We recently upgraded OpenSSL from version 1.1.1 to 3.4.0. After this upgrade, we observed that PKCS#12 files generated using OpenSSL 3.4.0 fail to import into the macOS Keychain with the following error: Failed to import PKCS#12 data: -25264 (MAC verification failed during PKCS12 import (wrong password?)) This issue is reproducible on macOS 14.8.2. The same PKCS#12 files import successfully on other macOS versions, including 15.x and 26.x. Additionally, PKCS#12 files that fail to import on macOS 14.8 work correctly when copied and imported on other macOS versions without any errors. PKCS#12 Creation The PKCS#12 data is created using the following OpenSSL API: const char* platformPKCS12SecureKey = _platformSecureKey.has_value() ? _platformSecureKey.value().c_str() : NULL; PKCS12* p12 = PKCS12_create( platformPKCS12SecureKey, NULL, keys, _cert, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 ); if (!p12) { throw std::runtime_error("Failed to create PKCS#12 container"); } PKCS#12 Import The generated PKCS#12 data is imported into the macOS Keychain using the following code: NSString *certPassKey = [NSString stringWithUTF8String:getCertPassKey()]; NSDictionary *options = @{ (__bridge id)kSecImportExportPassphrase: certPassKey, (__bridge id)kSecAttrAccessible: (__bridge id)kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly, (__bridge id)kSecAttrIsExtractable: @YES, (__bridge id)kSecAttrIsPermanent: @YES, (__bridge id)kSecAttrAccessGroup: APP_GROUP }; CFArrayRef items = NULL; OSStatus status = SecPKCS12Import( (__bridge CFDataRef)pkcs12Data, (__bridge CFDictionaryRef)options, &items );

Hi, I’d like to confirm something regarding the hosting of the apple-app-site-association (AASA) file. We have a server that publicly hosts the AASA file and is accessible globally. However, this server sits behind an additional security layer (a security server/reverse proxy). My question is: Will this security layer affect Apple’s ability to access and validate the AASA file for Universal Links or App Clips? Are there specific requirements (e.g. headers, redirects, TLS versions, etc.) that we need to ensure the security server does not block or modify? Any guidance or best practices would be appreciated.

When trying to check if a certificate has been revoked with SecPolicyCreateRevocation (Flags: kSecRevocationUseAnyAvailableMethod | kSecRevocationRequirePositiveResponse) and SecTrustEvaluateWithError I always get the result error code errSecIncompleteCertRevocationCheck, regardless if the certificate was revoked or not. Reproduction: Execute the program from the attached Xcode project (See Feedback FB21224106). Error output: Error: Error Domain=NSOSStatusErrorDomain Code=-67635 ""revoked.badssl.com","E8","ISRG Root X1" certificates do not meet pinning requirements" UserInfo={NSLocalizedDescription="revoked.badssl.com","E8","ISRG Root X1" certificates do not meet pinning requirements, NSUnderlyingError=0x6000018d48a0 {Error Domain=NSOSStatusErrorDomain Code=-67635 "Certificate 0 “revoked.badssl.com” has errors: Failed to check revocation;" UserInfo={NSLocalizedDescription=Certificate 0 “revoked.badssl.com” has errors: Failed to check revocation;}}} To me it looks like that the revocation check just fails („Failed to check revocation;“), no further information is provided by the returned error. In the example the certificate chain of https://revoked.badssl.com (default code) and https://badssl.com is verified (to switch see comments in the code). I have a proxy configured in the system, I assume that the revocation check will use it. On the same machine, the browsers (Safari and Google Chrome) can successfully detect if the certificate was revoked (revoked.badssl.com) or not (badssl.com) without further changes in the system/proxy settings. Note: The example leaks some memory, it’s just a test program. Am I missing something? Feedback: FB21224106

