Hello Apple Technical Support, We need a documented feasibility clarification before implementing a native macOS app running in the logged-in user's context. The app needs to generate and persist a software RSA 3072-bit private key in the Data Protection Keychain (DPK), for RS256 (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with SHA-256). The required properties are effective private-key non-exportability and signing-only use, enforced beyond our app's choice not to call export or other cryptographic operations. We also need a supported way to verify these properties without attempting any private-key export. We distinguish these requirements from access-group authorization, kSecAttrSynchronizable=false, ThisDeviceOnly accessibility, and hardware-bound keys. We recognize that access groups are a different boundary from exact CDHash/build exclusivity; we do not claim that exclusivity is satisfied. Group membership alone does not establish the requested key properties, including for another process legitimately entitled to the same group. Environment: recorded static header provenance is MacOSX27.0.sdk (Command Line Tools), not a successful build or runtime validation. Target macOS version and build: Apple M4, 16GB in memory, macOS Tahoe version 26.6.2. No DPK implementation or experiment is being submitted as evidence. Please clarify these four points: Is there an officially supported API/attribute combination to generate and persist this software RSA3072 key in DPK with enforceable non-exportability and signing-only use (no decrypt, unwrap or derive)? If yes, please identify the exact APIs, attribute placement and values, applicable macOS/SDK versions, and enforcement limits. Please distinguish actual key restrictions from requested attributes or app-side policy. How does that combination, if supported, relate to the generic macOS kSecKeyExtractable=false exception documented for SecKeyCopyExternalRepresentation [1], versus the Apple DTS explanation that raw bytes of standard DPK keys can be obtained through that API [2]? Does the exception apply to software RSA keys generated in DPK, or only to other key implementations? Please distinguish kSecKeyExtractable from kSecAttrIsExtractable where relevant. Which supported attributes, query APIs or other evidence establish effective non-exportability and signing-only restrictions without attempting export? Please specify whether SecKeyCopyAttributes or an item query guarantees the required fields for this key/store combination, and how absent or unsupported fields must be interpreted. We will not treat a missing field as false or infer enforcement from creation inputs. If this combination is not supported for software RSA in DPK, please confirm that limitation explicitly and distinguish it from hardware-bound keys. We are not asking to substitute Secure Enclave/EC or another algorithm, and do not assume hardware guarantees apply to software RSA. References: [1] SecKeyCopyExternalRepresentation https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/seckeycopyexternalrepresentation(::) [2] Apple DTS reply (June 2023), Developer Forums thread 731001 https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/731001 [3] TN3137: On Mac keychain APIs and implementations https://developer.apple.com/documentation/technotes/tn3137-on-mac-keychains [4] Protecting keys with the Secure Enclave https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/protecting-keys-with-the-secure-enclave An applicable technical answer with references and limits, or an explicit statement that this combination is unsupported, would resolve the feasibility question. If support or a non-exporting verification method cannot be established, we will keep support NOT_ESTABLISHED and implementation blocked. A successful signature or access-group isolation alone would not close it. Thank you. fapontec

Background: We are loading a web login page inside ASWebAuthenticationSession. For login page, username and password have autofill password options enabled. On click of the username textfield when we tap the system "Passwords" suggestion in the QuickType bar above the keyboard causes the app to become completely unresponsive. No crash occurs and nothing is logged to the console. The only option to get back to the app is we must force-quit to recover. This issue is observed only on OS 26.6.1 and 26.7.1 other variant of the OS-26.x seems to be working fine. We have tested the gmail app having the ASWebAuthenticationSession for login scenario, the similar issue is observed in that too. Does anyone else also have faced similar issue ? Any help/pointers much appreciated.

