 'auto-hide'. Thanks.
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Activity
Jun ’26
NSFileSandboxingRequestRelatedItemExtension: Failed to issue extension
Hi there, I have an SwiftUI app that opens a user selected audio file (wave). For each audio file an additional file exists containing events that were extracted from the audio file. This additional file has the same filename and uses the extension bcCalls. I load the audio file using FileImporter view modifier and within access the audio file with a security scoped bookmark. That works well. After loading the audio I create a CallsSidecar NSFilePresenter with the url of the audio file. I make the presenter known to the NSFileCoordinator and upon this add it to the FileCoordinator. This fails with NSFileSandboxingRequestRelatedItemExtension: Failed to issue extension for; Error Domain=NSPOSIXErrorDomain Code=3 "No such process" My Info.plist contains an entry for the document with NSIsRelatedItemType set to YES I am using this kind of FilePresenter code in various live apps developed some years ago. Now when starting from scratch on a fresh macOS26 system with most current Xcode I do not manage to get it running. Any ideas welcome! Here is the code: struct ContentView: View { @State private var sonaImg: CGImage? @State private var calls: Array<CallMeasurements> = Array() @State private var soundContainer: BatSoundContainer? @State private var importPresented: Bool = false var body: some View { VStack { Image(systemName: "globe") .imageScale(.large) .foregroundStyle(.tint) Text("Hello, world!") if self.sonaImg != nil { Image(self.sonaImg!, scale: 1.0, orientation: .left, label: Text("Sonagram")) } if !(self.calls.isEmpty) { List(calls) {aCall in Text("\(aCall.callNumber)") } } Button("Load sound file") { importPresented.toggle() } } .fileImporter(isPresented: $importPresented, allowedContentTypes: [.audio, UTType(filenameExtension: "raw")!], onCompletion: { result in switch result { case .success(let url): let gotAccess = url.startAccessingSecurityScopedResource() if !gotAccess { return } if let soundContainer = try? BatSoundContainer(with: url) { self.soundContainer = soundContainer self.sonaImg = soundContainer.overviewSonagram(expectedWidth: 800) let callsSidecar = CallsSidecar(withSoundURL: url) let data = callsSidecar.readData() print(data) } url.stopAccessingSecurityScopedResource() case .failure(let error): // handle error print(error) } }) .padding() } } The file presenter according to the WWDC 19 example: class CallsSidecar: NSObject, NSFilePresenter { lazy var presentedItemOperationQueue = OperationQueue.main var primaryPresentedItemURL: URL? var presentedItemURL: URL? init(withSoundURL audioURL: URL) { primaryPresentedItemURL = audioURL presentedItemURL = audioURL.deletingPathExtension().appendingPathExtension("bcCalls") } func readData() -> Data? { var data: Data? var error: NSError? NSFileCoordinator.addFilePresenter(self) let coordinator = NSFileCoordinator.init(filePresenter: self) NSFileCoordinator.addFilePresenter(self) coordinator.coordinate(readingItemAt: presentedItemURL!, options: [], error: &error) { url in data = try! Data.init(contentsOf: url) } return data } } And from Info.plist <key>CFBundleDocumentTypes</key> <array> <dict> <key>CFBundleTypeExtensions</key> <array> <string>bcCalls</string> </array> <key>CFBundleTypeName</key> <string>bcCalls document</string> <key>CFBundleTypeRole</key> <string>None</string> <key>LSHandlerRank</key> <string>Alternate</string> <key>LSItemContentTypes</key> <array> <string>com.apple.property-list</string> </array> <key>LSTypeIsPackage</key> <false/> <key>NSIsRelatedItemType</key> <true/> </dict> <dict> <key>CFBundleTypeExtensions</key> <array> <string>wav</string> <string>wave</string> </array> <key>CFBundleTypeName</key> <string>Windows wave</string> <key>CFBundleTypeRole</key> <string>Editor</string> <key>LSHandlerRank</key> <string>Alternate</string> <key>LSItemContentTypes</key> <array> <string>com.microsoft.waveform-audio</string> </array> <key>LSTypeIsPackage</key> <integer>0</integer> <key>NSDocumentClass</key> <string></string> </dict> </array> Note that BatSoundContainer is a custom class for loading audio of various undocumented formats as well as wave, Flac etc. and this is working well displaying a sonogram of the audio. Thx, Volker
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Activity
Jun ’26
Title: Clipboard manager rejected under Guideline 2.4.5 for using CGEvent.post — what is the correct approach?
I'm developing a sandboxed clipboard history manager for macOS. When a user selects an item from their clipboard history, the app: Writes the data to NSPasteboard.general Posts a ⌘V keystroke via CGEvent.post(tap: .cgSessionEventTap) This requires the user to grant permission under System Settings > Privacy & Security > Accessibility (kTCCServicePostEvent). The app does not use any Accessibility framework APIs (AXUIElement, AXIsProcessTrusted, etc.) — only Core Graphics event posting. The app has been rejected twice under Guideline 2.4.5, with the reviewer stating that Accessibility features should not be used for non-accessibility purposes. My understanding is that kTCCServicePostEvent (used by CGEvent.post) is a separate TCC service from kTCCServiceAccessibility (used by AXUIElement APIs), but both appear under "Accessibility" in System Settings, which may be causing confusion. My questions: Is there an approved way for a sandboxed Mac App Store app to simulate a keystroke (specifically ⌘V) after writing to the pasteboard? If CGEvent.post is not appropriate for App Store apps, what alternative API should clipboard managers use to provide a "paste" action? Is there a way to use CGEvent.post that is compliant with Guideline 2.4.5? I have a minimal sample project (single Swift file, sandboxed) that demonstrates the behavior. I can share it if helpful. I was referred here by DTS (Case-ID: 19088416).
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1k
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Jun ’26
Sometimes my apps crash on launch at _libsecinit_appsandbox.cold.6
I first started observing this behaviour through the crash logs of one of my App Store apps which are downloaded by Xcode. Then 3 days ago the same crash happened when launching one of my other apps on my own Mac. On the next try, the app launched correctly. The crash logs don't show any of my app's symbols, only a single thread that does something with libsecinit. I have no idea what the problem is, and since these crashes are also downloaded by Xcode, one would get the impression it’s a fault in my programming… but without any hint as to what I’m doing wrong, I have no chance to fix it, and so I get the feeling that it’s actually a macOS bug. I created FB22712334. crash
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May ’26