Hello, I’m working on an authorization plugin which allows users to login and unlock their computer with various methods like a FIDO key. I need to add smart cards support to it. If I understand correctly, I need to construct a URLCredential object with the identity from the smart card and pass it to the completion handler of URLSessionDelegate.urlSession(_:didReceive:completionHandler:) method. I’ve read the documentation at Using Cryptographic Assets Stored on a Smart Card, TN3137: On Mac keychain APIs and implementations, and SecItem: Pitfalls and Best Practices and created a simple code that reads the identities from the keychain: CFArrayRef identities = nil; OSStatus status = SecItemCopyMatching((__bridge CFDictionaryRef)@{ (id)kSecClass: (id)kSecClassIdentity, (id)kSecMatchLimit: (id)kSecMatchLimitAll, (id)kSecReturnRef: @YES, }, (CFTypeRef *)&identities); if (status == errSecSuccess && identities) { os_log(OS_LOG_DEFAULT, "Found identities: %{public}ld\n", CFArrayGetCount(identities)); } else { os_log(OS_LOG_DEFAULT, "Error: %{public}ld\n", (long)status); } When I use this code in a simple demo app, it finds my Yubikey identities without problem. When I use it in my authorization plugin, it doesn’t find anything in system.login.console right and finds Yubikey in authenticate right only if I register my plugin as non-,privileged. I tried modifying the query in various ways, in particular by using SecKeychainCopyDomainSearchList with the domain kSecPreferencesDomainDynamic and adding it to the query as kSecMatchSearchList and trying other SecKeychain* methods, but ended up with nothing. I concluded that the identities from a smart card are being added to the data protection keychain rather than to a file based keychain and since I’m working in a privileged context, I won’t be able to get them. If this is indeed the case, could you please advise how to proceed? Thanks in advance.

"I am attempting to read and write data to an Office Group Container, and I am consistently prompted with the "App would like to access data from other apps" alert. How can I configure the application or environment to suppress this repeated permission prompt?"

In our mobile we are using UUID as a device identifier . With this ID we using certain function like Primary device and secondary devices .
Primary device has more control to the app other than secondary device .
In our case user is getting new iPhone and the apps related data are moved to new device from old device from clone option.

While moving the keychain data is also moved , which is causing the new device also has same UUID and the customer are using both the devices in some cases ,

So both devices are considered as primary in our app .
Is there any way to identify the device is cloned ,

Needed suggestion

Has anyone here encountered this? It's driving me crazy. It appears on launch. App Sandbox is enabled. The proper entitlement is selected (com.apple.security.files.user-selected.read-write) I believe this is causing an issue with app functionality for users on different machines. There is zero documentation across the internet on this problem. I am on macOS 26 beta. This error appears in both Xcode and Xcode-beta. Please help! Thank you, Logan

I am new to swift development, and it's possible that I'm missing something fundamental/obvious. If so, I apologize in advance. My team is developing an application for iPadOS using SwiftUI, and I'm trying to accomplish something similar to what the original inquirer is asking for in this thread: https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/725152. The only difference is that I'm trying to use a PIV smart card to achieve authentication to a server rather than digitally sign a document. Unfortunately, I'm getting stuck when attempting to run the list() function provided in the accepted answer to the post mentioned above. When attempting to call SecItemCopyMatching(), I'm getting a -34018 missing entitlement error. I've attempted to add the com.apple.token to my app's keychain-access-groups entitlements, but this does not resolve the issue. I have checked the entitlements in my built app, per the recommendation in the troubleshooting guide here: https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/114456. The entitlement for com.apple.token is indeed present in the plist. Based on other documentation I've read, however, it seems that the explicit declaration of com.apple.token should not even be required in the entitlements. Is there something obvious that I'm missing here that would prevent my app from accessing the token access group?

I am using the CryptoKit SecureEnclave enum to generate Secure Enclave keys. I've got a couple of questions: What is the lifetime of these keys? When I don't store them somewhere, how does the Secure Enclave know they are gone? Do backups impact these keys? I.e. can I lose access to the key when I restore a backup? Do these keys count to the total storage capacity of the Secure Enclave? If I recall correctly, the Secure Enclave has a limited storage capacity. Do the SecureEnclave key instances count towards this storage capacity? What is the dataRepresentation and how can I use this? I'd like to store the Secure Enclave (preferably not in the Keychain due to its limitations). Is it "okay" to store this elsewhere, for instance in a file or in the UserDefaults? Can the dataRepresentation be used in other apps? If I had the capability of extracting the dataRepresentation as an attacker, could I then rebuild that key in my malicious app, as the key can be rebuilt with the Secure Enclave on the same device, or are there measures in place to prevent this (sandbox, bundle id, etc.)