While working with Local Authentication framework, specifically LAContext class I found myself with few contradictions to documentation, and although I believe that those differences are rather positive than negative, either documentation is lacking behind or those APIs are not working as intended - which I believe is combination of both. 1. Local Authentication 1.1 Biometry type, and associated with it hash With introduction of LADomainState one can extract underlying biometry type along it's (current) state hash this way: @available(iOS 18, macOS 15, *) func postIOS18() { let context = LAContext() let biometryType = context.domainState.biometry.biometryType // (1) let biometryStateHash = context.domainState.biometry.stateHash // (2) } prior to receiving above APIs, we would retrieve such information something along those lines: func preIOS18() { let context = LAContext() let policy: LAPolicy // ... var error: NSError? _ = context.canEvaluatePolicy(policy, error: error) // (3) // ... (Handle error - if present) let biometryType = context.biometryType // (4) let biometryStateHash = context.evaluatedPolicyDomainState // (5) } However, moving let biometryType = context.biometryType (4) before call to canEvaluatePolicy (3) still yields correct biometry type. This is in contradiction to article from Local Authentication documentation page Optionally, Adjust Your User Interface to Accommodate Face ID. Furthermore, biometryType documentation does not mentions such requirement. Another difference is that call to canEvaluatePolicy (3) might return an error, eg. LAError(.biometryLockout) (if implemented correctly) preventing as from returning biometryStateHash (5) with nil value. This is not the case for new API, where the same call (2) will yield nil as a result - LADomainStateBiometry documentation does not mention it. In summary, here are some questions: Which API should be used to retrieve biometry type?, and why the "older way" has not been deprecated? Is is safe to assume that calls to biometryType and stateHash from LADomainStateBiometry will produce meaningful results without prior call to canEvaluatePolicy? Should I assume that call to biometryType found on LAContext instance will always return biometryType without prior call to canEvaluatePolicy?, or perhaps those are only side effects of changes made to accommodate LADomainState, and prior to them (pre-iOS 18) we must call canEvaluatePolicy to get meaningful value. Are the stateHash properties found on LADomainState, LADomainStateBiometry and LADomainStateCompanion will return nil upon encountering any error under the hood? (which would be equivalent of below code, prior to iOS 18) func biometryStateHash() -> Data? { let context = LAContext() if #available(iOS 18, macOS 15, *) { _ = context.canEvaluatePolicy(policy, error: nil) return context.evaluatedPolicyDomainState } else { return context.domainState.biometry.stateHash } } 1.2 Deprecation of evaluatedDomainState There is a forum post LAContext.evaluatedPolicyDomainState change between major OS versions mentioning missing documentation (fixed), however there's still information missing of how they correlate to each other. From my findings, the deprecated evaluatedDomainState property value matches those of LADomainState stateHash (when no companion device is present), and LADomainStateBiometry stateHash (all the time). Are those assumptions correct? 1.3 LAContext (authenticated) session lifespan Theres is little information about it state when authenticated by the user. Documentation on LAContext does not mention this behavior, while there are hints that once authenticated, and context is reused, any farther calls will not prompt user with UI. The problem is that this behavior is little, to no documented. Here are few examples I have found: Logging a User into Your App with Face ID or Touch ID (code sample) contains comment // Get a fresh context for each login. If you use the same context on multiple attempts //  (by commenting out the next line), then a previously successful authentication //  causes the next policy evaluation to succeed without testing biometry again. //  That's usually not what you want. Recent forum post, where such approach is mentioned by Quinn 'The Eskimo!' "At the API level, one option you have is to create an LAContext and pass it in to each SecItemCopyMatching call via kSecUseAuthenticationContext." WWDC22 Streamline local authorization flows session "By binding the LAContext to our private key reference, we ensure that executing the signature operation will not trigger another authentication, while allowing the operation to continue without unnecessary prompts. These binding also means that no additional user interactions will be required for future signatures until the LAContext is invalidated." Furthermore this is complicated by the touchIDAuthenticationAllowableReuseDuration property from LAContext instance which states that "The default value is 0, meaning that no previous biometric unlock can be reused." which is in direct contradiction to what I have experienced while working with LAContext and sources mentioned above. While digging on this, whether this behavior is intended or not, I came across a post (I would love to share it, but the domain is not permitted) that shared the same findings (and concerns) regarding LAContext behavior as me. The author also provided a FB9984036 feedback number - although no further update was made on that topic. So my questions are: Is it safe to reuse LAContext (authenticated) instance? How long such instance is considered authenticated?, is it a time duration or perhaps it stays in authenticated state until explicitly invalidated using invalidate method. (its invalidated for sure when app is terminated, but this was to be expected :)) How does,touchIDAuthenticationAllowableReuseDuration work, and how does it correlate to "reusability" of the authenticated LAContext instance? In what scenarios, touchIDAuthenticationAllowableReuseDuration should be used and what is its expected behavior? (I have tried it both on iOS and macOS; from my perspective API this does not "work")