In some crashlog files, there are additional pieces of information related to codesigning. I can understand what most of themcorresponds to (ID, TeamID, Flags, Validation Category). But there is one I have some doubt about: Trust Level. As far as I can tell (or at least what Google and other search engines say), this is an unsigned 32 bit integer that defines the trust level with -1 being untrusted, 0, being basically an Apple executable and other potential bigger values corresponding to App Store binaries, Developer ID signature, etc. Yet, I'm not able to find a corresponding detailed documentation about this on Apple's developer website. I also had a look at the LightweightCodeRequirements "include" file and there does not seem to be such a field available. [Q] Is there any official documentation listing the different values for this trust level value and providing a clear description of what it corresponds to?

I am developing a macOS application (targeting macOS 13 and later) that is non-sandboxed and needs to install and trust a root certificate by adding it to the System keychain programmatically. I’m fine with prompting the user for admin privileges or password, if needed. So far, I have attempted to execute the following command programmatically from both: A user-level process A root-level process sudo security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/cert.pem While the certificate does get installed, it does not appear as trusted in the Keychain Access app. One more point: The app is not distributed via MDM. App will be distributed out side the app store. Questions: What is the correct way to programmatically install and trust a root certificate in the System keychain? Does this require additional entitlements, signing, or profile configurations? Is it possible outside of MDM management? Any guidance or working samples would be greatly appreciated.

Using the simplified sign-in with tvOS and a third party password manager, I receive a complete ASPasswordCredential, and I can easily log into my app. When I do the same thing but with Apple's password manager as the source, I receive an ASPasswordCredential that includes the email address, but the password is an empty string. I have tried deleting the credentials from Apple Passwords and regenerating them with a new login to the app's website. I have tried restarting my iPhone. Is this the expected behavior? How should I be getting a password from Apple's Password app with an ASAuthorizationPasswordRequest?

Estou compartilhando algumas observações técnicas sobre Crash Detection / Emergency SOS no ecossistema Apple, com base em eventos amplamente observados em 2022 e 2024, quando houve chamadas automáticas em massa para serviços de emergência. A ideia aqui não é discutir UX superficial ou “edge cases isolados”, mas sim comportamento sistêmico em escala, algo que acredito ser relevante para qualquer time que trabalhe com sistemas críticos orientados a eventos físicos. Contexto resumido A partir do iPhone 14, a Detecção de Acidente passou a correlacionar múltiplos sensores (acelerômetros de alta faixa, giroscópio, GPS, microfones) para inferir eventos de impacto severo e acionar automaticamente chamadas de emergência. Em 2022, isso resultou em um volume significativo de falsos positivos, especialmente em atividades com alta aceleração (esqui, snowboard, parques de diversão). Em 2024, apesar de ajustes, houve recorrência localizada do mesmo padrão. Ponto técnico central O problema não parece ser hardware, nem um “bug pontual”, mas sim o estado intermediário de decisão: Aceleração ≠ acidente Ruído ≠ impacto real Movimento extremo ≠ incapacidade humana Quando o classificador entra em estado ambíguo, o sistema depende de uma janela curta de confirmação humana (toque/voz). Em ambientes ruidosos, com o usuário em movimento ou fisicamente ativo, essa confirmação frequentemente falha. O sistema então assume incapacidade e executa a ação fail-safe: chamada automática. Do ponto de vista de engenharia de segurança, isso é compreensível. Do ponto de vista de escala, é explosivo. Papel da Siri A Siri não “decide” o acidente, mas é um elo sensível na cadeia humano–máquina. Falhas de compreensão por ruído, idioma, respiração ofegante ou ausência de resposta acabam sendo interpretadas como sinal de emergência real. Isso é funcionalmente equivalente ao que vemos em sistemas automotivos como o eCall europeu, quando a confirmação humana é inexistente ou degradada. O dilema estrutural Há um trade-off claro e inevitável: Reduzir falsos negativos (não perder um acidente real) Aumentar falsos positivos (chamadas indevidas) Para o usuário individual, errar “para mais” faz sentido. Para serviços públicos de emergência, milhões de dispositivos errando “para mais” criam ruído operacional real. Por que isso importa para developers A Apple hoje opera, na prática, um dos maiores sistemas privados de segurança pessoal automatizada do mundo, interagindo diretamente com infraestrutura pública crítica. Isso coloca Crash Detection / SOS na mesma categoria de sistemas safety-critical, onde: UX é parte da segurança Algoritmos precisam ser auditáveis “Human-in-the-loop” não pode ser apenas nominal Reflexões abertas Alguns pontos que, como developer, acho que merecem discussão: Janelas de confirmação humana adaptativas ao contexto (atividade física, ruído). Cancelamento visual mais agressivo em cenários de alto movimento. Perfis de sensibilidade por tipo de atividade, claramente comunicados. Critérios adicionais antes da chamada automática quando o risco de falso positivo é estatisticamente alto. Não é um problema simples, nem exclusivo da Apple. É um problema de software crítico em contato direto com o mundo físico, operando em escala planetária. Justamente por isso, acho que vale uma discussão técnica aberta, sem ruído emocional. Curioso para ouvir perspectivas de quem trabalha com sistemas similares (automotivo, wearables, safety-critical, ML embarcado). — Rafa