I'm implementing Apple's App Attest service in a Swift iOS app using DCAppAttestService, with a TypeScript backend hosted on Cloudflare Workers. Key generation and attestation registration both work correctly. The server successfully validates Apple's certificate chain, confirms that the public key matches the key ID, and stores the P-256 public key. However, when the app calls generateAssertion, the server consistently fails to verify the returned signature. Here's what I've checked so far: The app passes SHA256(clientData) to generateAssertion, as Apple's documentation requires. The server constructs the verification message using authenticatorData || SHA256(clientData). I've confirmed that the client and server use matching hashes, assertion data, authenticator data, and verification messages. The stored public key matches the App Attest key ID. The returned signature has a valid DER structure. Signature verification fails using both Web Crypto (with DER-to-P1363 conversion) and a separate Node.js verification method. Both verification methods work correctly with independently generated test signatures. Challenge validation, RP ID checks, environment checks, and extension validation all pass. One thing that stands out: The assertion's authenticator data contains the flags 0xC0 (AT + ED). An extension data map appears immediately after the standard 37-byte header, without the credential data that would normally be expected when the AT flag is set. Apple mentioned new App Attest assertion extensions in WWDC26, but I haven't found documentation explaining whether this specific format is expected on iOS 27. My server includes the entire original authenticator data, including the flags and extensions, when verifying the signature. Nothing is removed or modified. I have three questions: Is 0xC0 a valid flag combination for App Attest assertions on iOS 27 when extension data follows the 37-byte header without a separate credential data section? Does the standard signature verification formula, SHA256(authenticatorData || SHA256(clientData)), still apply when these new extensions are present? Are there any known issues or changes in iOS 27 that could cause generateAssertion to succeed while the server cannot verify its signature using the public key obtained during registration? I'm testing on a physical iPhone using a Debug development build, not the simulator. I've also kept the original App Attest key and registration unchanged throughout testing. At this point, the client and server appear to agree on all the data used for verification, but the signature still fails. I'm trying to determine whether I'm missing something about the new assertion format or whether there is another part of the verification process I should investigate. Any guidance would be appreciated.

Hello, I am developing an application that integrates with Apple Music to provide a personalized music video experience for Apple Music subscribers. We are working on support for many devices like Android TV / Google TV / WebOS / etc. and would like to implement an authorization experience suitable for a television, where entering account credentials with a remote control is cumbersome. Intended authorization flow We would like to implement the following experience: The application on the TV displays a QR code or short activation code. The user scans the QR code with their phone and opens an Apple-hosted authentication and authorization page. The user signs in to their Apple Account if necessary and approves Apple Music access for the application on the TV. The TV application receives or retrieves the resulting authorization and can use it for the supported Apple Music functionality. The objective is for the TV application itself to be authorized following approval on the phone, with no need to enter the Apple Account credentials on the television. Relevant implementation evidence found on Apple’s website While researching this integration, we examined JavaScript publicly served by link.apple.com. In the following OAuth view bundle, we observed these identifiers: PartnerAuthorizationRequest isOffDeviceOAuth2Flow DEVICE_CODE Source: Apple-hosted OAuth view bundle — oauth-views-OAuth-vue.4db9105e.js In the associated OAuth initializer bundle, we observed properties including: client_id scope response_type Source: Apple-hosted OAuth initializer bundle — oauth-views-OAuthInitializer-vue.23605d03.js These elements suggest that Apple’s authorization interface includes an off-device authorization path associated with partner clients. We understand that these implementation details are not public API documentation and do not establish whether this flow is available to third-party developers. We are looking for the officially supported integration and enrollment process, if one is available. Clarification requested 1. Availability for third-party TV applications Does Apple offer a supported Apple Music authorization flow of this kind for third-party applications running on non-Apple devices? If the observed flow is limited to certain integrations or partners, what are the eligibility requirements for obtaining access? 2. Client registration and account configuration What is the official process for registering or obtaining a client_id authorized to use this flow? We have reviewed the standard MusicKit configuration involving Media IDs, Media Services keys, App Services and Capability Requests, but have not identified the configuration or application process for off-device authorization. Could you clarify whether this requires: A standard MusicKit Media ID and Media Services key; An additional service configuration or managed capability request in the Apple Developer account; A separate OAuth client registration; Or approval through an Apple Music partner program? 3. Supported integration documentation If this integration is available, where can we obtain the documentation or SDK covering: The required client configuration, request parameters and permitted scopes; Creation of the authorization request and the QR code or activation link; The mechanism by which the TV checks for completion or receives the result; The resulting token type, its intended use, and its expiration or reauthorization requirements? In particular, we would appreciate clarification on whether the resulting authorization provides a Music User Token usable by the TV application, or another token that requires a documented exchange. 4. Apple Music access on the authorized TV Which Apple Music APIs or SDKs can consume the resulting authorization? We would like to confirm its supported use with Apple Music API and MusicKit for Android, including any separate requirements for playback on the TV. Our intended design is for authorization to be issued for the TV application, rather than transferring a Music User Token issued for the phone. If this access is handled outside the standard MusicKit developer workflow, could you please identify the applicable program and enrollment process, or who to route this request to the Apple Music team responsible for partner authorization and connected-device integrations? Thank you for helping us identify the supported path for this integration. Louis