Hi all, I’m building a macOS-native C++ trading bot, compiled via Xcode. It sends REST API requests to a crypto exchange (Bitvavo) that require HMAC-SHA256 signatures using a pre-sign string (timestamp + method + path + body) and an API secret. Here’s the issue: • The exact same pre-sign string and API secret produce valid responses when signed using Python (hmac.new(secret, msg, hashlib.sha256)), • But when I generate the HMAC signature using C++ (HMAC(EVP_sha256, ...) via OpenSSL), the exchange returns an invalid signature error. Environment: • Xcode 15.3 / macOS 14.x • OpenSSL installed via Homebrew • HMAC test vectors match Python’s output for basic strings (so HMAC lib seems correct) Yet when using the real API keys and dynamic timestamped messages, something differs enough to break verification — possibly due to UTF-8 encoding, memory alignment, or newline handling differences in the Xcode C++ runtime? Has anyone experienced subtle differences between Python and C++ HMAC-SHA256 behavior when compiled in Xcode? I’ve published a GitHub repo for reproducibility: 🔗 https://github.com/vanBaardewijk/bitvavo-cpp-signature-test Thanks in advance for any suggestions or insights. Sascha

Hi Apple Developers, I'm having a problem with evaluatedPolicyDomainState: on the same device, its value keeps changing and then switching back to the original. My current iOS version is 26.1. I upgraded my iOS from version 18.6.2 to 26.1. What could be the potential reasons for this issue? { NSError *error; BOOL success = YES; char *eds = nil; int edslen = 0; LAContext *context = [[LAContext alloc] init]; // test if we can evaluate the policy, this test will tell us if Touch ID is available and enrolled // success = [context canEvaluatePolicy: LAPolicyDeviceOwnerAuthenticationWithBiometrics error:&error]; if (SystemVersion > 9.3) { // test if we can evaluate the policy, this test will tell us if Touch ID is available and enrolled success = [context canEvaluatePolicy: LAPolicyDeviceOwnerAuthentication error:&error]; } else{ // test if we can evaluate the policy, this test will tell us if Touch ID is available and enrolled success = [context canEvaluatePolicy: LAPolicyDeviceOwnerAuthenticationWithBiometrics error:&error]; } if (success) { if (@available(iOS 18.0, *)) { NSData *stateHash = nil; if ([context respondsToSelector:@selector(domainState)]) { stateHash = [[context performSelector:@selector(domainState)] performSelector:@selector(stateHash)]; }else{ stateHash = [context evaluatedPolicyDomainState]; } eds = (char *)stateHash.bytes; edslen = (int)stateHash.length; } else { eds = (char *)[[context evaluatedPolicyDomainState] bytes]; edslen = (int)[[context evaluatedPolicyDomainState] length]; } CC_SHA256(eds, edslen, uviOut); *poutlen = CC_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; } else { *poutlen = 32; gm_memset(uviOut, 0x01, 32); } }