We maintain an SFAuthorizationPluginView-based authorization plugin (mechanisms registered in system.login.console) on macOS 26 (Darwin 25.x) and are seeing a cosmetic but user-visible issue at the login window that we believe originates in the host, not our code. We'd like to confirm whether it's expected behavior or a bug worth filing via Feedback. Setup Two local users, A and B. Our plugin adds a custom mechanism to the login chain, so after credential submission the host may present additional UI (our mechanism's view). Each authorization round runs in a fresh SecurityAgentHelper process (verified via PID in logs), so no state of ours survives between rounds. Reproduction Log out of user A at the login window. Select user B and type their password. Submit. Our mechanism (invoked after submission, e.g. an enrollment prompt for a not-yet-enrolled user) presents its UI. Observed For roughly 1.1–1.4 s between our mechanism's window appearing and covering the host's, the login window shows user A's name/avatar tile — the previously selected user — before our panel covers it. Instrumentation confirms: Our process logs willActivate(withUser:) delivering user A (the previous round's user) while the authorization context (GetContextValue on kAuthorizationEnvironmentUsername) correctly contains user B. The stale tile renders inside what appears to be the host's own window (class LUI2Window, created ~300 ms before our surface activates). Our code makes no writes to the engine context at that point (we log every SetContextValue; zero writes occurred during the flip window). The flip only happens when our mechanism round starts after credential submission. If the mechanism round starts before user selection (the normal login path), each user click produces a fresh willActivate with the correct name and no flip is visible. Question Why does the login window display the previous round's user (user A) after I've selected and submitted credentials for user B? The willActivate(withUser:) callback our mechanism receives still carries user A at that moment, while the authorization context already contains user B — the two disagree. Is the host intentionally re-showing the last logged-in user's tile when a mechanism presents UI after credential submission, and can a mechanism do anything to prevent it?

Hello, I’m working on a security agent plugin for Mac. The plugin provides a mechanism with custom UI via SFAuthorizationPluginView and a privileged mechanism with the business logic. The plugin needs to support unlocking the device, so I changed the authorize right to invoke my agent: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd"> <plist version="1.0"> <dict> <key>class</key> <string>evaluate-mechanisms</string> <key>created</key> <real>731355374.33196402</real> <key>mechanisms</key> <array> <string>FooBar:loginUI</string> <string>builtin:reset-password,privileged</string> <string>FooBar:authenticate,privileged</string> <string>builtin:authenticate,privileged</string> </array> <key>modified</key> <real>795624943.31730103</real> <key>shared</key> <true/> <key>tries</key> <integer>10000</integer> <key>version</key> <integer>1</integer> </dict> </plist> I also changed the system.login.screensaver right to use authorize-session-owner: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd"> <plist version="1.0"> <dict> <key>class</key> <string>rule</string> <key>comment</key> <string>The owner or any administrator can unlock the screensaver, set rule to "authenticate-session-owner-or-admin" to enable SecurityAgent.</string> <key>created</key> <real>731355374.33196402</real> <key>modified</key> <real>795624943.32567298</real> <key>rule</key> <array> <string>authenticate-session-owner</string> </array> <key>version</key> <integer>1</integer> </dict> </plist> I also set screenUnlockMode to 2, as was suggested in this thread: macOS Sonoma Lock Screen with SFAutorizationPluginView is not hiding the macOS desktop. In the Display Authorization plugin at screensaver unlock thread, Quinn said that authorization plugins are not able to use Touch ID. However, on a MacBook with at touch bar, when I lock the screen, close the lid, and then open it, the touch bar invites me to unlock with Touch ID. If I choose to do so, the screen unlocks and I can interact with the computer, but the plugin UI stays on screen and never goes away, and after about 30 seconds the screen locks back. I can reliably reproduce it on a MacBook Pro with M1 chip running Tahoe 26.1. Is this a known macOS bug? What can I do about it? Ideally, I would like to be able to integrate Touch ID into my plugin, but since that seems to be impossible, the next best thing would be to reliably turn it off completely. Thanks in advance.

I am validating a local backup and recovery workflow using artificial files only. I would like guidance on supported quarantine handling, not a way to bypass Gatekeeper. The recorded tests used: Native ditto with --rsrc --extattr --acl --qtn. Native pax-tar creation and restore with --mac-metadata and --fflags. Important limitation: the quarantine markers were seeded manually in the test fixtures. These were not files quarantined through a real browser download, so I have not established that the fixtures represent normal download provenance. Unmarked controls matched their source. In marked copy/restore cases, payload hashes and other checked metadata matched, but com.apple.quarantine differed. One earlier copy recorded a flag-prefix change from 0081 to 0281; other marker fields also changed. Original marker bytes can be retained exactly as archive data, but that does not explain the security effect of the native-restored value. I have not stripped or normalized restored markers, changed Gatekeeper settings, or tested execution of the restored files. An earlier project record lists macOS 26.5.1. The current OS build and exact native-tool versions have not been refreshed for this question. Could you clarify: Is manual marker seeding a supported way to test copy/restore behavior, or should this be evaluated using an OS-managed quarantine event instead? Can these native operations intentionally change quarantine state, and which documented interfaces or guidance establish the meaning and security impact? Is preserving the original bytes as archive evidence while leaving native-restored metadata untouched the supported approach? What checks or supported options should a recovery workflow use without rewriting the marker or weakening Gatekeeper? I am not claiming this is a macOS vulnerability or that the changed value is harmless. No business files, private logs or attachments are included.

Hey everyone, I'm hitting an absolute brick wall with Sign in with Apple on an Expo/React Native project distributed via TestFlight. The native API (isAvailableAsync() via expo-apple-authentication) is returning false globally across multiple physical devices, different user Apple IDs, and different network environments. We have completely ruled out a local code crash—the framework initializes, but the local iOS kernel is explicitly returning a hard false on the availability check before even attempting to present the modal sheet. Here is exactly what we have isolated and verified based on DTS documentation: Identifiers & App ID Setup: Team ID: NJ5JQ25956 (Luxor Interactive LLC) iOS Bundle Identifier: com.myoseph.carswipeapp App ID Capabilities: Checked and verified that "Sign in with Apple" is explicitly enabled on the Apple Developer Portal for this explicit bundle ID. Credentials & Provisioning Purge: We suspecting a cached provisioning profile or identifier cross-talk (our Android layout previously used a different package string, though we just unified it to com.myoseph.carswipeapp across the configuration scripts to rule out cryptographic hash collisions). We completely revoked and purged all old Distribution Certificates and App Store Provisioning Profiles from both the build engine cache and the Apple Developer Portal. Regenerated a completely fresh Distribution Certificate (Serial: 7383AE36E5D21E93F3F0B907D3A87DF3) and a brand-new, active Provisioning Profile (ID: L328ZDW2A4). Entitlements Inspection: Inspecting the compiled .ipa container structure shows the explicit com.apple.developer.applesignin entitlement key array is correctly present and injected. Despite having pristine, newly-minted cryptographic certificates tightly bound to a verified App ID, Build 62 on TestFlight still rejects the authentication framework instantly at the OS level. Is there a known propagation lag on Apple's identity database servers for newly updated Team ID capabilities, or is there an internal backend entitlement lock on our corporate Team ID container that isn't reflecting on the developer portal UI? Any insights or a sanity check from DTS would be an absolute lifesaver. Thanks in advance.

This is a pre-implementation question about supported direct Keychain service access, based on documentation and SDK-declaration review. No device/Simulator result, runtime failure, compiled sample or verified signing configuration is being reported. Assumed configurations An embedded, app-specific, non-UI ExtensionFoundation extension, restricted to its containing app's extension point. No unrestricted or third-party extension scope is assumed. A: the extension point requires EnhancedSecurity(true). B: the point definition omits EnhancedSecurity. This is not a claim that B is unsandboxed or equivalent to every configuration explicitly declaring EnhancedSecurity(false). Generic-password items, with valid signed membership in the destination Keychain access group assumed for the question only. If that assumption cannot hold for A or B, please identify the unsupported prerequisite. No real identifiers or profiles are supplied. Version scope The API question concerns iOS 26.0 and later only where the relevant symbols/configurations are supported. In the installed iPhoneOS 27.0 SDK declarations inspected, AppExtensionPoint, EnhancedSecurity and UserInterface have iOS 26.0 availability; some binding conveniences have iOS 26.2 availability. Those are declaration observations, not evidence of Keychain authorization or behavior on any OS release. No runtime comparison or final deployment target is selected. Please specify any finer minimum OS/SDK requirement or version-dependent difference; do not infer older-iOS support from the framework name alone. Question For A and B separately, is each of SecItemCopyMatching, SecItemAdd, SecItemUpdate and SecItemDelete supported directly from the extension process for those items, without forwarding the operation to the containing app? Please distinguish the four operations and, for any supported or conditional case, identify: The public sandbox/service rule and required entitlements, separately from access-group membership. Applicable OS/SDK versions and any device-versus-Simulator or development-versus-distribution limits. Lock state, item accessibility, user-interaction or other prerequisites that change the answer. If a case is unsupported or unspecified, stating that and citing the applicable public documentation would resolve that part of the question. API availability or absence of the EnhancedSecurity requirement alone is not being treated as permission to access the service. This asks for the direct API/service boundary only. Relevant public references https://developer.apple.com/documentation/extensionfoundation/adding-support-for-app-extensions-to-your-app https://developer.apple.com/documentation/extensionfoundation/appextensionpoint/enhancedsecurity https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/sharing-access-to-keychain-items-among-a-collection-of-apps