Hi everyone, I’m working an Objective-C lib that performs Keychain operations, such as generating cryptographic keys and signing data. The lib will be used by my team in a Java program for macOS via JNI. When working with the traditional file-based Keychain (i.e., without access control flags), everything works smoothly, no issues at all. However, as soon as I try to generate a key using access control flags SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags, the Data Protection Keychain returns error -34018 (errSecMissingEntitlement) during SecKeyCreateRandomKey. This behavior is expected. To address this, I attempted to codesign my native dynamic library (.dylib) with an entitlement plist specifying various combinations of: keychain-access-groups com.apple.security.keychain etc. with: My Apple Development certificate Developer ID Application certificate Apple Distribution certificate None of these combinations made a difference, the error persists. I’d love to clarify: Is it supported to access Data Protection Keychain / Secure Enclave Keys in this type of use case? If so, what exact entitlements does macOS expect when calling SecKeyCreateRandomKey from a native library? I’d really appreciate any guidance or clarification. Thanks in advance! Best regards, Neil

Hi... It would be nice if Apple / XCode would be so gracious to explore the possibility of providing the ability to include: Code scrambling / renaming Control-flow obfuscation String encryption Anti-debugging Anti-hooking Jailbreak detection App integrity checks Runtime tamper detection That way, we could eliminate the need to settle for third-party software. Who do we have to bribe to submit such a request and entertain such an idea?

Hello! I do know apple does not support electron, but I do not think this is an electron related issue, rather something I am doing wrong. I'd be curious to find out why the keychain login is happenning after my app has been signed with the bundleid, entitlements, and provision profile. Before using the provision profile I did not have this issue, but it is needed for assessments feature. I'm trying to ship an Electron / macOS desktop app that must run inside Automatic Assessment Configuration. The build signs and notarizes successfully, and assessment mode itself starts on Apple-arm64 machines, but every single launch shows the system dialog that asks to allow access to the "login" keychain. The dialog appears on totally fresh user accounts, so it's not tied to anything I store there. It has happened ever since I have added the provision profile to the electron builder to finally test assessment out. entitlements.inherit.plist keys <key>com.apple.security.cs.allow-jit</key> <true/> <key>com.apple.security.cs.allow-unsigned-executable-memory</key> <true/> entitlements.plist keys: <key>com.apple.security.cs.allow-jit</key> <true/> <key>com.apple.security.cs.allow-unsigned-executable-memory</key> <true/> <key>com.apple.developer.automatic-assessment-configuration</key> <true/> I'm honestly not sure whether the keychain is expected, but I have tried a lot of entitlement combinations to get rid of It. Electron builder is doing the signing, and we manually use the notary tool to notarize but probably irrelevant. mac: { notarize: false, target: 'dir', entitlements: 'buildResources/entitlements.mac.plist', provisioningProfile: 'buildResources/xyu.provisionprofile', entitlementsInherit: 'buildResources/entitlements.mac.inherit.plist', Any lead is welcome!

Hi Team, How can we fetch the macOS password requirement(for setting a new password) that are inforce during login for users? Is there a way to get this info in swift programming?

Hi everyone, I’d like to clarify something regarding the behavior of Team IDs after an app transfer between Apple Developer accounts. I have an app update that enforces a force update for all users. My plan is to release this update under the current developer account, and then proceed with transferring the app to a different developer account shortly afterward. My concern is: once the transfer is complete, will users who download the same app version (released before the transfer) be logged out due to a change in Team ID? Specifically, does the transferred app continue to use the original Team ID (used to sign the last submitted build), or does the Team ID change immediately upon transfer — affecting Keychain access? Any insights or confirmation on this would be greatly appreciated. Thanks!