We develop an authorization plugin that replaces password entry at the login window and at screen unlock with a phone-based sign-in. The user scans a QR code with their phone, or the Mac reaches the phone over Bluetooth. Either way the plugin ends up with the user's password, which it hands to the authorization engine as if it had been typed. All networking runs in a LaunchDaemon that the plugin calls over XPC. Setup system.login.console: loginwindow:login → OurPlugin:login system.login.screensaver: rule use-login-window-ui → authenticate-session-owner-or-admin, with screenUnlockMode set to 2 authenticate: builtin:authenticate → OurPlugin:authenticate The UI is an SFAuthorizationPluginView subclass. On success we set username and password in the context (plus home at login) and call SetResult with kAuthorizationResultAllow. What we see on macOS 27 Since moving to macOS 27 on a MacBook Pro (M3 Pro), we hit these more often: Touch ID unlocks the Mac but leaves our view on screen. Open the lid and unlock with Touch ID. The desktop becomes usable, but our plugin view stays on top, and shortly after the screen locks again. Same symptom as thread 819454, where it was filed as FB22289735. Saved passwords disappear from apps after an unlock through our plugin. They come back only after the user logs out and in again. This looks like FB13128730 (thread 796487). The lock screen stays on the desktop after sign-in. The clock, the user picture and our view, with its filled-in password field, stay on screen while the menu bar and Dock are drawn on top of them. Similar to FB12074874. We also saw this once: the password field in our view would not take keyboard input at the lock screen. Every key press just played the system alert sound, and nothing was typed. Questions Is there any workaround for these on macOS 27? Or a supported way to stop macOS offering Touch ID while our plugin handles unlock? Is an SFAuthorizationPluginView plugin still a supported way to replace the login and unlock UI? If not, what should we move to? Is Platform SSO with the new web-based authentication in macOS 27 (login window, Lock Screen and FileVault unlock) the path you would recommend? If so, is there a supported option for offline sign-in, which we do over Bluetooth today?

I'm testing PRF evaluation with a YubiKey Bio through AuthenticationServices on iOS. Registration succeeds, but during later authentication with the enrolled fingerprint, I don't receive a PRF result. Using the key’s FIDO2 PIN works. Environment iPhone 12 iOS 27.0.1 YubiKey Bio connected through USB Firmware: 5.7.0 Steps to reproduce Configure a FIDO2 PIN and enroll a fingerprint on the YubiKey Bio. Connect the key to the iPhone. Register a credential using ASAuthorizationSecurityKeyPublicKeyCredentialProvider with PRF support requested. Request authentication for the registered credential with PRF input and userVerificationPreference = .required. Authenticate using the enrolled fingerprint. Check the returned PRF result. Compare this with authentication using the FIDO2 PIN. Expected result Successful authentication with PRF evaluation returns a 32-byte PRF output. Actual result No PRF result is returned when using fingerprint verification. The PIN flow works. Related report I found WebKit bug #314934, which reports missing PRF results with a YubiKey C Bio in Safari. The reporter observed successful authentication but a null PRF output. Could AuthenticationServices be affected by a similar issue? Is there a known limitation or workaround for PRF evaluation with YubiKey Bio fingerprint verification?

Sign in with Apple fails with "Sign-Up Not Completed" Team A884B34HZR The authorization sheet renders correctly with our app name and the user's Apple Account. After the user authorizes, it ends with "Sign-Up Not Completed" and no credential is returned to the app: our delegate receives no credential, and our server never receives a request. Bundle ID: com.dinogoal.ios (created in 2026) Feedback: FB24978334. Developer Support case: 102979104342 (closed without a resolution) Already tried, with no change: Removing the Sign In with Apple capability from the App ID, saving, re-adding it as a primary App ID and saving again. Regenerating the provisioning profile and shipping a new signed build. Several Apple Accounts, on Wi-Fi and cellular, on iOS 26 and iPadOS 27. Our submission has been rejected under Guideline 2.1(a) because of this. This looks like the same server-side registration failure reported in threads 789452 and 837986.

We are transferring an iOS app from Team A to Team B and following TN3159 to migrate Sign in with Apple users. Setup on Team A: The app’s bundle ID (com.example.app) is enabled for Sign in with Apple as its own primary App ID, not grouped. Our website uses a Services ID (com.example.web-service) whose primary App ID is a different App ID (com.example.web), not the app. Some users signed in only on the website and never used the app. Using a Sign in with Apple key associated with the app’s App ID and client_id=com.example.app, /auth/usermigrationinfo returns a transfer_sub for every user we tested, web-only users included. Questions: After the transfer, Team B will exchange these transfer_sub values with client_id=com.example.app and its own client secret. Will that work for users who only authorized the web Services ID? Or can it fail (for example invalid_request) because they never authorized the app’s App ID? If it can fail, can we change the Services ID’s primary App ID to the app’s App ID before the transfer, so the Services ID transfers with the app (as TN3159 describes)? Would that affect existing users, for example by changing their identifiers or asking for consent again? For users with a private relay email: since Team A has no other app those users use, does the old relay address stop forwarding after the transfer? Does the exchange return the new relay address for web-only users too? Thanks!

Overview We are investigating repeated "login" Keychain prompts affecting our macOS application on macOS 26.6.x. The issue appears after upgrading an existing installation. A clean uninstall/reinstall of the same version resolves it. Changing the affected Keychain item's Access Control from "Confirm before allowing access" to explicitly allowing our application/process also stops the prompts. On one affected machine, Apple Support observed a securityd crash followed by: SecKeyCreateSignature failed CSSMERR_DL_INVALID_DB_HANDLE Our code uses some legacy SecKeychain* APIs, so we are currently investigating whether this is related. Questions Were there any changes in macOS 26.6.x around securityd, Keychain ACL handling, or legacy SecKeychain* APIs that could explain this? Could an existing Keychain ACL become stale after an application upgrade, even when both versions are signed with the same Developer ID?

I’m looking for technical clarification on how the standalone Apple Passwords app protects credentials on iOS 26 and iOS 27, specifically when a device is locked after its first unlock since boot (AFU). Apple’s Platform Security documentation identifies Safari website passwords as using the When Unlocked Keychain protection class: https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secb0694df1a/web However, it is unclear whether this documentation also describes the implementation of the newer standalone Passwords app. Keychain accessibility classes Does the Passwords app continue to store website and application passwords using kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked or an equivalent, more restrictive class? Do passkeys, TOTP verification-code secrets, and any intermediate keys necessary to decrypt stored credentials receive the same protection? Locked-AFU protection When an iPhone has been unlocked once since boot and subsequently locked again, are the cryptographic keys required to retrieve saved website passwords inaccessible until the user unlocks the device again? Specifically, does the When Unlocked class enforce this restriction cryptographically, or could a process with elevated operating-system privileges retrieve the protected material while the device remains locked? Full-filesystem and Keychain extraction Assuming an authorized forensic examiner obtains a full-filesystem extraction or privileged operating-system execution on a device that remains locked in AFU, but does not know the device passcode: Does filesystem access alone expose usable plaintext credentials stored in Apple Passwords? Are additional cryptographic keys or authentication steps required? What security guarantees remain for When Unlocked Keychain items under these conditions? I’m not requesting information about undisclosed vulnerabilities or specific forensic-tool exploits. I’m interested in the documented behavior and security boundaries of Apple’s Keychain architecture. Independent verification Are there any published technical assessments, research papers, forensic experiments, or Apple security documents that verify the actual accessibility classes used by the Passwords app on iOS 26/27? For context, a 2026 independent security assessment of Proton Pass identified its use of kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly for sensitive Keychain material as a defense-in-depth weakness and recommended kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly. I’m trying to understand whether Apple’s native Passwords app provides a stronger cryptographic boundary against locked-AFU extraction, rather than merely a different user-interface authentication requirement. Any clarification from an Apple engineer or references to authoritative technical documentation would be greatly appreciated.

For macOS 26.7.1 (25G241), Xcode 27.0 (27A266a), and macOS SDK 27.0, we request the supported, exact Info.plist schema for NSDataAccessSecurityPolicy: its value type, literal key names and nesting, item types, and identity-selector grammar. Can the policy allow only the owning process signed with a specific Team ID and signing identifier, without allowing all applications signed by that Team? Are cdhash or designated-requirement selectors supported, and how do process and installer/package identities differ? Please clarify the relationship to user consent and Full Disk Access exceptions, and confirm whether this configuration is supported for the macOS build listed above. Please provide primary documentation or an authoritative schema, rather than a schema inferred from NSUpdateSecurityPolicy.

I’m designing a dedicated local PostgreSQL service account on macOS 26.3.1. No account has been created. Design requirements: no usable human password credential, no ordinary interactive login, shell /usr/bin/false, home /var/empty, no SSH credential, and no admin/wheel membership or Secure Token/FileVault volume-owner role. Any eventual service execution would be separately controlled. These are desired properties, not claims about established macOS behavior. I’m seeking a supported provisioning and verification procedure. Direct disabled creation: What supported Apple API/tool and attribute representation can create a local service account directly in a DisabledUser state? Can this be established during initial creation, without an externally available enabled password-authenticating intermediate state? Credential absence: Can creation occur without ever assigning or storing a usable human password credential or equivalent authentication secret? Please distinguish no password, an empty password, an unknown/generated password, disabled password authentication, and a disabled account. An empty password is unacceptable for this design. DisabledUser scope: What authentication paths does it prevent on macOS 26.3.1—password authentication, GUI/console login, SSH password authentication, and other Open Directory-backed authentication? How does this differ from system-controlled process execution under the UID, including launchd execution using UserName/GroupName? Nonauthenticating verification: What supported read-only attributes, policies, or APIs establish that the account is disabled and lacks a usable password credential, without attempting authentication or exposing hashes/secrets? Does inspecting the disabled marker establish only account state, or also credential absence? Secondary clarification: Is pwpolicy disableuser still recommended for local accounts? Is DisabledTags;SecureToken relevant only to token issuance, and can a controlled daemon run under a disabled UID without enabling human authentication? Source basis APPLE_DOCUMENTED: AuthenticationAuthority documentation identifies DisabledUser as indicating a disabled account. APPLE_DOCUMENTED: ODNode documentation provides record creation with attributes; the reviewed material does not establish the requested creation-time guarantee. LOCAL_MANUAL_DOCUMENTED: The installed pwpolicy(8) describes disableuser; its complete current authentication-path scope remains unresolved. APPLE_DOCUMENTED: Secure/bootstrap-token guidance discusses token issuance separately from account authentication. APPLE_DOCUMENTED, ARCHIVED: Daemon guidance describes selecting service identities through launch configuration. Not yet established: a safe credential-free creation sequence, the state of every intermediate step, the complete disabling scope, and sufficient nonauthenticating verification. A create-then-disable sequence would not meet the requirements unless every intermediate authentication state is characterized.

Our app signs users up through ASWebAuthenticationSession (not ephemeral). The sign-up page is a normal HTML form that posts to our server. When sign-up succeeds, the server redirects to our custom-scheme redirect_uri, which closes the session, as expected. When the user types a password and submits, iOS shows the "Save Password?" modal inside the session. From there, iOS 26 and iOS 27 behave differently: iOS 26.5: iOS waits. The form isn't sent until the user answers the modal. Then the request goes out, the redirect closes the session, and the password has been saved. iOS 27.0 and 27.2 beta 2: iOS doesn't wait. The form is sent right away, the redirect closes the session in under a second, and the modal disappears with it. The user never gets to tap Save. Things we checked: Same server, same page, same device, same app build. Only the iOS version changes the result. prefersEphemeralWebBrowserSession is off. Safari itself never waited on neither versions. The waiting only happened inside ASWebAuthenticationSession. Saving passwords still works on the device otherwise, and every test used a new account and password. Questions: Is the iOS 27 behaviour intended? If so, is there any supported way to let the user answer the sheet before the redirect closes the session? If it's a bug, is it tracked somewhere? The only fix we've found is to show an extra page after sign-up and only redirect from there, which adds a step for every user. We'd rather not ship that if the iOS 26 behaviour is coming back.

I’m investigating App Attest sandbox configuration for a native macOS app. Apple DTS suggested asking here. Environment: Physical MacBook running macOS 27.0.1 (26A434) Xcode 27.0 (27A266a) Native SwiftUI macOS application, launched from Xcode in Debug Development signing with a regenerated Mac development provisioning profile The same App ID is used for the iPad and Mac targets Observed behavior: App Attest is enabled for the App ID in the Developer portal. The Mac entitlements source requests: com.apple.developer.devicecheck.appattest-environment = development We tried both a build-setting substitution and the literal development value, regenerated the profile, and rebuilt. The inspected Mac provisioning profile does not contain this entitlement. Xcode’s generated signing entitlements (.xcent) and the signed application also omit it. DCAppAttestService generates a fresh key and returns an attestation successfully. Our development server observes AAGUID 61707061747465737400000000000000 (production) and rejects it because it requires development evidence. The physical iPad development build produces development evidence and enrolls successfully against the same server. Relevant server diagnostic: client App Attest environment mismatch expected_environment=development observed_aaguid=61707061747465737400000000000000 The failure occurs at the environment gate, before certificate/signature verification. I am not claiming that the entire Mac attestation has already passed cryptographic verification. Questions: Is development/sandbox App Attest supported for native macOS 27 apps? If supported, which entitlement and provisioning configuration is required, and why is the requested environment omitted during signing? If production-mode evidence is expected for development-signed Mac apps, what is the recommended server environment policy? Is this a known issue with macOS 27.0.1 or Xcode 27.0? We would like to keep development attestation separate from production while retaining full cryptographic verification and using the same App ID for both platforms. I can provide sanitized entitlement and signing-output excerpts, together with a minimal reproducer. Which diagnostics would help establish why the development entitlement is missing?